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ABSTRACT
As typified by its recent decisions in Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin and
Shelby County v. Holder, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence concerning race has
long imposed strict judicial oversight over any use of race for the formulation of
public policy. This top-down approach has invited various undesirable outcomes,
the most pernicious of which are the endorsement of silence on the subject of race
and the delegitimizing of most public deliberations about race by non-Court actors.
Consequently, speech within universities and other learning environments regarding
race has become a psychologically challenging risk for both students and faculty, who
justifiably perceive themselves as lacking either the competence or the authorization
to venture into the realm of race. At the same time, the Court has delegated to uni-
versity administrators a role for race in admissions on the condition that they master
locutions marking discourse about race as an expert argot.
This Article proposes an alternative path in which control of race is wrested from
the courts—and their appointed delegates in university administration—through the
creation of small, experimental university communities. Such communities would
select their own membership with a conscious concern for a healthy racial discourse
in higher education. This shift in responsibility for racial discourse and community
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composition to a wider set of actors, including young adults who are inclined toward
openness to diversity, will transform the discussion over race from one requiring the
sanction of judges and administrators to one that is genuinely frank and open.
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INTRODUCTION
The expectation that Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin1 might mark a
watershed in Supreme Court jurisprudence on race admissions to universities rested
on a nose count between two existing judicial camps and not on a hope for new in-
sights about our racial heritage.2 That simple bimodal anticipation highlights the con-
ceptual dead end into which American race jurisprudence has fallen. One rhetorical
strain in the opinions of the Court claims that all use of race, if overt and acknowl-
edged, is toxic, constitutionally forbidden, and socially ineffectual as a path to racial
progress or individual justice.3 The counter-rhetoric contains at least a grain of pa-
ternalistic concern for a minority group that has been, for much of history, variously
deprived of agency, depicted from a white perspective,4 and seen as a subject for
remedial work.5
1 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013).
2 See generally Allen Rostron, Affirmative Action, Justice Kennedy, and the Virtues of
the Middle Ground, 107 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 74 (July 19, 2012), http://colloquy
.law.northwestern.edu/main/2012/07/affirmative-action-justice-kennedy-and-the-virtues-of-the
-middle-ground.html (explaining the potential votes of the Supreme Court Justices deciding
the Fisher case).
3 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 353 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The Consti-
tution abhors classifications based on race, not only because those classifications can harm
favored races or are based on illegitimate motives, but also because every time the govern-
ment places citizens on racial registers and makes race relevant to the provision of burdens
or benefits, it demeans us all.”).
4 For a depiction of the erasure of black agency from a narrative about white history
using black narrators as the interpreter of a contest that renders black people invisible in
the story, see DAVID W. BLIGHT, BEYOND THE BATTLEFIELD: RACE, MEMORY, AND THE
AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 195–96 (2002). See also ERIC FONER, FOREVER FREE: THE STORY OF
EMANCIPATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 28 (2005) [hereinafter FONER, FOREVER FREE]
(referring to “the conspiracy of silence that sought to preserve national unity” before the
Civil War). For an interesting treatment of representations of African Americans in art de-
signed to sell Charleston, South Carolina, as a tourist destination bathed in a soft light of
myth, see STEPHANIE E. YUHL, A GOLDEN HAZE OF MEMORY: THE MAKING OF HISTORIC
CHARLESTON 83 (2005) (describing a Charleston artist’s use of images of African Americans
as “anonymous and quaint props” intended for a picturesque effect, “like a mansion’s balus-
trade or a church’s steeple”).
5 In dissent in a case about federal contracting preferences, Justice Stevens emphasized
a history of “racial subjugation” and the lack of social skills that may handicap minority
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None of the opinions in Fisher pointed to an exit from the exhausted arguments.
Justice Ginsburg depicted the other side’s vision as that of the ostrich, its head firmly
planted in the sand to avoid admitting that race-neutral university admission pro-
grams rely on racial segregation in secondary schools as a proxy for race in university
admissions.6 The other Justices covered their ears and ignored her jibe.7 Perhaps she
and her liberal colleagues have been the barnyard roosters in race jurisprudence, an-
nouncing the dawn of new days just like the last, alerting the country to the continuing
facts about a historic legacy of race. The sunrise comes again, and the same bulletin
alerts us to a new chance to awaken and see the day clearly and do needed chores.
Neither the ostrich nor the barnyard rooster tells us anything new. One calls for
a traditional silence about race, arguing that race is not a basis for official action.8 The
other argues that a majority must make amends for the effects of a great injustice.9
The result is an argument within the Court that conveys little insight for addressing the
legacy of a fraught racial history in a nation aspiring to be post-racial but unable to
form a consensus about the path to racial fairness.
This Article addresses the shortfall in Supreme Court race jurisprudence and
official race discourse. With few exceptions, the jurisprudence of the Court today
frames race as a matter for which public silence is the constitutional norm. In our
phrase, the Court hits the mute button.10 The Court claims exclusive institutional con-
trol over the forms that official action may take, and hence much control over public
discourse and judgment. In reply, a current minority argues for sharing control with
other decisionmakers who would formulate race-conscious programs to achieve racial
harmony and group advancement, primarily for the African-American descendants
of an oppressed American group. A shaky compromise, contained in Grutter11 and
now Fisher,12 allows another set of decisionmakers, such as democratically selected
bodies of legislators or governing boards and education administrators in universities,
to play a limited role, using locutions blessed and monitored by the Court. The three
paths share historic flaws, envisioning race in terms that limit a common partnership
among races, envision the majority race as a source of agency in the interests of the
contractors. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 253, 261 (1995) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
6 Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2433 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S.
244, 303–04 n.10 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)).
7 See id. at 2415–22 (majority opinion).
8 See, e.g., Grutter, 539 U.S. 353.
9 The demonstrative rooster points to portraits of a past that figures black people stranded
in antebellum Charleston, while the ostrich urges us not to look at either the past or the present.
10 Without reviewing the body of jurisprudence attached to a mute button, we note, in
particular that the Court engaged in summary affirmances in the immediate post-Brown era
to avoid open statement of its new race approach, with the purpose of “dialing down” the
potential for conflict.
11 See generally Grutter, 539 U.S. 306.
12 See generally Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013).
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historically minority group, or inhibit the construction of a knowledgeable racial dis-
course. The Grutter/Fisher compromise casts race as a concern within the university
environment into a dark hole of administrative fiat, a fiat that too readily obfuscates and
manipulates campus race dynamics for the appearance of health. The very goal that
diversity purports to advance—in Justice Breyer’s evocative term, fraternity13—may
well be undermined by the role played by administrators who rely on convenient lan-
guage to mask an uneasy mixture of rationales and to avoid the hard work of building
fraternity as the democratic, liberty-enhancing purpose of race-conscious admissions.
The formation of an approved discourse about race in university admissions, de-
vised in a crucible of interaction among ideologically entrenched judicial dogmas14
and strategic university leaders, has implications for the very undertaking of the
university—encouraging wide-ranging, imaginative, and bold thinking and expres-
sion about difficult issues. A linguistically complicated solution, with a specialized
vocabulary shared by the Court and an education hierarchy, may well be damaging
to the capacity of the university as a First Amendment institution to draw upon the
energy of its youngest members and thereby evolve away from a history of constraint
of speech about race, a problematic national habit that need not be a permanent legacy
from past generations.15 The university, an incubator of ideas, social trends, and per-
sonal networks, has at times been the subject of outside pressures to conform to pre-
vailing views on race that are convenient to influential university patrons.16 The
13 Writing about “active liberty,” Justice Breyer provides a helpful typology of the differ-
ing approaches. See STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC
CONSTITUTION 75–84 (2005). In Breyer’s terms, the color-blind view and the benign remedy
view function as competing interpretations of the norm of equality contained in the Fourteenth
Amendment. See id. He argues that diversity in Grutter rests not on the concept of the uni-
versity as a repository of First Amendment aspirations, but on the “ancient” idea of active
liberty, which emphasizes the active participation of all citizens in governing their society.
See id. He encapsulates the idea using the terms “solidarity” and “fraternity.” Id. We add here
the strong link between fraternity and open exchange based on a community bond.
14 Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict
Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 841–43 (2006) [hereinafter Winkler,
Fatal] (reporting and analyzing data showing judicial treatments of race cases to be heavily
associated with the ideology of the judges).
15 RUSSELL B. NYE, FETTERED FREEDOM: CIVIL LIBERTIES AND THE SLAVERY CONTRO-
VERSY, 1830–1860, at 79–81 (1949) (characterizing a “sterile silence” in the South created
by the “refusal of the South to allow freedom of discussion . . . in its institutions of higher
learning” and describing the choice of Northern business interests to reassure the South by
“suppress[ing] in educational institutions any [discussion of slavery] to which the South
might object”).
16 WALTER P. METZGER, ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN THE AGE OF THE UNIVERSITY 8 (1955)
(recounting the suppression in 1833 of an anti-slavery society at Lane Theological Seminary
by trustees made up of “solid businessmen and some clergymen”). Professor Anita Bernstein
suggests that businesses today support diversity out of an embrace of “[p]rerogative[s] for
[m]anagers,” whether the theory of diversity yields profit or not for their companies or useful
outcomes for students. Anita Bernstein, Diversity May Be Justified, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 201,
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jurisprudence of the Court and pressures from business interests are forms of outside
pressures17 that today shape the atmosphere in university environments in which racial
understandings and forms of exchange among students, with one another and with
faculty, are structured.18 The role of the Court is central in doling out speech empower-
ment through permissions, prohibitions, and the example of its own forms of silence.19
With a shared history of racial avoidance and silence about race,20 the university,
and hence the country, do not gain from the Court’s race jurisprudence. The man-
aged silence that Supreme Court race jurisprudence serves to institute21 damages the
214–16 (2012). Bernstein explains that managers like discretion and a free hand without con-
straint by facts; diversity provides that, as fixed “quotas” do not. Id. at 214–18. She notes that
managers in the public domain are equally fond of the prerogative that the diversity rationale
confers. Id. at 215–16.
17 See generally Paul Horwitz, Fisher, Academic Freedom, and Distrust, 59 LOY. L. REV.
489 (2013) (expressing concern about the erosion of universities’ academic freedom as a
result of intervention by outsiders and noting the influence of business interests in fostering
diversity protocols).
18 In a characteristically witty essay, Professor Walter Metzger in 1996 reviewed the peri-
odic denunciations of universities for claimed faculty deficiencies and indicated that faculty
are good targets and poor combatants. Walter P. Metzger, Critics of College Teaching, in THE
NEA 1996 ALMANAC OF HIGHER EDUCATION 35, 46–47 (1996). Though classifying much
of the cyclical critique as ideological in source, often from the right, Professor Metzger noted
concern expressed from the hard-to-classify, anti-elites scholar, Eugene Genovese, at the atmo-
sphere around identities, including race. Id. at 38; cf. generally Eugene Genovese, Heresy,
Yes—Sensitivity, No: An Argument for Counterterrorism in the Academy, NEW REPUBLIC,
Apr. 15, 1991, at 30–35 (describing purges in the 1950s of left-wing professors as resulting
from craven administrators and not from a takeover of universities by the right and suggesting
that “political correctness” in the 1990s presented similar threats of administrative misconduct
under a veil of classically liberal values, with damage to the ability of professors to teach about
race and other identity-related matters and to black students to receive instruction untainted
by posturing).
19 Our claim throughout this Article that the creation of an approved script by the Supreme
Court, and its effectuation by education bureaucrats, chills open discourse by students and fac-
ulty is supported by both common knowledge among those groups and the careful and nuanced
writing of Professor Randall Kennedy. See, e.g., RANDALL KENNEDY, FOR DISCRIMINATION:
RACE, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, AND THE LAW 218 (2013) (“A criticism of academic culture on
many campuses is that it stifles robust debate regarding affirmative action, preferring instead
rote acquiescence.”). We suggest that the Court impoverishes our race discourse, reducing the
occasions for official speech about race and rebuking attempts at open discourse. The Court’s
stance as the policeman of race as a public category blunts the creation of forums for debate,
experimentation, and action.
20 A companion piece develops a theme of a recurring historic silence about race in the
culture and in the official response to race issues throughout American history. See generally
Mae Kuykendall, Pressing the Mute Button: Racial Silence in American Law and Culture
(2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) [hereinafter Kuykendall, Pressing the
Mute Button].
21 In a 1995 article, Adam Winkler identified the problematic focus of the Supreme Court
in affirmative action cases, which focused on conceptions of particular institutions rather
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public’s capacity for engaging in a healthy discourse on race. A constrained atmo-
sphere limiting open exchange about race in the country generally, and in universities
most especially, is a serious obstacle to racial harmony and to a shared dignity of citi-
zenship. This Article proposes an approach to free the university community—faculty
and students—to participate in creating the premises for a racially diverse, exchange-
rich learning community. Insofar as the reform proposal is underdeveloped, the pro-
posal cannot function as a counterfactual revealing of the lost potential in the diver-
sity modus vivendi.
The strands of Supreme Court jurisprudence that permit racial considerations
in composing a learning or collaborative group, fueled by the protections of the First
Amendment for forming dialogic groupings, can be fashioned to permit a degree of
community control over the premises for diversity. Community self-composition al-
locates agency to the racial minority, an agency shared by the majority, and overcomes
the perceived paternalistic implications of benign racial measures. The long-sought
goal of an enriched society, aware of a troubled racial past and committed to a future
of harmony and progress, might begin to be realized if the Court reforms its race
rhetoric to authorize and encourage robust communities self-composed with racial
exchange as a learning purpose.22
The Article proceeds directly to the Court’s opinion in Fisher as a coda to the
Court’s strong embrace of its primary superintendence of race as a formal category
and its continuing inability to engage one another with an enriched race vocabulary
by which to encourage, and permit, collective efforts by communities to address race
using state-supplied resources.
I. BRIEFLY, FISHER V. UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN
In the opinion for the Court, Justice Kennedy relied upon a restatement of affirma-
tive action opinions across contexts,23 using quotations that function as constitutional
than on race justice. See generally Adam Winkler, Sounds of Silence: The Supreme Court
and Affirmative Action, 28 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 923 (1995) [hereinafter Winkler, Sounds of
Silence]. Thematically addressing the “Sounds of Silence” by the Court, Winkler’s work
prefigures the emphasis here on the forms and effects of a historic silence about race in law
and culture and, crucially, in contemporary Supreme Court “speech.” See id. at 923–25; see
also Bernstein, supra note 16, at 210–11 (characterizing each of the Powell rationales for
diversity—heterogeneity, managerial prerogative, and rejection of quotas—as “pointedly
silent about segregation and subordination”).
22 For exploration of the potential for allocating greater authority to local bodies to ex-
periment in ways that enhance constitutional rights norms and free expression, see Heather
K. Gerken, Foreword: Federalism All the Way Down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 4, 9 (2010)
(“Federalism-all-the-way-down can provide a structural means for achieving goals tradi-
tionally associated with rights-protecting amendments like the First and Fourteenth.”).
23 Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2417–19 (2013) (variously address-
ing the university context, city awards of contracts, federal contracting, marriage, interracial
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icons.24 He repeatedly cited the Court as the only final authority on permissible use of
race by university administrators or by any other public actor.25 The touchstones were
Justice Powell’s Bakke protocol26 and Grutter’s limited permission for universities to
predicate admissions on the goal of fostering diversity.27 The Fisher opinion added
emphasis on the necessity that the university demonstrate to a court’s satisfaction that
no reasonable alternative to the use of a “racial classification” was possible once a
plaintiff carried the burden of showing a scheme of racial classification.28 While
giving credit to the university’s judgment that the admissions process is a critical com-
ponent of the pedagogical mission of higher education, the Court assumed that any
race consciousness in admissions is a racial classification.29 The existence of racial
classification led the Court to apply the full range of Court doctrine to the educator’s
choice of implementation strategies to achieve the goal of educational diversity.30 Yet
race consciousness is also a form of expressive enrichment of policy choices.
Justice Ginsburg, in dissent, mocked the bright-line distinction between racial
classifications as “race consciousness” and race-neutral alternatives that achieve race
diversity as innocent of race consciousness.31 Her skepticism is effectively a sub
cohabitation, secondary education, school district layoff policy, and gender-based admissions
to a state nursing school).
24 Id. at 2418–19.
25 Id. at 2417 (“Any racial classification must meet strict scrutiny.”); id. at 2418 (asserting
that race admissions are permitted “only if a clear precondition is met: The particular ad-
missions process used for this objective is subject to judicial review.”); id. at 2419 (“Strict
scrutiny is a searching examination, and it is the government that bears the burden to prove
[legitimate use].”); id. (“A court, of course, should ensure that there is a reasoned, principled
explanation for the academic decision.”); id. at 2419–20 (“Once the University has established
that its goal of diversity is consistent with strict scrutiny, however, there must still be a further
judicial determination that the admissions process meets strict scrutiny in its implementation.
The University must prove that the means chosen by the University to attain diversity are nar-
rowly tailored to that goal. On this point, the University receives no deference.”); id. at 2420
(“[I]t remains at all times the University’s obligation to demonstrate, and the Judiciary’s obli-
gation to determine.”); id. (“Narrow tailoring also requires that the reviewing court verify that
it is ‘necessary’ for a university to use race to achieve the educational benefits of diversity.”);
id. (“The reviewing court must ultimately be satisfied that no workable race-neutral alter-
natives would produce the educational benefits of diversity.”); id. (“[S]trict scrutiny imposes
on the university the ultimate burden of demonstrating, before turning to racial classifications,
that available, workable race-neutral alternatives do not suffice.”); id. at 2421 (“Strict scrutiny
does not permit a court to accept a school’s assertion that its admissions process uses race in
a permissible way without a court giving close analysis to the evidence of how the process
works in practice.”); id. (“The higher education dynamic does not change the narrow tailoring
analysis of strict scrutiny applicable in other contexts.”).
26 Id. at 2417–18; see also Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 269–325 (1978).
27 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 311–44 (2003).
28 Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2419–20.
29 Id. at 2420–21.
30 See generally id.
31 Id. at 2433 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (using “ostrich” jibe).
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silentio theme in the Court’s race jurisprudence; she even relegated part of it to a
footnote, thereby functioning as the irreverent outsider rather than the interlocutor
in reasoned, authoritative discourse.32 The preference noted throughout this Article
for silence about race is well illustrated by the assumptions about what counts as an
overt racial classification and by the lack of engagement by the Court majority with
the contestable meaning of the key term, racial classification.33
Justice Thomas’s concurrence functioned more as a dissent than a concurrence,
with a frontal attack on Grutter as precedent,34 and with bold claims asserting moral
and doctrinal continuity between segregationist rationales for using race as a barrier
to admission to public accommodations and schools and, today, rationales associated
with affirmative action and diversity.35 Strikingly, Thomas referred to the Plessy/
Grutter line of cases,36 a rhetorical move surely designed to infuriate proponents of
diversity in the composition of healthy university environments or classic affirmative
action. Yet this Article in draft already contained an examination of a commonality
in the settings enabled by the Plessy and Grutter cases: that of the segregated railway
car and the “managed” classroom as based on attribution of choice and social prefer-
ence to the occupants.37 In each instance, speech and social health is attributed to silent
groupings, with claims that the attribution serves social need and effectuates prefer-
ences and interests in a positive way for all.38 The insight by Justice Thomas coincides
with a visually narrated railcar setting in early 1900s Alabama and a contemporary
classroom composed for diversity by education elites and interpreted by Grutter’s
32 Id. at 2425 n.2. Horwitz interprets Justice Ginsburg as suggesting, though not directly
stating, that universities will use race no matter what the rules say, so they should be per-
mitted to do it openly and honestly. See Horwitz, supra note 17, at 527–28. For a perspective
supportive of affirmative action programs, see, for example, Katie Eyer, Fisher and the Issue
of Race-Neutrality, CONCURRING OPINIONS (June 24, 2013), http://www.concurringopinions
.com/archives/2013/06/fisher-and-the-issue-of-race-neutrality.html (expressing concern that
Justice Ginsburg’s phrasing will be used to attack race-neutral programs as requiring strict
scrutiny because they are not really race-neutral).
33 Indeed, Justin Driver has identified a lacuna in the Court’s command of a vocabulary
of race, one in which the Court has no discernible normative concept of when to “recognize
race” in opinion writing by identifying, or not, the race of litigants. Justin Driver, Recognizing
Race, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 404, 404 (2012) (arguing that the Court and legal scholars fail to
understand that “opinions can adhere to the anticlassification principle while avoiding the
colorblindness principle—two distinct concepts that legal scholars have incorrectly conflated”
and thus the Court and scholars err both by “asymmetric racial recognition and gratuitous
racial recognition”). This lacuna in the Court’s command over a conscious awareness of the
apt choice of when to “recognize race” is consonant with the theme suggested here of a shortfall
in the critically important role the Court assumes in race constitutionalism. Id.
34 Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2422 (Thomas, J., concurring).
35 Id. at 2425–26.
36 Id. at 2429.
37 See infra Part II.A (discussing the parallels between the railcar and the classroom).
38 See infra Part II.A.
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rationale.39 Though Justice Thomas may overstate the moral equivalence between
segregationist claims used to exclude a minority from full access to civil society and
integrationist aspirations to create a broadly inclusive society, his critique of the exist-
ing framework for inclusion has sufficient purchase on the distance between concep-
tion and reality to merit close attention.
As will be argued, however, his flat rejection of diversity as a compelling interest
is extreme. A university may surely find means to create an environment that supports
an educational mission that includes a discursively rich exchange about race supported
by the composition of the student body.
II. THE SUPREME COURT, RACIAL SILENCE, AND
MAKE-BELIEVE: PAST AND PRESENT
The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on race, restated in Fisher v. University of
Texas at Austin, sharply restricts state use of race to apportion access to desirable
goods. Justices who embrace race-restricting jurisprudence argue there is a critical
need for a judicial shield to guard the nation from degraded race discourse. These
Justices fear the effects on race relations if groups compete for public goods—seen
for universities as seats in the student body—on the basis of group racial identity.
Paradoxically, the Court’s warnings about race, with accompanying restrictions on
its overt use by public bodies as a basis to award benefits, limit the potential for con-
structive racial discourse by disabling community forums as sites for official speech
about race and by signaling disapproval of race as a public concern. The very effort
to preclude toxic discourse empowers subterranean speech and gives toxic speech
a hardiness and durability.40 The most powerful impact of the Court’s work is thus
in framing race as a matter for which public silence is the constitutional norm.41
A. Railway Cars and Classrooms: Social Spaces Then and Now
In Fisher, the Court attempted to reconcile silence as a constitutional norm
with the First Amendment mission of universities to foster diversity of speech and
speakers.42 In concurrence, Justice Thomas argued passionately that the effort to use
39 See Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2431–32 (discussing the consequences of the “discriminating
admission program” on both white and minority students).
40 This Article is part of a joint project. For a full exploration of the impact on race discourse,
see Charles Adside, III, Turning Up the Volume: Racial Silence, Race Jurisprudence, and Race
Baiting in the Public Forum (Aug. 15, 2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
41 For an exploration of the history of an official norm and a political practice of silence
about race in the United States, see generally Kuykendall, Pressing the Mute Button, supra
note 20.
42 The high water mark of such an approach came in Justice Powell’s influential opinion
in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 269–320 (1978). Powell’s
2014] UNMUTING THE VOLUME 1021
diversity rhetoric as a means of blending race discretion with attempts to use stu-
dents as embodied carriers of symbolic race discourse positions the Court in a line
of cases that starts with Plessy and uses race to achieve goals said to be for public
welfare.43 In his view, both Grutter and Plessy involve claims about the positive re-
sults that official mandates prescribing racial interaction can achieve.44 In Plessy, the
Court argued that the most socially workable setting for both races was mandated
segregation in railway cars because it conformed to popular needs and preferences.45
The Court further suggested that any offense taken by segregated black citizens was
without basis, thus asserting that the atmosphere in the railway cars was pleasant for
all passengers.46 In Grutter, supported by Fisher,47 the Court suggests that classrooms
that include a mixture of races chosen by administrators for diversity will be beneficial
for racial harmony and understanding.48 In a similar fashion, proponents of diversity-
based admissions policies portray a classroom of races engaged with one another in
an atmosphere of comfortable social dynamics that supports enhanced learning and
understanding. The students, without being consulted, are cast as agents of racial
healing and new kinds of connection. The occupants of both the nineteenth-century
railway car and the twenty-first-century classroom are conscripted for an imaginary
social benefit and are described as collaborators in the fancied result of racial har-
mony and mutual respect. They have ascribed agency in a narrative written for them
and students of any race, for which their parts are not their own.49
theory of vindicating the First Amendment authority of university administrators to create
education benefits in a diverse society has been the touchstone for the education bureaucracy
and the Court since Powell devised the approach. Id. at 311–12. Despite the useful and gen-
erative insight of Powell’s opinion, as a former school board President, Lewis F. Powell, WASH.
& LEE U., http://law.wlu.edu/alumni/bios/powell.asp (last visited Apr. 15, 2014), Powell
emphasized the top-down control of education elites and the judiciary, Bakke, 428 U.S. at
312, rather than the concept advanced by Justice Breyer of fraternity, see supra note 13 and
accompanying text. That feature of the possible payoff of diversity has languished as a feature
of either the Court’s jurisprudence, with its theme of final Court say and acceptance of the
claims for diversity as a self-executing form of educational benefit, or the work of the edu-
cation leadership. The Court has continued to rely heavily on a perplexed and perplexing view
of race as a legacy that stands apart from the problem-solving capacity of our democracy.
43 See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2422–32 (2013) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
44 See id. at 2429.
45 Plessy v. Ferguson, 169 U.S. 537, 551–52 (1898).
46 See id. at 551.
47 See generally Fisher, 133 S. Ct. 2411.
48 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003).
49 One scholar has recently argued that groups identified as racial minorities constitute
a valuable asset that those identified as white trade as a commodity for their benefit. Nancy
Leong, Racial Capitalism, 126 HARV. L. REV. 2151 (2013). In our doubts about the purity of
administrative motivations, we credit such claims. Nonetheless, we also believe that all racial
groups are damaged by being co-opted into a script that is an artifice for administrators to
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Reports on the reality of the social spaces once defined by racially segregated train
cars and today by diversity-populated classrooms offers a picture unlike the idealized
portrait of healthy racial dynamics. Alabama native Clarence Cason, a writer about
the atmosphere that prevailed in the South in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, provided a vividly corrective narrative of the true atmosphere in Southern
railway cars in the late nineteenth century.50 As a young sensitive man first riding on
a train in Alabama, he understood the black porter as the ultimate arbiter of good char-
acter and manners, and he craved above all the approval of such an August figure.51
By contrast, newly prosperous white passengers, from a less genteel class than Cason’s
family, visited conspicuous and discourteous demands for service on porters, and
rougher white passengers rewarded the black porters with rank racist insults.52 The
license given to white passengers to bully vulnerable black passengers created ugly
scenes reported in occasional personal reports of other passengers.53 The rules permit-
ting black nurses attending children allowed for white people to position any black
woman permitted on the train as subservient, nonsexual, and inferior to white women
traveling in the same car, thus imposing a construction that could not be reasonably de-
scribed as a circumstance of equality and simple social preference between the races.54
Empirical reports and some personal accounts by faculty and students today also
present a different reality in classrooms from the idealized one adopted by the Court,55
use for personal advantage. White students who are discomfited by the knowledge there is
an assigned script, albeit one over which they lack mastery, are damaged in their capacity for
growth, for exploration, and for cross-racial connections. While some white students may feel
morally elevated by their “acceptance” of their minority colleagues, others are simply cut off
from the possibility of genuine exchange in a group that feels organic and authentic. In addi-
tion, the temporary psychic income some consume may stunt their moral growth in ways that
can be seen as a cheat by educators, who owe their students foundations for learning for a
multi-ethnic society.
50 CLARENCE CASON, 90 DEGREES IN THE SHADE 121–24 (1935).
51 Id. at 122–23.
52 Id. at 123–24.
53 See JOSIAH QUINCY, FIGURES OF THE PAST: FROM THE LEAVES OF OLD JOURNALS
341–43 (1882). Quincy’s book contains an account of a pre–Civil War encounter in a first-
class compartment in Massachusetts, set aside for African Americans, in which a slaveholder
from the South was astonished to find a black passenger able to ride in dignity, and, after
setting upon him, was ordered by the president of the road to leave or be arrested. See id.
Plessy v. Ferguson gave the sanction of law to crude conduct by white Southerners after
Reconstruction yet rested on a claim to be no more than a respectful concession to the right
of personal association and the needs of social harmony. 163 U.S. 537, 551–52 (1896).
54 See Kenneth W. Mack, Law, Society, Identity, and the Making of the Jim Crow South:
Travel and Segregation on Tennessee Railroads, 1875–1905, 24 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 377,
389 (1999).
55 As the District Court emphasized, the Law School’s admissions policy promotes “cross-
racial understanding,” helps to break down racial stereotypes, and “enables [students] to better
understand persons of different races.” Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821, 850 (E.D.
2014] UNMUTING THE VOLUME 1023
a reality of awkward silences, circumspection, and unease.56 Administrators widely
acknowledge the shortfall in classroom dynamics by sponsoring “safe spaces” for
minority students.57 Many faculty members strive to avoid creating discomfort with
an awkward phrase or a potentially tense discussion about racial topics, or, in some
reports, faculty members give offense to students in a class.58
B. Parceling out Race Agency Then and Now
Before the litany of cases in the Fisher Court opinion was decided, a majority
of the Court conceived race as a matter for which the agency of a white-American
majority could provide answers for the benefit of the racial minority. That view is
still present on the Court but has lost power to persuade a majority of the Court or to
sway public opinion.59 The fear of race as a formal category for government action
has effectively undermined the appeal to white agency to remedy the lingering effects
of slavery and the racial oppression that followed the end of slavery. Exacerbating
that general fear is the increasing racial and ethnic diversity of American society,
which fuels resentments, misunderstanding, and cynicism about the manipulability
of race categories.60 Further, an appeal to majoritarian agency in aid of a historically
Mich. 2001); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 246a, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003)
(No. 02-241). These benefits are “important and laudable” because “classroom discussion is
livelier, more spirited, and simply more enlightening and interesting” when the students have
the greatest possible variety of backgrounds. Grutter, 137 F. Supp. 2d at 849–50; see also
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003). Notably, the courts do not cite empirical
studies that report data on the student experience.
56 See Meera E. Deo, The Promise of Grutter: Diverse Interactions at the University of
Michigan Law School, 17 MICH. J. RACE & L. 63, 104 (2011).
57 In today’s climate of diversity within homogeneity, minorities adopt strategies of
“counterspaces.” See Walter R. Allen & Daniel Solorzano, Affirmative Action, Educational
Equity and Campus Racial Climate: A Case Study of the University of Michigan Law School,
12 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 237, 258–59 (2001). In a successful pedagogy constructed
around a mission of cross-group connections, counterspaces would lack significance to an
engaged community.
58 Studies show minimal achievement of the goal of cross-racial exchanges in diverse
classrooms. See, e.g., Deo, supra note 56, at 63 (concluding that “lively discussions drawing
from diversity” rarely occur in the classroom).
59 See CAL. CONST., art. I, § 3 (banning affirmative action); MICH. CONST. art. I, § 26
(banning affirmative action). See generally Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist.
No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007). In both California and Michigan, the voters approved initiatives
that forbade any use of race for university admissions. See Tamar Lewin, Affirmative Action
Ban in Michigan is Rejected, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2012, at A25.
60 See Russell K. Nieli, Diversity’s Discontents: The “Contact Hypothesis” Exploded,
21 ACAD. QUESTIONS 409, 411 (2008) (reviewing assertions by prominent legal academics, for
example, Alan Dershowitz and Randall Kennedy, that diversity is a pretext for now rejected
pre-Bakke remedial goals for racial justice).
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disempowered group contains echoes of the traditional portrayal of African Americans
as a subject for remedial action rather than one partner in building a fair, ethnically
diverse society.61 Though a morally powerful argument, the claim for benign efforts
to remedy race sins can neither command general agreement nor move past the portrait
of majority, or white, agency as the path to racial progress. Receptive listeners are
relatively rare. The judicial advocates of benign racial classifications for social justice
resemble the barnyard rooster62 when they announce, predictably and perhaps reason-
ably, a critical need to see the facts of race history as a present force in our social life.
The barnyard rooster goes unheard because of his relentless repetition, and the os-
trich will not see. The ostrich, boy or girl, wastes the gift of eyesight, and the cock-
a-doodle-doing rooster squanders the gift of voice.63
In light of the discursive problems with a norm of official race silence as well
as with a call for reliance on majority agency as a remedial race program, the com-
peting race narratives contained in the Court’s jurisprudence do little good and con-
siderable harm to a project of public dialogue and knowledge about race history. In
a manner resembling the general effects of its established claim of final ownership
of constitutional interpretation, the Court’s claimed monopoly over racial discourse
muffles other sources of interpretation and resolution of the morally fraught issues of
racial harmony and progress.64 In Fisher, Justice Kennedy repeatedly hammered home
the Court’s claim to a monopoly, invoking the exclusive responsibility of a court to
make final determinations about a university’s use of race-conscious methods to
achieve diversity, as well as to scrutinize whether diversity is a compelling interest.65
61 For examples of historic erasure of black agency, see supra note 4.
62 The opposite of the ostrich is the barnyard rooster, who is alert and awake early to see
what is on the horizon (and still present from the past). Rather than spread fear and a need for
withdrawal from the day, he crows loudly a warning to be heeded by all. The ostrich appeals for
relief from potentially bad news. Uncharitably, one poem derides the character of the ostrich:
“Peek-a-Boo, I can’t see you, / Everything must be grand. / Boo-ka-Pe, they can’t see me, / As
long as I’ve got me head in the sand. / Peek-a-Boo, it may be true, / There’s something in what
you’ve said, / But we’ve got enough troubles in everyday life, / I just bury me head.” The
Ostrich, HOPE TO THE END, http://hopetotheend.com/ostrich (last visited Apr. 15, 2014).
63 See supra text accompanying notes 6–9. To be fair, the rooster is not a welcome presence
in the city. See, e.g., Jennie Grant, A Rooster’s Fate: Modern Chicken-Keeping Practices in the
U.S. Do Little for the Future of Majestic Roosters, URB. FARM (Jan. 14, 2013, 10:37 PM),
http://www.urbanfarmonline.com/urban-livestock/chickens/roosters-fate.aspx (“It’s illegal to
keep roosters in many cities.”).
64 See ABNER S. GREENE, AGAINST OBLIGATION: THE MULTIPLE SOURCES OF AUTHORITY
IN A LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 3–4 (2012) (suggesting that the function of law to “settle
[contestable] matters . . . risks alienating power from its true source—the people, as citizens”
and advancing a view of “constitutional interpretation as plural” as a means of “preserving
citizen sovereignty”).
65 See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2419 (2013) (“Once the
University has established that its goal of diversity is consistent with strict scrutiny, however,
there must still be a further judicial determination.”); see id. at 2414 (“On this point [narrow
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The Court is thus the source of the primary official pronouncements on race. The
Justices thus assume a responsibility that rightly should be measured by their contri-
bution to American racial discourse.
Unfortunately, each approach on the Court to race jurisprudence contains an
implicit race narrative that echoes a troubled past. The Court’s sense of discovery of
a color-blind race jurisprudence, conceived as a rejection of past use of race as a
formal category in law, in fact revives the dysfunctions associated with official race
silence.66 On the other hand, the story of racial oppression as a matter for remedy by
the agency of a repentant majority replicates a legal and cultural erasure of black
agency while fueling white resentment.67 Recounting the past typically adopts a white
perspective with missing acknowledgment or recognition of the active roles of African
Americans in building a common cultural heritage,68 their own liberation from en-
slavement,69 and their gradual advancement as citizens.70 Thus, the jurisprudence of
tailoring] the University receives no deference.”); see also id. at 2421 (“Strict scrutiny does
not permit a court to accept a school’s assertion that its admissions process uses race in a per-
missible way without a court giving close analysis to the evidence of how the process works
in practice.”).
66 See supra notes 63–65 and accompanying text; infra Part IV.
67 On erasure of black agency, see supra note 4. On racial resentment, see generally
EDUARDO BONILLA-SILVA, RACISM WITHOUT RACISTS: COLOR-BLIND RACISM AND THE
PERSISTENCE OF RACIAL INEQUALITY IN THE UNITED STATES (2d ed. 2006), and Winkler,
Sounds of Silence, supra note 21, at 937.
68 See generally EUGENE D. GENOVESE, ROLL, JORDAN, ROLL: THE WORLD THE SLAVES
MADE (1974) (explaining the Afro-American culture the slaves helped create and the organic
bond between the races that existed in the slave system within a context of antagonism and
an imposed white-controlled family structure that made those held as slaves part of one
plantation family). For the bondsman’s contribution to the colonial economy and the cultural
heritage from early economic activities, see PETER H. WOOD, BLACK MAJORITY: NEGROES
IN COLONIAL SOUTH CAROLINA FROM 1670 THROUGH THE STONO REBELLION 35–62 (1974)
(suggesting that African know-how about cultivating and processing rice led to the successful
production of rice in South Carolina as a mainstay of the early economy).
69 In addition to the companion piece by Kuykendall on racial silence, see generally
Kuykendall, Pressing the Mute Button, supra note 20, there are provocative and useful
explanations of the cultural, literary, and official conventions that have tended to suppress
open discourse about race. See generally DANIEL A. AARON, THE UNWRITTEN WAR:
AMERICAN WRITERS AND THE CIVIL WAR (1973) (discussing the difficulty of authors’
discussing the “real” war); MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, “THE PEOPLE’S DARLING
PRIVILEGE”: STRUGGLES FOR FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN AMERICAN HISTORY (2000)
(discussing the suppression of criticisms of slavery); MICHAEL T. GILMORE, THE WAR ON
WORDS: SLAVERY, RACE, AND FREE SPEECH IN AMERICAN LITERATURE (2010) (discussing
“perseverance of . . . censor[ing]”).
70 See generally JOHN DITTMER, LOCAL PEOPLE: THE STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS IN
MISSISSIPPI (1994) (discussing a ground-level look at the work of individuals to advance
African Americans as full citizens, able to participate as voters, civic leaders, and contribut-
ing members of the economy).
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the Court lacks narrative richness about a race history in which the races have been
intertwined.71 Nor does any endorsement by the Court of a strategy for racial health
contemplate the partnership of these historically connected groups.72 Color-blind ide-
ology severs the connection created by history, and color-consciousness echoes past
treatment of black persons as objects for another’s agency.
III. AGENCY, SPEECH, EQUALITY: THE UNIVERSITY, COMMUNITY, AND RACE
As seedbeds for vibrant discourse on many topics, universities rightly seek to
foster a discursively rich racial environment. Yet the language of diversity, created for
race-conscious admissions policies and blessed in Grutter v. Bollinger73 and again
in Fisher,74 grants administrators space and the incentive to invent evasions and coded
understandings about race.
A. Managed Race Discourse in a Free Speech Setting
The Grutter opening to race considerations assigns agency to university bureau-
crats to position some students as passive recipients of a racial pedagogy and other
students as aiding the learning process by embodying a message of race complexity
by their presence.75 Race and race meaning become categories managed by hierarchies
that control public language about race, using the racial identity of students as the
form of hierarchical discourse. Racial identity is the medium by which the Court and
its nominees, education administrators, speak for students. This method creates two
dimensions of an agency/silencing issue—white majority as agency versus minority
as subjects, and administrators as agency versus students as subject. The former is a
feature of institutional arrangements in a setting that is still white dominated and can
be, historically, a basis for black separatist movements.76 Yet the combination of the
71 See generally Driver, Recognizing Race, supra note 33 (showing the lack of a com-
mand over basic choices of when to identify the race of figures in a Supreme Court opinion
as one glimpse at the weak narrative command at the Supreme Court over the American story
of race).
72 Numerous writers explain the deep intertwining of the predominant white-American
culture with that of the African Americans who worked with them, lived with them, and
contributed knowledge to solve problems for much of the formative history of the nation. See
supra notes 68–70 and accompanying text.
73 539 U.S. 306, 343–44 (2003).
74 Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013).
75 See Grutter, 539 U.S. 306.
76 Professor Mark Tushnet pointed out the two dimensions of the silence thesis in this
paper, as well as the relevance of such writings as Harold Cruse’s The Crisis of the Negro
Intellectual: A Historical Analysis of the Failure of Black Leadership as a source for consid-
eration of sentiments for black separatism as an agency solution. E-mail from Mark Tushnet,
William Nelson Cromwell, Professor of Law, Harvard Law Sch., to author (Oct. 6, 2013,
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two agency/subject maneuvers, directed at students collectively, helps shift the focus
to the discursive effects of the manner in which agent and subject are positioned in the
communities created by diversity rationales for university admissions.
The effect is to withdraw race speech from public currency but leave space for its
manipulation in coded managerial terminology. The combination of public evasion
and insider code tends to create passive learning communities.77 Hierarchies, those of
the Court and administrators, hold a monopoly over appropriate official race speech,
and the communities created by this stylized control are drafted as subjects, not em-
powered as speakers and listeners in a vibrant learning community.78 Students of all
racial backgrounds lose a sense of agency that goes with membership in an authentic
community or exposure to the unplanned diversity of the world outside the university.
They enter an environment constructed as a muted statement, one that communicates
too much and too little.79
Students gather in classrooms assembled by a bureaucrat’s vision of classroom
diversity. Seeing one another as pieces on an administrator’s game board surely makes
the formation of an engaged community unlikely. Indeed, a classroom is a place that
has the potential to be sterile or what has been called a non-place, meaning a “space
which cannot be defined as relational, or historical, or concerned with identity.”80
10:46 AM) (on file with author) (citing HAROLD CRUSE, THE CRISIS OF THE NEGRO
INTELLECTUAL: A HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FAILURE OF BLACK LEADERSHIP (1967)).
77 See Allen & Solorzano, supra note 57, at 249–300 (discussing a case study of students
at the University of Michigan in preparation for their role as court experts in Grutter).
78 See Winkler, Sounds of Silence, supra note 21, at 931 (referring to “[t]he etiquette of
racial discourse and the silences it produces” and “the racial silence [the Court] encourages”).
79 The commitment to diversity in admissions creates resentment and harm to the reputation
of black and Hispanic students, see id. at 937, yet one study has shown that the theorized
benefits of the University of Michigan Law School “seldom [take] place within the classroom,”
Deo, supra note 56, at 63 (asserting an absence of efforts in law schools to foster diversity
discussions in classrooms).
80 Sharon Halevi & Orna Blumen, What a Difference a Place Makes: The Reflexive
(Mis)management of a City’s Pasts, 37 J. URB. HIST. 384, 389 (2011) (internal quotation
marks omitted). The cues sent by the classroom setting are surely complicated and worthy of
the closest scrutiny, applying to a Grutter-selected class the acute observations of group dy-
namics bequeathed to us by sociologist Erving Goffman. See ERVING GOFFMAN, INTERACTION
RITUAL: ESSAYS IN FACE-TO-FACE BEHAVIOR 5–7 (defining “face” as “the positive social
value a person effectively claims for himself by the line others assume he has taken during
a particular contact” and explaining that “the person’s face clearly is something that is not
lodged in or on his body, but rather something that is diffusely located in the flow of events in
the encounter and becomes manifest only when these events are read and interpreted for the
appraisals expressed in them”). In Interaction Ritual, Goffman explains how human beings
maintain “face” in encounters by entering an interaction ritual that derives from universal
human nature yet makes of a human, when presenting face, a “construct built up not from
inner psychic propensities but from moral rules that are impressed up on him from without.”
Id. at 44–45. In this passage, Goffman assumes a relatively abstract group cooperating in a
human ritual and a generally shared ability to master the ritual. Id. In another work, Goffman
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These are described as characterized by “detachment between [the place] and the
people traversing it.”81 Insofar as a place bears the burden of constructing the idea of
shared values and beliefs, “nonplanned neighborhoods with a history”82 are a much
more likely source of human connection and shared values.83 When a place, like a
classroom, has the potential for aridness, the human peer connection presumably must
arise from the unplanned composition of the grouping of student occupants, or other
sources of a feeling of bonding and shared identity. As in a neighborhood, the students
are most likely to form bonds if they have the sense of discovering one another as
organic to the location, not as human artifacts designed for planned “discovery.”84
acknowledges that teams may form to manipulate impressions to their advantage. ERVING
GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE 7 (1973) [hereinafter GOFFMAN,
THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE]. In addition, Goffman defines stigma as a
departure from an expected norm, such as white skin, fully functioning limbs, normal speech,
and so forth. ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY
5 (1986). Those in possession of a stigma must make special efforts in connection with man-
aging interaction ritual. See id. at 6. Hence, in a setting such as the classroom, signals in the
interaction ritual are surely thrown off by the presence of individuals with a stigma. Moreover,
the face-saving capacity of the person with stigma may be impaired. Note that Goffman’s use
of stigma is a neutral classification, unlike the use of it by opponents of affirmative action, who
use it to suggest an entire group’s achievements are degraded in public opinion by the attri-
bution to everyone of an unearned advantage. But the fact of stigma as a neutral description
does suggest that successful group “interaction ritual” could be achieved by group participa-
tion in constituting the group with the dimensions of “normal” defined by a common interest
in diversity.
81 Halevi & Blumen, supra note 80, at 389.
82 Id.
83 Erving Goffman studied group behavior as a type of theater, in which each person, “in
the moment,” is engaged in “impression management” consonant with the staging of the
moment in which he finds himself. GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY
LIFE, supra note 80, at 229. The implications for any classroom group are surely considerable,
with manifold combinations of impression management based on the formation of what
Goffman calls “teams” who pre-plan their own staging, in some cases to cast a favorable
light on the team by comparison with a nonmember. See id. at 77–105. Given the continuing
salience of race, combined with some understanding by some students that minority students
are not present as a spontaneous, organic outgrowth of admissions but as an artifice designed
by administrators, the odds that teams may implicitly form and engage in staging to the dis-
advantage of perceived outsiders is likely to be nontrivial. Id. Goffman discusses variations
in the extent to which the participants believe in the staging and performances as real being
related to the idea of performances that are an “unintentional product of” an unselfconscious
individual. Id. at 70. Such an assumption is disrupted if the staging of the collective performance
is visible to the participations. See id. at 111–14 (discussing the backstage of performances).
84 Indeed, the sense of artifice in the presence of identifiable diversity admittees may well
feed the tendency of human individuals to mark others and treat them punitively on the basis
of trivial differences. See The Baby Lab, 60 MINUTES (Nov. 18, 2012), http://www.cbsnews
.com/8301-18560_162-57551557/babies-help-unlock-the-origins-of-morality/ (discussing
a social experiment with infant behavior).
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Purely merit-based selection may lead students to see the classroom as a natural com-
position, created by a neutral metric that creates an unplanned community with a basis
for a shared interest and a bond. Today, such university communities often are homog-
eneous, the products of prosperous homes able to nurture and educate their offspring
for expected participation in a common culture of achievement.85 But the path to a
dynamic community that contains greater diversity, and hence greater exposure for
students across dimensions of culture and life experience, may be found in “messy
planning,” the proposed permission to communities to build premises for connection
across cultural differences.86 Today’s approach to diversity does not build or nurture
premises of connection and discovery. Rather, artifice undermines them.87
B. Sharing Agency with Students: Students Admitting Students
Student input, through a carefully designed format containing safeguards against
racial groupthink, could be a path to designing learning communities for social health.88
A shared agency would remove the threat of stigma by giving the members a personal
involvement in the community they have helped create. The strands of the Supreme
Court jurisprudence that permit racial considerations in composing a learning or col-
laborative group can be fashioned to permit a degree of community control over the
premises for diversity. The protections of the First Amendment for forming dialogic
groupings within the academy give especially strong support for student input fashioned
85 See generally SEAN F. REARDON ET AL., RACE, INCOME, AND ENROLLMENT PATTERNS
IN HIGHLY SELECTIVE COLLEGES, 1982–2004 (2012), available at http://cepa.stanford.edu
/sites/default/files/race%20income%20%26%20selective%20college%20enrollment%20august
%203%202012.pdf (finding comparatively low chances of enrollment in elite schools for black
and Hispanic students compared with white students and low- and middle-income students
compared with students from top-income-quintile families).
86 See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2417–18 (2013) (“Part of the
business of a university [is] to provide that atmosphere which is most conducive to speculation,
experiment and creation.” (citations omitted)).
87 I am grateful to Paul Horwitz for the following comment:
[W]hile I agree with much of this, I wonder whether you’re focusing
too much on the bureaucrats here and not enough on individual teachers
and classrooms. Messy planning might take place on a classroom level
despite the formalized structures that appear in the bureaucrats’ docu-
ments, which are framed in large measure with a court as the intended
audience. To be sure, however, the canned discourse of diversity also
ends up becoming part of the individual teachers’ rhetoric and may en-
courage them, too, to offer up a tamed version of diversity even at the
classroom level.
E-mail from Paul Horwitz, Professor of Law, Univ. of Ala., to author (Oct. 4, 2013, 9:50 AM)
(on file with author).
88 See generally Allen & Solorzano, supra note 57 (examining race and gender climates
at undergraduate and graduate level campuses).
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to energize the exchange of ideas and social knowledge.89 Community self-composi-
tion allocates agency to the racial minority, an agency shared by the majority, and
overcomes the paternalistic implications of benign racial measures.90 The long-sought
goal of an enriched society, aware of a troubled racial past and committed to a future
of harmony and progress, might begin to be realized if the Court reforms its race
rhetoric to authorize and encourage robust communities self-composed with racial
exchange as a learning purpose.
The race category has been denied or avoided by the national government91 and
censored by states in forums for exchange fostered by local institutions.92 Race has
been viewed as a toxic category and has been ruled out of order as a subject for official
recognition for much of our history, with the modern Civil Rights Movement as the
strongest exception since Reconstruction.93 The history of race in the United States
contains great injustice for which remedies are elusive and the long-term consequences
89 See infra Part VII.
90 Kuykendall writes about the absence of personification of black students or other
minorities in the jurisprudence of diversity. See generally Kuykendall, Pressing the Mute
Button, supra note 20. The University of Michigan intervenors felt the necessity of bringing
their agency, and their experience, to the Grutter lawsuit. See Reply Brief for Defendant-
Intervenors at 3, Grutter v. Bollinger, 247 F.3d 631 (6th Cir. 2001) (No. 01-1516).
91 Reply Brief for Defendant-Intervenors, supra note 90, at 8–9. The framers of the
original Constitution acquiesced to slave owners’ demands that free states return runaway
slaves, yet avoided use of the word ‘slave’:
No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws
thereof, escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or
Regulation therein, be discharged from such Service or Labour, but shall
be delivered up on Claim of the Party to whom such Service or Labour
may be due.
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3 (1791), nullified by U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
We make no claim that white opinion has been in consensus and hence a source of a
universal reticence about race. Rather, the mixture of power by forces hostile to racial dis-
course, constitutional doctrine that made race a volatile subject during the pre–Civil War
period, happy myths about the past that are easily spread, and emerging dogma about becoming
a color-blind society have played various roles. These multiple factors have tended toward
a suppression of full and open public discourse on race. For an account of the substantial
pre–Civil War debate in Congress about race, with open debate about the role of race in the
constitutional order, see generally JAMES OAKES, FREEDOM NATIONAL: THE DESTRUCTION
OF SLAVERY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1861–1865 (2012). For a recounting and critique of
historical interpretations that negatively portray the Northern racial climate during the Civil
War and in later history, see generally GARY W. GALLAGHER, THE UNION WAR (2011).
92 In Arizona, the Governor signed a law in 2010 that was designed to prohibit ethnic
studies classes in public schools, including charter schools. H.B. 2281, 49th Leg. (Ariz. 2010),
amending ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-1-1, available at http://www.azleg.gov/legtext/49leg
/2r/bills/hb2281s.pdf; see also Gregory Rodriguez, The White Majority Strikes Back, L.A.
TIMES, Feb. 20, 2012, at A15.
93 See infra notes 159–65 and accompanying text.
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tenacious. Yet silence and loss of memory of the past are often the preferred answers.94
In fact, these comforting evasions ask nothing of anyone and provide no answers for
a diverse society with a history of racial injustice.
After the civil-rights era, there is again a call for a veiling of the nation’s unfortu-
nate racial history and its present-day traces. Repeatedly, we imagine that a form of
forgetting and silence about race heralds the dawn of a new insight about race in offi-
cial understanding and cultural practice.95 Yet the “new” forms revive past evasions96
and reinforce an impoverishment of public discussion in favor of a hidden, uncorrected
racial subtext fed by public silence.97 Educational opportunities are a critical site for
contestation over race as a public category on which to predicate policy.98
With a conceptual focus on distribution of life prospects by race, and with oppor-
tunity seen as a limited good, conscious actions that affect the composition of learning
communities raise the stakes and trigger anxiety about race-based redistribution. With
rare exceptions relating to administrative claims of necessity, such as separating pris-
oners by race to prevent gang violence in prisons, the Court has come close to holding
that race may not be the basis for official action of any kind.99 As a result, the Court
is, perhaps inadvertently, suppressing the public discussion of race as a category. In
particular, the jurisprudence restricting, and with Fisher v. University of Texas at
Austin potentially narrowing even further,100 direct concern for racial equality or
94 See BLIGHT, supra note 4, at 196 (describing African Americans in the semi-centennial
of the Civil War as “deeply interested and implicated, but segregated and invisible”); FONER,
FOREVER FREE, supra note 4, at XVI, XX (explaining the ideological victory of the South
in shaping the memory of the Civil War).
95 Strong statements of this trope of America were provoked by the acquittal of George
Zimmerman for the killing of an unarmed black teenager. See, e.g., Lizette Alvarez & Cara
Buckley, Zimmerman Is Acquitted in Trayvon Martin Killing, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2013,
at A1.
96 See infra text accompanying notes 148–57. See generally Justin Driver, The Southern
Manifesto and the Politics of Judicial Supremacy (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author)
(relating race jurisprudence today to the arguments advanced by the Southern Manifesto).
97 See infra text accompanying notes 148–57.
98 See generally WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID: THE
NATION’S TOP LEGAL EXPERTS REWRITE AMERICA’S LANDMARK CIVIL RIGHTS DECISION
(Balkin ed., 2001) (asserting that the meaning of Brown v. Board is heavily contested, with
claims on its heritage by on a variety of perspectives on race).
99 In Johnson v. California, the Supreme Court subjected race-conscious prisoner intake
to strict scrutiny. 543 U.S. 499 (2005). The two most conservative Justices participating—
Scalia and Thomas—would have applied a relaxed standard of review for the prison setting.
Id. at 524 (Thomas, J., dissenting). By contrast, the more liberal Justice Stevens argued that
the five-member majority had not in truth applied strict scrutiny. Id. at 517–19 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). He posited that, in remanding the case for proceedings in light of the opinion, the
majority had forgiven the transparent inability of the state to offer evidence at trial in support
of a strong state interest in the use of race to assign new prisoners to temporary cells. Id.
100 Before the fix came, some scholars anticipated a strong holding against diversity-
enhancing affirmative action. Ellen D. Katz, On Overreaching, or Why Rick Perry May Save
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democratic participatory access,101 the ability of universities to use race as a factor
in composing their learning communities reduces local input into the goals set by ad-
missions process at these institutions. With the tightening of any room for race-aware
admissions, administrators and state officials, and the people at large, could lose all
means of fostering a discourse about race in connection with composing a learning
community that enables further racial exchange. The potential loss may affect two
specific discursive locations: the deliberations in university boards and exchange,
however constrained in today’s race environment under Grutter principles, in the
classroom. The impact in the two prime sites for addressing race would reduce pub-
lic discourse as well, both in the planning of university communities and in the en-
richment of race discourse that must surely result from the university experiences of
alumni of engaging learned communities. If boards may not consider race in com-
prising the university community, there will be no deliberation in this public body,
and less diversity in the university.102
A strong official signal favoring silence about race may appear as the easiest way
to extinguish racist views and to eradicate ethnic conflict. But for race, “pressing the
mute button” does not safeguard communal harmony in the long term.103 Rather, it
gives short-term relief from open conflict and race anxiety and contributes to long-
term failure of open discourse.
C. Impoverishing Race Discourse in the University (and the Nation)
The consequence for the university of the Court’s failure to examine race as a
social category in need of enrichment through programs of engagement built by com-
munities granted state resources is that students and faculty act like the ostrich of
Justice Ginsburg’s metaphor, with only a few taking on the work of the barnyard
rooster.104 The mastery of speech about race is awarded to administrators and with-
drawn from the community at large, with a loss of a large potential for the young to
forge new paths.105 The Court insists on a purist view of a color-blind social and
the Voting Rights Act but Destroy Affirmative Action, 11 ELECTION L.J. 420, 420 (2012)
(suggesting a likely strong holding against diversity-enhancing affirmative action). Since the
holding, opinion over the likely direction set by the Court has been divided. Horwitz, supra
note 17, at 493 (summarizing reactions).
101 See BREYER, supra note 13, at 80–84 (addressing the element of liberty implicated in
using race to compose a university community).
102 For an argument that Michigan’s constitutional prohibition of race as a factor in uni-
versity admissions prevents advocates for race as a consideration comparable to legacy ad-
missions from utilizing the democratic process, see Brief in Opposition, at I, Schuette v. Coal.
to Defend Affirmative Action (Feb. 4, 2013) (No. 12-682).
103 See generally Kuykendall, Pressing the Mute Button, supra note 20.
104 See supra notes 6–8 and accompanying text.
105 There is evidence that a young demographic values diversity. See JAMES E. RYAN, FIVE
MILES AWAY, A WORLD APART: ONE CITY, TWO SCHOOLS, AND THE STORY OF EDUCATIONAL
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political order, which borrows from past race narratives to shape official discourse
about race.106 The court’s explanation of race becomes dominant as an official creed,
one that deepens silence about race. By blocking creative local forces and marginal-
izing the voices of a younger generation, the Court adds to a tragic history of official
suppression of race as a matter for public discussion and remedial action aimed at
communal harmony.107 The predominant Court approach certifies a norm of race si-
lence as constitutional etiquette.
The risk in the Court’s jurisprudence is not backlash from pressing for progressive
change,108 but the sponsorship of an unhealthy silence.109 Such silence renders race
a suppressed fact, ignored even where official policies create conditions akin to a
“[n]ew Jim Crow,”110 and leaves the culture to repeat emotional habits and mistakes
OPPORTUNITY IN MODERN AMERICA 15–16 (2010) (citing empirical evidence of a generational
change in which younger respondents express a high level of support for diversity compared
with previous generations).
106 Katie Eyer has shown that the Court engages in a sub rosa practice of permitting race-
conscious action in family law and other domains because the Court believes the uses made
of race in some contexts are benign. Katie Eyer, Constitutional Colorblindness and the
Family, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 537 (2014).The Court avoids open acknowledgment of its view
that race has a proper role in some state actions. Id. at 538. The unacknowledged acceptance
of race-influenced government decisions is a special instance of the Court’s silencing approach
to race, one that furtively permits the use of race, while the Court asserts in its marquee opin-
ions on affirmative action that race is virtually never a legitimate consideration on which to
base state action. See generally Eyer, supra. This aspect of the Court’s approach to race, in
Eyer’s view, contains “serious process, legitimacy, and substantive concerns.” Id. at 538.
107 Efforts by the executive to fill the gap do not succeed. The attempt by President Bill
Clinton to foster racial discourse in a commission charged with energizing a public forum for
considering racial history and contemporary dynamics foundered from the critical reception
it received at its inception and the negative reviews of its relevance on its completion. See
Claire Jean Kim, Clinton’s Race Initiative: Recasting the American Dilemma, 33 POLITY
175, 176 (2000). There was resistance and criticism from the beginning about the executive
rationale and propriety of sponsorship of a forum for community discourse on race. See id.
108 See, e.g., Thomas M. Keck, Beyond Backlash: Assessing the Impact of Judicial
Decisions on LGBT Rights, 43 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 151, 152 (2009) (critiquing claims that
progressive judicial decisions harm progressive causes by generating backlash).
109 See TALI MENDELBERG, THE RACE CARD: CAMPAIGN STRATEGY, IMPLICIT MESSAGES,
AND THE NORM OF EQUALITY 106 (2001) (“The abandonment of explicit rhetoric only reflects
a positive development when it is replaced by true silence, but not when it is replaced by im-
plicit rhetoric. If silence conceals opposition to racial equality, it makes that opposition harder
to combat.”).
110 MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF
COLORBLINDNESS 164 (2010) (explaining the radiating harm of the “silence that hovers over”
the large-scale imprisonment of black men). We are in alignment with the critique by Professor
Alexander of the color-blind ideal as harmful to citizens’ capacity to see one another and harm-
ful to the interests of African Americans. We hasten to add that the color-blind myth is harmful
to a common interest in knowledge of the past and the present, and to all citizens (though not
identically across a monochromatic world without race). In Professor Alexander’s words:
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of the past.111 Fisher presented a key moment for the Court either to deepen its claimed
monopoly on race discourse or to recognize the need to refine its teaching on race and
open up race discourse to other state actors. Justice Kennedy, for the Court, empha-
sized that university actions must survive close judicial scrutiny by the Court designed
to detect improper uses of race.112 The Court faces no greater test of constitutional
judgment for a democratic society than properly identifying other actors who may
participate with the Court in fashioning room for sensitive treatments of race by com-
munities seeking betterment and security for all.113 Preventing all others from taking
“We should hope not for a colorblind society but instead for a world in which we can see
each other fully, learn from each other, and do what we can to respond to each other with
love.” Id. at 231.
111 There are many treatments of the period of Southern white supremacy and Northern
complacency. See generally, e.g., ROBERT PENN WARREN, THE LEGACY OF THE CIVIL WAR
(1961) (providing a classic exposition). Warren reflected on the extended results of the Civil
War. See generally id. He charged Northerners with seeing their region as the “Treasury of
Virtue” for their role in freeing enslaved people in the South, and Southerners with relying on
the “Great Alibi” to avoid facing their region’s lag in economic progress and racial fairness.
Id. at 53–66. For a description of the forces and trends that undermined the Northern commit-
ment to Reconstruction and led to the re-establishment in the South of white supremacy, see
ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863–1877, at 412–
511 (1988) [hereinafter FONER, RECONSTRUCTION]. C. Vann Woodward’s Origins of the New
South, 1877–1913 provides an account of the gradual reversal of Reconstruction by Redeemer
governments, with a rapprochement between Northern money interests and a Southern planter
class that allowed the South to reverse black political power, install methods to prevent free
and fair elections and frustrate the development of political efficacy among poor whites. C.
VANN WOODWARD, ORIGINS OF THE NEW SOUTH, 1877–1913, at 50–74 (1951). Woodward
depicts methods for disenfranchisement of African Americans that “could be employed against
whites of the same economic or educational status.” Id. at 55. In effect, white supremacy, in
Woodward’s telling, served until populism to maintain rule by financial interests compatible
with “the new economic order [of the North].” Id. at 50; see also CASON, supra note 50
(providing a narrative account of the long-term effects of the Civil War on life in the South,
in a manner that foreshadowed the interpretive gloss offered by Penn Warren).
112 Professor Horwitz comments as follows on the Court’s mixture of trust and avowals
of scrutiny:
[A]nother way of thinking about its move here is that, by going so
lightly over the compelling interest argument and more or less accepting
it arguendo, while focusing its firepower on the least restrictive means
test, it 1) accepts only the most milquetoast statements about race at this
level and 2) renders them less important and more of a rote exercise.
E-mail from Paul Horwitz to author, supra note 87. With prisons, the most conservative race
purists would permit officials to sort by race, for the health of the prisoners, and with the ef-
fect of segregating them. See Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 506, 515 n.3, 526 (2005).
113 For example, using strict but less-than-fatal scrutiny, in the time of mass incarceration
of black men, for segregating prisoners by race, accompanied by a flat prohibition on using
race to create racially healthy learning environments, would suggest that race jurisprudence
has a cramped vision of what makes a compelling state interest, focusing the state’s coercive
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a role in shaping race discourse, with some use of public resources with distributive
import, improperly seizes an undue portion of our common, shared life.
The Court’s teachings about the risks presented by unrestrained affirmative
action programs are not without basis.114 Drawing from these teachings, we frame
the problem of race-conscious programs as one with significant risk that hierarchies
will divert goods—both material and discursive—based upon political agendas, self-
advancement, and private motives.115 Therefore, we accept the need for judicial scru-
tiny in this area. At the same time, we reject an approach that effectively monopolizes
race discourse in courts and then ends it altogether. We propose a new approach that
claims race as a proper concern in constituting communities, one that shifts respon-
sibility for addressing the concern to carefully designed community choice.
Complete judicial suppression of racial categories in admissions programs, ex-
cept as an occasional warning against the use of race,116 would be unwise because it
would prohibit educational institutions from implementing race-conscious programs
designed to remove obstacles in the way of their core mission to provide a marketplace
of ideas for their students. The Equal Protection Clause does not preclude universities
from using innovative measures to root out social dynamics that inhibit dialogue so
long as those measures are narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest.117
We propose, as a means of advancing effective speech capacity about race for race-
conscious admissions, to incorporate student participation and displace the top-down
approach to admissions, which lacks the buy-in of a population that could easily be
well disposed to serving as partners in building a diverse community. Without strong
student engagement, the abstract claims lack an empirical, or even common-sense,
power on preventing racial violence and not on its interest in educating a healthy citizenry
for racial health and peace. See ALEXANDER, supra note 110, at 169.
114 See generally City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (explaining
the dangers of political deal-making to distribute government benefits).
115 It is a commonplace understanding that agents in corporations may impose agency costs
on the principal, in other words, the shareholders, by diverting value to themselves that should
belong to the principal. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308
(1976) (“We define an agency relationship as a contract under which one or more persons (the
principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which
involves delegating some decision making authority to the agent. If both parties to the rela-
tionship are utility maximizers, there is good reason to believe that the agent will not always
act in the best interests of the principal.”).
116 See Ellen D. Katz, Grutter’s Denouement: Three Templates from the Roberts Court,
107 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 1045, 1048–51 (2013), http://www.law.northwestern.edu
/lawreview/colloquy/2012/15/LRColl2012n15Katz.pdf (describing methods by which the
Court could avoid overturning Grutter in Fisher yet issue a warning that Grutter lacks con-
tinuing force). In Fisher, the Court issued a warning about the importance of strict scrutiny
by courts but stopped short of suppression. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct.
2411, 2419 (2013).
117 See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).
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psychological basis, while they may allow some administrators to achieve political
agendas rather than pedagogical goals.118
We have identified silence about race as a persisting problem in American juris-
prudence. To establish the deep roots of a habit of racial silence, we provided a tele-
scoped review of history on race, detailing specific periods in which silence dominated
and adversely affected the nation’s racial health. Silence has long influenced the
Court’s jurisprudence on race, serving to shift the locus of race rules to privatized
racial bigotry and to the evasions of a system of white supremacy. Today, silence still
influences the Court, reducing constitutional race law to a stale debate between two
views—the increasingly influential ideal of a color-blind constitution and the weaken-
ing impact of the moral reading of the Fourteenth Amendment as about racial justice
for African Americans. The form and the outcome of the ongoing disagreement reduce
space in other public forums for race discourse.
Building on our view that race jurisprudence lacks a rich account of race, today
and in the past, we argued that the Court’s jurisprudence for university admissions
slights the importance of allocating agency to the students for whom diversity is said
to be a benefit. Such an agency would be shared agency among the students, including
those who have been historically deprived of agency and could energize the kind of
exchange that is thought desirable in a university setting. Justice Powell’s opinion in
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke usefully explained that admissions
programs implicate dual constitutional concerns under both the First and Fourteenth
Amendments, explicated by Justice Breyer in his writings on active liberty as contain-
ing a feature of fraternity.119 Academic freedom gives colleges the right to identify
diversity as an educational objective but does not give administrators carte blanche to
implement racial classifications in any fashion they deem appropriate without achiev-
ing the claimed benefit to the learning environment. Universities create resources for
the public square by admitting students who will contribute to the ongoing project
intended to enrich the quality and quantity of citizen engagement. Rank use of race
primarily to confer private advantage, either on students or administrators, creates
social costs that may exceed the gain, particularly given the plausible reasons to doubt
the right or capacity of administrators to act as racial superintendents. But communi-
ties of learners have a strong interest in helping to create the predicate for a healthy
society in which the silence that impairs racial progress is broken by their involve-
ment in composing their learning community with awareness of race and other forms
of diversity as a critical component.
118 Professor Horwitz provides the following caution:
I think you’re right but as a matter of university administration and
academic freedom, including a plurality of approaches among univer-
sities, I think I would emphasize allowing and encouraging student
participation rather than mandate it or see it as a necessary element of
university decisionmaking in this or other areas.
E-mail from Paul Horwitz to author, supra note 87.
119 See generally BREYER, supra note 13.
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The tradition of silence about race and the connection between control over the
form of discourse about race and social and political power point to a need to em-
power student communities, and hence free speech about race. Myths have tended
to supplant greater historical understanding. As a result, we argue, the turn to the
rubric of diversity, managed by administrators, is not an especially good break with
a history of reticence about race.
While subsequent affirmative action opinions, in particular Justice O’Connor’s
opinion in City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co.,120 add useful analysis and caveats
to the entire body of affirmative action constitutional doctrine, Justice Powell’s opin-
ion in Bakke stands out as having struck a conceptual balance for racial health be-
tween personal rights to a benefit and First Amendment freedoms in the academy and
implicitly in other contexts.121 Yet, we express concern that the current Court could
be poised to break this balance after Fisher and could eventually mandate adherence
to strict color blindness.
The framework set out in Grutter v. Bollinger, which permitted a degree of def-
erence to university administrators, was applied by the Fifth Circuit in its Fisher opin-
ion and then “fixed” by the Court in its Fisher opinion. The Fisher “fix” is incomplete,
lacking a template for going forward, as by apportioning “agency” to the whole uni-
versity community.122 We contend that after Fisher, the Court should adapt its affir-
mative action jurisprudence to a revised, renewed Bakke vision of shared agency123
and reject strict color-blind constitutionalism, which would foreclose opportunities
for educational and other community institutions to implement measures that can
overcome racial problems through interracial dialogue. Bakke is by no means perfect.
The language of diversity is implicated in strengthening the tradition of silence about
race.124 Moreover, Bakke is top-down in spirit with an appeal to expertise.125 Yet
Bakke has seeds for constructing a shared agency in the university.
Innovative measures to achieve real racial discourse on campus are a path forward.
Learning communities designed to select students with unique perspectives on race
can create an environment of cross-racial exchange that comports with the college’s
“special niche” in our First Amendment traditions.126 Student participation in admis-
sions, either as a real-world reform or a contrast to the constitutional perils posed by
top-down admissions programs that are vulnerable to administrative manipulation
120 See City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
121 See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
122 See Gail Heriot, Fisher v. University of Texas: The Court (Belatedly) Attempts to Invoke
Reason and Principle, 2013 CATO. SUP. CT. REV. 63, 87–88 (“As a result [of the Fisher
decision], we have now a two-track strict scrutiny test for campus diversity policies . . . . [Such]
[d]ouble standards, however, tend to be unstable.”).
123 Bakke, 428 U.S. at 292–93.
124 See, e.g., Winkler, Sounds of Silence, supra note 21.
125 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 316 (using Harvard admissions as the model).
126 Id. at 311–12.
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of racial categories, is a concept that can generate creative proposals with the poten-
tial to open up healthy racial discourse on campuses.
IV. RACE, SILENCE, AND THE COURT
Race is an essential part of the American story. Despite its centrality to the story
of the nation, it has dropped from sight as a subject for frank public discussion or
remedial action in the era of slavery, during the writing of the Constitution, after
Reconstruction, and in much of the twentieth century. Because silence is the central
shortfall in our national story of race, we add here to our earlier evocation of the past
reticences about race.
A. Racial History: Power, Silences
With the creation of a nation state, what some called the “Slave Power” became
a controlling feature of American politics for a significant part of the nation’s early
history, posing a moral challenge to the Union in demanding that slavery be excluded
from political attack.127 The power of the slave states was sufficient to impose a gag
rule in the House of Representatives that sought to prevent any matter related to slav-
ery from being considered, or even read, on the floor of Congress.128 Tolerated for
eight years, and evaded with debates about the rule itself, the gag rule is emblematic
of subsequent periods and of today: Race was so salient that a rule of silence was
sought by the legislative branch, distorting the normal function of that institution.129
127 See WILLIAM W. FREEHLING, THE ROAD TO DISUNION: SECESSIONISTS TRIUMPHANT,
1854–1861, at xii (1990) (“Northerners called the militant slavocracy the Slave Power, meaning
that those with autocratic power over blacks also deployed undemocratic power over whites.”).
The idea of the “Slave Power” as a political force was contested for some period after the
Civil War but has support from historians. For discussion of Northern views at the time of
the Dred Scott case, see DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE SLAVEHOLDING REPUBLIC: AN
ACCOUNT OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT’S RELATIONS TO SLAVERY 281–82 (Ward
M. McAfee ed., 2001). See also LEONARD L. RICHARDS, THE SLAVE POWER: THE FREE
NORTH AND SOUTHERN DOMINATION, 1780–1860, at 10 n.15 (citing studies showing a dis-
proportionate presence of Southerners in national government).
128 See FEHRENBACHER, supra note 127, at 76 (recounting the initial adoption of the gag
rule by a vote of 117 to 68 in 1836, means of evading it, and its adoption as a standing rule
in 1840, formally preventing the House from receiving or “entertained in any way whatever”
anti-slavery petitions); id. at 76–77 (regarding the standing rule from 1840–1844). James
Oakes emphasizes and recounts that vigorous debate nonetheless occurred during the period
of the gag rules. See OAKES, supra note 91, at 36–40.
129 MICHAEL T. GILMORE, THE WAR ON WORDS: SLAVERY, RACE, AND FREE SPEECH IN
AMERICAN LITERATURE (2010) (describing at length a thesis about silence). Gilmore connects
the evasions in the founding documents, such as the three-fifths clause, the clause affecting
“persons ‘held to service or Labor in one State,’” the gag rule, and the pre–Civil War attacks
on open speech about slavery to the “forcible muzzling” of writing about race in literary works
and attacks on the speech of black persons. Id. at 5–10.
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Ironically, a body designed for robust debate ruled the subject of race off limits at a time
when race was a national preoccupation. The use of the mail to deliver anti-slavery
literature to the South was sabotaged by postmasters and opposed by a president.130
Indeed, tight control over the postal service to prevent its becoming a means of break-
ing the silence imposed on black Americans was first implemented in 1802, when a
rule was enforced forbidding any black person in the North from being employed by
the postal service or handling mail in any role.131 The goal was to prevent any black
person from learning and providing information that might become the basis of re-
sistance to a regime of white rule over both black slaves and free black Northerners,
who were granted little claim on the normal rights of white Americans.132 Blocking
access to information positioned black people as only subjects, deprived of the agency
that would be conferred by information that might enable them to break a pervasive
rule of racial silence. As discussed in a related piece, a tendency toward silence in the
North about the racial basis for the war and the fate of enslaved Southerners and a
practice of censorship in the South were a feature of the official approach and of
popular opinion during the war.133
After the Civil War, political reconciliation between Northern and Southern
whites was pushed by revisionist historians who supported a widespread amnesia
about slavery as the cause of the war.134 The cessation of hostilities between the states
130 This example of the official distaste for race discourse was given a striking expression
when Northern abolitionists undertook a mail campaign to the South, using the postal service to
direct abolitionist newspapers and other tracts to Southern elites and officials. See Smithsonian
Nat’l Postal Museum, America’s First Direct Mail Campaign, PUSHING THE ENVELOPE BLOG
(July 29, 2010), http://postalmuseumblog.si.edu/2010/07/americas-first-direct-mail-campaign
.html. Southern postal officials dragged their feet in their job requirement of delivering the mail,
allowing mobs to destroy the mail in the post office, and were backed by the Postmaster
General. Id. President Jackson sought a law prohibiting the use of the mail to deliver anti-
slavery messages to the South. Id. Again, official policy sought to suppress race as a category
about which dispute was possible or policy change conceivable. Race was benign so long as
a full circulation of disparate views was kept off limits. Id.; see also FEHRENBACHER, supra
note 127, at 76–77 (recounting the initial adoption of the gag rule by a vote of 117 to 68 in
1836, means of evading it, and its role as a starting rule in 1840 preventing the House from
receiving or “entertain[ing] in any way whatever” anti-slavery petitions).
131 See LEON F. LITWACK, NORTH OF SLAVERY: THE NEGRO IN THE FREE STATES, 1790–
1860, at 57 (1961) [hereinafter LITWACK, NORTH OF SLAVERY] (describing Postmaster General
Granger’s expressed concern about “objections to Negro mail carriers ‘of a nature too delicate
to engraft into a report which may become public, yet too important to be omitted or passed
over without full consideration’”).
132 Id. (“Negro . . . [mail carriers] constituted a peril to the nation’s security, for employment
in the postal service afforded them an opportunity to co-ordinate insurrectionary activities,
mix with other people, and acquire subversive information and ideas.”). Granger wished to
prevent free black Americans learning about natural rights and having “an opportunity of
associating . . . and of establishing a chain or line of intelligence.” Id. at 57–58.
133 See generally Kuykendall, Pressing the Mute Button, supra note 20.
134 See JAMES M. MCPHERSON, THIS MIGHTY SCOURGE: PERSPECTIVES ON THE CIVIL WAR
4–8 (2007) (reviewing the dominance into the twentieth century of now-discredited blends
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ushered the country into a preliminary national discussion on the place of newly
freed slaves in a transformed Southern economy built around free labor, as well as
the scope of federal power in protecting the rights of these free laborers.135 For the
first period—the Johnson Reconstruction—harsh “black codes” were enacted that
effectively reinstated involuntary servitude.136 After race riots in Memphis and New
Orleans that resulted in many deaths of freed persons, a political backlash elected
a strong Republican Congress.137 The Republican victory launched a rare political
dialogue on black citizenship and the constitutional policies that would shape the
“essence of Reconstruction.”138 Vindicating the aspiration for equal legal rights as a
basis for political and economic progress, the Congress proposed, and states ratified,
constitutional amendments to abolish involuntary servitude,139 confer citizenship
rights,140 and guarantee suffrage.141 The Reconstruction period ensued, during which
black men and women briefly functioned as partners with white Republicans in ad-
dressing demands for public policies that might build a healthy South with interra-
cial amity.142
That period of partnerships between white Republicans and black Southerners
ended with the loss of commitment in the North to oversee a South still set on ra-
cial separation and white supremacy. Gradually, a “wave of counterrevolutionary
terror . . . swept over large parts of the South.”143 The goal was to stop Reconstruction
in its tracks, use violence or other means to censor any discussion of racial equality,144
and, importantly, treat all political involvement by black citizens as speech treason-
ous to the lingering Southern culture of white dominance and black subservience.145
of Progressive interpretation treating economics as mainly explanatory of American politics,
Southern insistence on a states’ rights interpretation, and revisionists who implied Northern
abolitionists and even Abraham Lincoln were responsible for releasing passions that magnified
sectional conflicts that were not uniquely serious).
135 See FONER, RECONSTRUCTION, supra note 111, at 35–36.
136 Id. at 198–201.
137 See id. at 261–71.
138 Id. at 35.
139 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII (“Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude . . . shall exist
within the United States.”).
140 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
141 U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
142 See FONER, RECONSTRUCTION, supra note 111, at 281–345.
143 Id. at 425.
144 Id. at 426. To this end, terrorist groups, like the Ku Klux Klan, targeted reformers: “The
object of it is to kill out the leading men of the [R]epublican party,” said one Klan victim,
“men who have taken a prominent stand.” Id.
145 A critical event, the Colfax Massacre in Louisiana, crystallized the violent determi-
nation of the white South to use any means to regain racial dominance and pointed the way
to Northern withdrawal from concern for the citizenship of Southern black people. LEEANNA
KEITH, THE COLFAX MASSACRE: THE UNTOLD STORY OF BLACK POWER, WHITE TERROR, AND
THE DEATH OF RECONSTRUCTION 88–110 (2008). In addition, the rule of silence rendered in
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This impulse to censorship became pervasive over time, even reaching into efforts
to silence some Southern scholars, less brutally but with equal force.146 The implicit
acknowledgment of a continuity of de facto African-American citizenship from the
beginning of our history gave way to de facto “non-citizens[hip].”147
As part of an arrangement to settle the election of 1876, when the South almost
elected the first Democratic president since the Civil War, President Rutherford B.
Hayes ordered the withdrawal of federal troops from the South and tacitly granted the
region home rule in the management of its domestic affairs, particularly on matters
pertaining to the status of its black citizens.148 Over the next two decades, the old
guard slowly gained control over state legislatures and enacted laws to “redeem” the
South by reinstating white supremacy and white rule.149 Silence once again enveloped
the matter of race. Over time, the myth of the “Lost Cause,” became a common myth
influencing national understanding.150 In the atmosphere of North/South reconciliation,
blacks lost allies in law.
With the overhang of myth about a lost benign racial hierarchy, and the preference
of Southern aristocrats for elite control over both whites and blacks, a system that
kept elite control in place by setting poor whites apart from potential black allies came
into being.151 With the end of slavery, there was increasingly physical separation be-
tween the races and a dwindling basis for a sense of personal connection.152 Plessy
v. Ferguson adopted, from an existing palette of judicial reasoning about race as a
private matter,153 an ideology about race—one remitting to silence the return of race
suppression—and claimed that public meaning did not arise from legally mandated
segregation. In Plessy, the Court situated race as a private category to which meaning
local memory the massacre of blacks as a “riot” by blacks, a false memory nicely labeled a
“semantic victory” for the silencing of black reality. See id. at xiv.
146 See infra note 344.
147 Margaret Washington: Obstacles Faced by African-Americans, AM. EXPERIENCE PBS,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/1900/filmmore/reference/interview/washing_obstaclesfaced
.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2014).
148 See FONER, RECONSTRUCTION, supra note 111, at 587.
149 See WOODWARD, supra note 111, at 54–55.
150 See GAINES M. FOSTER, GHOSTS OF THE CONFEDERACY: DEFEAT, THE LOST CAUSE,
AND THE EMERGENCE OF THE NEW SOUTH, 1865–1913, at 63–75 (1987) (describing how
Civil War veterans began to express mutual respect for one another and thus to “refocus”
their memory of the war). The Lost Cause involved pictures of a system of benign plantations
that managed slaves and gave them moral guidance, the economic cause of the Civil War,
and reconciliation between whites who had fought. Id.
151 See WOODWARD, supra note 111, at 51–74 (discussing economic reasons to encourage
racial division).
152 See generally JOEL WILLIAMSON, THE CRUCIBLE OF RACE: BLACK-WHITE RELATIONS
IN THE AMERICAN SOUTH SINCE EMANCIPATION 5–52 (1984).
153 Roberts v. Boston, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 198, 209 (1850) (establishing the doctrine of
separate but equal and averring that “prejudice, if it exists, is not created by law, and probably
cannot be changed by law”).
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might be assigned by the races; whites could treat enforced segregation as a private so-
cial preference with no attached meaning meant to be read by blacks, and blacks could
treat it as an insult if they chose to give it a private but unwarranted “construction.”154
Even as government enforced a race practice, the meanings were deemed to be private
and hence neutral and in harmony with the post–Civil War amendments. The Southern
“law” of race was held to be something other than law and hence to contain no state-
enforced message about race.155 Yet the mechanism of a court opinion denying pub-
lic or even private meaning to enforced separation in civic life conveyed additional
insult. In Plessy, race existed as a disadvantage in fact, set forth in the opinion, and yet
did not exist in the legal framework announced to permit states to impose disadvantage
about a category the Court removed from its docket of legal concerns.156 The Court
had earlier, without announcing any theory of racial meaning, neatly excised from the
Fourteenth Amendment any role for public, national law to enforce equality in access
to public places.157
In the twentieth century, racist demagogues refined methods to control public dis-
course, encouraging hysteria about desegregation as an alien threat to Southern life.158
The federal courts avoided direct rebukes when neutral doctrine could impose a check
on crude attacks on civil rights. Attempts to deploy corporation law and libel law to
drive civil rights leaders out of Southern states led to new constitutional doctrine about
associational rights and free speech, but without explicit connection to race speech.159
154 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551–52 (1896).
155 Rebecca Scott analyzes the phrase “public rights,” meaning a right to be treated with dig-
nity in a public sphere. Rebecca J. Scott, Public Rights, Social Equality, and the Conceptual
Roots of the Plessy Challenge, 106 MICH. L. REV. 777, 781 (2008). The term was in use in
Louisiana, with French roots and with an appearance in the Louisiana Constitution. See
generally id. It neatly separated the connotations that the term “social equality” created re-
lating to social intimacy and hence to anxieties about interracial sexual connections from the
public sphere, which many elements of Louisiana society understood as the arena in which “the
dignitary dimension of public life” should be protected. Id. at 787. Opponents successfully
conflated the “notion of public respect” with forced social equality in a private, even intimate
sphere. Id. at 788. Thus, the public sphere became the private sphere, and the forced arrange-
ments backed by state law were placed outside official notice, in a purported space containing
the uncoerced social choices of individuals. The state was able to enforce a rule of race while
claiming to be a silent bystander, indifferent to and uninvolved in private interactions. See
id. at 792. Scott refers to “the fiction of consent.” Id.
156 Plessy, 163 U.S. at 542.
157 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 74–76 (1873).
158 See NUMAN V. BARTLEY, THE NEW SOUTH: 1945–1980, at 236–37 (1995). As part of
linking race with other categories of threat to the Southern order, the White Citizens Council
called its crusade against desegregation a war against “atheism, communism, and mongrel-
ization,” id. at 205, thereby creating the specter of “homosexual integrationist Communists,”
id. at 221.
159 See generally, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); NAACP v.
Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
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The struggles of the black Southerner for a voice often yielded abstract victories for
association and speech but did not produce any significant judicial chastisement of
official state actors for their involvement with the mechanisms of racial silence.160
The Civil Rights era was an exception to the reign of calculated and imposed
silence. The late 1940s to the early 1970s marked a period of real public, official ef-
forts to address the race legacy.161 The aftermath of World War II brought white and
black citizens into a common effort to renew American ideals in individual rights
and equality in post-war life.162 This created a context for a legal strategy on the part
of civil rights lawyers, leading to a slow disassembling of the doctrine of “separate
but equal” established in the late nineteenth century Plessy embrace of a rule of Jim
Crow–validating race evasion.163
In the silence-disrupting case of Brown v. Board of Education,164 the Court re-
versed not only a point of doctrine, but ended the denial that meaning attached to
state-enforced racial segregation and committed the country to an era of open dis-
course about race, thus conceding the impact of public silence on private lives and the
need for public action to address the effects of a history of injustice supported by
tactics of evasion.165 The holding in Brown directly refuted the race psychology of
Plessy by insisting that “separate but equal” public school facilities psychologically
harmed black children.166 Brown’s statement about the meaning of segregation was
a bold embrace of a discourse about race. Yet, with a bold invitation to treat race as
a category of public concern, it has been noted that the Brown Court never frankly
announced that the Brown doctrine, rationalized as a needed corrective to harm in-
flicted upon children, was a new rule about race, applicable to public parks167 and
other municipal facilities.168
160 For a discussion of the strong component of racial harassment in the litigating choices
in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, see Garrett Epps, The Other Sullivan Case, 1 N.Y.U. J.L.
& LIBERTY 783, 785 (2005).
161 See Theodore M. Shaw, The Race Convention and Civil Rights in the United States,
3 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 19, 35 (1998) (citing World War II as a major factor in bringing about
social change with regard to race).
162 See id.
163 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
164 399 U.S. 294 (1955).
165 Id.
166 Id. at 298. The Court denied that racially segregated schools could be separate but equal.
167 See Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (per curiam).
168 See Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61 (1963) (per curiam) (courtroom); Turner v. City
of Memphis, 369 U.S. 350 (1962) (per curiam) (airport restaurant); Gayle v. Browder, 352
U.S. 903 (1956) (per curiam) (bus); Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (per
curiam) (public golf course). In defending Brown v. Board of Education against the criti-
cisms of Herbert Wechsler in Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV.
L. REV. 1, 22–34 (1959), Charles Black lodged only one critique: The failure of the Court to
“[spell] out that segregation . . . is perceptibly a means of ghettoizing the imputedly inferior
race.” Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421,
1044 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 22:1011
B. Persisting Racial Silences
Even though Brown set the nation forth on a new era in which a classification
by race could be never again be said to have no meaning, race did not disappear from
the nation’s life. New work describing and making salient the pattern in incarceration
of black males as a form of social control is both a recognition of and challenge to the
persistence of racial silence.169 The grain of truth in Plessy, that white social prefer-
ence was the behavioral driver of separation of the races, remains part of American
life. Race is pervasive in private decisions regarding housing,170 schooling,171 em-
ployment,172 marriage,173 and social interactions arising from proximity created by
430 n.25 (1960). Black speculated that even Brown, despite its acceptance of common sense
about the Plessy error as to the psychology of enforced segregation, contained one bow to
the prevailing silence about race: “[R]eluctance to go into the distasteful details of the southern
caste system.” Id.
169 See ALEXANDER, supra note 110, at 164. Alexander develops a comparison of the mass
incarceration of racial minorities as a result of the War on Drugs to the operation of Jim Crow
Laws. See id. She maintains that the purported color blindness of mass incarceration coupled
with the “mistaken belief that racial animus is necessary for the creation and maintenance of
racialized systems” perpetuate our nation’s “deep denial” regarding race and social control.
Id. at 178.
170 See Sheryll D. Cashin, Localism, Self-Interest, and the Tyranny of the Favored Quarter:
Addressing the Barriers to New Regionalism, 88 GEO. L.J. 1985, 1994 n.35 (2000).
171 See Donald E. Lively & Stephen Plass, Equal Protection: The Jurisprudence of Denial
and Evasion, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 1307, 1338 n.168 (1991).
172 See Leticia M. Saucedo, The Browning of the American Workplace: Protecting Workers
in Increasingly Latino-ized Occupations, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 303, 313 (2004) (“[A]n
analysis of brown-collar occupations in eighteen immigrant-receiving, ethnically heterogeneous
metropolitan areas shows that whites are the population most likely to be segregated from
brown collar workers, followed by native blacks, native Latinos, and earlier immigrant Latinos.
White males benefit because segregated jobs tend to ‘crowd’ white males into higher-paying
positions. . . . The trend is especially troubling because it may signal the re-segregation of the
workplace throughout the South and Midwest.”).
173 See RALPH RICHARD BANKS, IS MARRIAGE FOR WHITE PEOPLE? HOW THE AFRICAN
AMERICAN MARRIAGE DECLINE AFFECTS EVERYONE 2–3 (2012) (referring to African
Americans as “the most unmarried people in our nation,” noting the absence of marriage
partners for college-educated black women and asserting that black women “marry down but
not out”); see also PAUL TAYLOR ET AL., PEW RESEARCH SOCIAL & DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS,
MARRYING OUT: ONE-IN-SEVEN NEW U.S. MARRIAGES IS INTERRACIAL OR INTERETHNIC
(2010), available at http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1616/american-marriage-interracial-interethnic
(providing statistics on interracial marriage rates). Although the rate of interracial marriage
has doubled over the past thirty years, see RYAN, supra note 105, at 292–93, over eighty-five
percent of the public prefers to marry a person from the same race. See TAYLOR ET AL.,
supra. According to Pew Research, in 1980, 6.7% and now 14.6% of newlyweds are inter-
racial couples, but the rates vary by racial demographic, with Hispanics and Asians experi-
encing little to no growth, while “[r]ates more than doubled among whites and nearly tripled
among blacks.” Id. at ii.
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housing and employment. The historical residue carried over from the nation’s past
of private racial rules and separations lures some citizens to live behind a wall of ra-
cial silence in which they are shielded from interacting with other ethnic groups in
their daily lives. Consequently, race discussion occurs in private undertones and in
occasional eruptions about a racially polarizing incident.174 National controversies,
such as cross-racial murder charges or the arrest of a Harvard professor for entering
his home, generate loud arguments on cable television and on internet websites, but
rarely contain the seeds of official deliberation over race.175 Colorable accusations of
racism, especially if class is also an element, create volatile reactions that often de-
mand a disavowal of the claim. If the charge hits someone who figures as a stand-in
for “color-blind” authority, it becomes a speech act in need of erasure.176 Charges that
threaten the “raceless” reading of disputed interactions trigger responses of the deepest
resentment and repudiation.177 The dialogue that occurs is submerged in opinion polls,
174 The trial of the football star O.J. Simpson for murder, the arrest in his Cambridge home
of Professor “Skip” Gates as a possible intruder, and the trial for the killing of teenager
Trayvon Martin by a neighborhood watchman are all sufficiently notorious to rank as com-
mon knowledge.
175 AP Poll: Majority Harbor Prejudice Against Blacks, POLITICO (Oct. 27, 2012,
10:37 AM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1012/82964.html (“‘Part of it is growing
polarization within American society,’ said Fredrick Harris, director of the Institute for Re-
search in African-American Studies at Columbia University. ‘The last Democrat in the White
House said we had to have a national discussion about race. There’s been total silence around
issues of race with this president. . . . It will take more generations, I suspect, before we elim-
inate these deep feelings.’”).
176 The incident involving the arrest in his home of Professor Gates generated strong reac-
tions denying race could have played any part:
Amid the accusations of racial profiling, many online commentators,
bloggers, and analysts came to Crowley’s defense, saying he was putting
his life on the line responding to a report of a crime in progress, basi-
cally doing honest police work. But for Gates’s bellicosity, those people
said, the arrest would not have occurred and the encounter would have
gone unpublicized.
Tracy Jan, No Charge, but Gates Case Seethes, BOS. GLOBE (July 22, 2009), http://www
.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/articles/2009/07/22/no_charge_but_gates_case_seethes/.
177 Even the first black President must minimize his claim on “agency” in race politics by
avoiding frank discussion of race uproars. President Obama has learned to avoid comments on
such incidents, lest he be seen as “taking sides” between an African-American elite professor—
as a stand-in both for black suspects and snobbish intellectuals—and a working-class white
policeman. In the occasional cacophony of voices over race, the dialogue becomes a sideshow,
lacking any part in a public agenda of racial discourse or policy-making to address race. See
Obama Remark on Gates’ Arrest Angers Cops, USA TODAY (July 23, 2009, 7:31 PM),
http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2009-07-23-cops-reaction_N.htm (quoting claims that
Obama’s comments calling the arrest of Professor Gates in his home “stupid” will make it more
difficult for “police to work with people of color”); see also Ta-Nehisi Coates, Fear of a Black
President, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Sept. 2012, at 76, 78 (discussing the reticence of President
Barack Obama to discuss race, describing “indelible blackness” as “irradiat[ing] everything
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call-in programs, and comment sections on the Internet.178 It has been argued that the
charge of racism can only be understood and afforded rhetorical power if the form
that it takes “refer[s] to no identifiable object, literally means nothing.”179 Race as a
public category is both avoided and manipulated.
C. Racial Silence, Higher Education, and Supreme Court Racial Jurisprudence
A potential asset in building racial discourse is higher education. Ideally, the
nation’s campuses would be a source of energy and initiative in enriching under-
standing of the country’s racial past and helping shape its future as a racially diverse
society. Yet critics (or cynics), including some Supreme Court Justices, assert that
college administrators use race to fashion programs that lack a commitment to cross-
racial understanding and union in diversity.180 Some argue that race-based admissions
he touches,” and asserting that “African Americans have historically been restricted to the
realm of protest and agitation” rather than power); Frederick C. Harris, The Price of a Black
President: Have African-American Elites Given Obama a Pass, Accepting Symbolism over
Substance?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2012, at SR1 (describing the Obama presidency as having
“marked the decline, rather than the pinnacle, of a political vision centered on challenging
racial inequality”).
178 Often, black and white opinion differs markedly. See, e.g., PEW RESEARCH CTR. FOR
THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS, BIG RACIAL DIVIDE OVER ZIMMERMAN VERDICT: WHITES SAY
TOO MUCH FOCUS ON RACE, BLACKS DISAGREE 1 (2013) (finding that only five percent of
black respondents were satisfied with the acquittal of the defendant in the shooting of teenager,
Trayvon Martin, compared with forty-nine percent of white respondents). The portrait of a
“diverse” society, imagined as a mixture of individuals blending together across racial and
ethnic lines and sorted into cohorts of affinity by life experience and work and other roles,
displays strong traces of racial sorting beneath the new layer of paint. Yet there is normally
more talk of an imagined diversity than of the underlying sharp lines of separation. Again, there
is an easy adoption of an image over a confrontation with remnants of our racial legacy.
179 See Claudia Brodsky Lacour, Doing Things with Words: “Racism” as Speech Act, and
the Undoing of Justice, in RACE-ING JUSTICE, EN-GENDERING POWER: ESSAYS ON ANITA
HILL, CLARENCE THOMAS, AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY 127, 138–39 (Toni
Morrison ed., 1992) (interpreting the “bifurcation of ‘racism’ from the realm of literal referents”
in connection with Supreme Court nominee Clarence Thomas’s charge that Anita Hill’s tes-
timony against him constituted racism). Instances in which a single derogatory racial remark
can end a career provide some refutation of this characterization, leaving the land-mines of
speech affecting race buried in uncharted terrain.
180 At their most scathing, the Justices accuse university administrators of indulging in an
aesthetics of race for their own personal gratification:
Because the Equal Protection Clause renders the color of one’s skin
constitutionally irrelevant to the Law School’s mission, I refer to the
Law School’s interest as an “aesthetic.” That is, the Law School wants
to have a certain appearance, from the shape of the desks and tables in
its classrooms to the color of the students sitting at them.
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 354 n.3 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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that create racially diverse campuses, without a programmatic plan for exchange, leads
to a social climate in which students are given group resources to segregate themselves
along racial lines. Indeed, the concept of “counterspaces” as a remedy for racial dis-
comfort encourages some degree of racial separation.181
Campus diversity is promoted as a design for amelioration of tensions in a
largely peaceful society. Yet, there is some indication in empirical examinations that
diverse campuses may have surprisingly high levels of racial tension.182 Empirical
evidence on the educational and social impact of campus diversity is, despite the
link of such evidence to the claims for diversity designed by university bureaucrats,
virtually absent from the extensive Supreme Court analytic efforts to fashion racial
jurisprudence for social health in educational settings and in society generally.183 The
low visibility of such information in legal materials, other than to determine whether
race is used as a determinative factor in admissions,184 leads the Court to rely heavily
upon constitutional platitudes.185 Such platitudes have the effect of “framing” the race
discussion in ways that tend to replicate, rather than enhance, the available cultural
material that gives shape to understandings for “cataloging Blacks.”186
With such thin empirical knowledge as a base, the Court has devised a limited
menu of choices for judicial decisionmaking on race-conscious government pro-
grams.187 As much as race penetrates the American psyche and impacts individual
181 See Allen & Solorzano, supra note 57, at 258–63 (describing counterspaces).
182 See, e.g., Sylvia Hurtado, The Campus Racial Climate: Contexts of Conflict, 63
J. HIGHER EDUC. 539, 541–43 (1992) (discussing the phenomenon of racial conflict on
American campuses in the 1980s, relating the level of conflict to selectivity, and calling for
more research to identify factors that contribute to different groups’ development in the uni-
versity environment).
183 See Justin Pidot, Intuition or Proof: The Social Science Justification for the Diversity
Rationale in Grutter v. Bollinger and Gratz v. Bollinger, 59 STAN. L. REV. 761, 795–96
(2006) (suggesting that the courts may draw unsupported conclusions from the diversity
studies presented in litigation); see also id. at 805 (“Like the dueling opinions issued by the
Sixth Circuit, neither the majority nor Justice Thomas’s dissent in Grutter explained why
certain social science evidence was convincing.”).
184 See generally, e.g., Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
185 While we do not wish to be uncharitable in characterizing the Court’s contribution in
advancing constitutional dialogue on race, it is nonetheless worth considering the extent of
the distance between core claims by the Court about race and the stories called by Professor
Eduardo Bonilla-Silva “ideological ‘of course’ racial narratives.” BONILLA-SILVA, supra note
67, at 76. Professor Bonilla-Silva calls these stories “social products,” with generic characters
(“a black man”), the use of similar phrases (“the past is the past”), and an ideological function
that places “the story tellers and their audiences” in a shared, factual universe. Id.; see supra
text accompanying notes 14–15.
186 ROBERT M. ENTMAN & ANDREW ROJECKI, THE BLACK IMAGE IN THE WHITE MIND:
MEDIA AND RACE IN AMERICA 49 (2000) (explaining “framing” as a type of schema that
selectively defines problems and creates images and propounds moral judgments and, with
race, helps support latent prejudice).
187 The opinion in Fisher provides a mini-treatise on the existing protocol on the limited
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decisionmaking, poorly articulated, even intuitive and informal attitudes about race
influence the Court’s response to efforts to address the legacy of racial injustice. The
jurisprudence it has generated cannot be called sociological, with the much-critiqued
exception of Brown.188 It can scarcely be called path-breaking in terms of enriching
race discourse. It comes today to rest on opposing moral claims that can neither be
settled by reasoned debate nor used to create constructive public exchange addressing
the legacy of race. The Court’s jurisprudence does not create discourse linking our
racial past to our present racial world. Nor does it give to the rising generations, being
sorted by numerical and other comparisons into educational settings often lacking a
basis for community of any kind, the tools with which to change the direction of our
racial journey. The Court’s jurisprudence now limits exploration into official discourse
on race to mainly two competing, unnuanced theories that either withhold opportuni-
ties for innovation or provide too much deference to a purported government expertise
in this area.189 The ensuing debate between these schools of thought reinforces the
nation’s propensity for silence and inhibits meaningful efforts to improve racial health.
One effect is a significant amount of segregation in secondary education, and even
within “diverse” university environments. Without repeating a wholesale embrace of
de jure segregation, contemporary jurisprudence tends toward reproducing “[t]he
separation of the races in the schools” and “perpetuat[ing] a separation of cultures”
that came to characterize the South for many years.190
V. COLOR-BLIND DOGMA, COLOR-CONSCIOUSNESS, AND BAKKE:
JURISPRUDENCE OF SILENCE, OPEN ANTISUBORDINATION RACIAL
INCLUSION, AND APPROVED ADMINISTRATOR CODE
A. The Color-Blind and Color-Conscious Theories
In all the ink spilled in its race cases, the Court has constructed mainly two com-
peting ideologies that superintend government action aimed at addressing past racial
wrongs and in the process chart the perimeters of official discourse on race. The anti-
subordination theory conceives a Fourteenth Amendment that restricts the state from
creating classifications intended to “stigmatize or exclude.”191 This theory affords
the government some leeway in experimenting with racial categories that are benign,
meaning that racial classifications are constitutional so long as they remedy the social
effects of past discrimination against minorities as well as the legacy of slavery. This
permissions to use race classifications. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411,
2417–20 (2013).
188 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
189 See infra notes 191–206.
190 WILLIAMSON, supra note 152, at 252.
191 Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 771, 799 (2007)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
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interpretation has a moral component. White supremacy, these theorists contend, is
not the equivalent of measures taken by the majority to benefit the minority, which
are legitimated in our entire jurisprudence as the antisubordination principle.192
It also is a good fit for the overall jurisprudence of the Court on the Fourteenth
Amendment, which emphasizes that the Fourteenth Amendment is meant to protect
against an intentional abuse of government power with a purpose to inflict harm.193 The
doctrine holds that a discriminatory effect of a program not designed with a purpose
to harm a group, though the effect is certain to occur, does not violate the Fourteenth
Amendment.194 Thus, because programs designed to create a public commitment to
modest racial ameliorations are not plausibly aimed at harming white people, the anti-
subordination theory has support in other Fourteenth Amendment doctrines embraced
by the conservative Justices on the Court.195 This is admittedly an aggressive interpre-
tation of cases mainly about the ability of legislatures to help a group even when there
is predictable harm to an entirely different group. Insofar as any effort to aid a racial
group or groups harms the racial population group or groups not aided, the argument
is defective. Indeed, some of the anticlassification rhetoric in affirmative action cases
attempt to claim antisubordination for white applicants to schools, who are presented
as victims harmed by belonging to a disfavored race.196 Whether all populations not
192 For an explication of the source of the antisubordination theory in the writings of Owen
Fiss, its comparison with the anticlassification theory, and an argument that antisubordination
remains an element of American constitutional law, see generally Jack M. Balkin & Reva B.
Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition: Anticlassification or Antisubordination?, 58
U. MIAMI L. REV. 9 (2003).
193 See, e.g., Town of Castle Rock, Colo. v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 768 (2005) (holding that
a property interest must have some ascertainable monetary value); Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S.
327, 335–36 (1986) (holding that where a government official’s act causing injury to life, liberty,
or property is merely negligent, no procedure for compensation is constitutionally required).
194 Except for the formalism of the anticlassification principle, cases that allow state actions
with a predictable discriminatory result if they are not motivated by a discriminatory motive
adopt a rule that forgives damaging effects on an impacted group if there is no animus or
motive to harm the group. See, e.g., Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 274–75
(1979) (regarding gender); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239–45 (1976) (regarding race).
195 See supra note 191.
196 Justice Scalia’s assertion that “there can be no . . . debtor race” casts the white majority
as a group potentially burdened by a status subordinate to that of the “creditor . . . race.”
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 239 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring). Though
much of the U.S. population has taken on consumer debt, there is a stigma historically asso-
ciated with the idea of being a debtor, particularly one that has a long overdue amount owing.
Indeed, the denial that the white race can be a debtor race resonates oddly with the metaphor
in Martin Luther King’s I Have A Dream speech, in which he asserted, “America has given
the Negro people a bad check, a check which has come back marked ‘insufficient funds.’”
Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr., I Have A Dream (Aug. 28, 1963). Scalia’s echo of debtor lan-
guage suggests a group at risk of being assigned to a long-term subordinate status based on
the collective stigma of moral insolvency.
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aided by a formal classification are intended to be harmed is the nub of the argument.
Large programs aimed at expressive richness in a university are not necessarily the
equivalent of reverse discrimination aimed at individuals with malicious intent.197 They
do deal in a common classification and cannot be seen as affecting a classification.
The opposing theory is that of the color-blind constitution. A “color-blind” man-
date embraces strict anticlassification or antidiscrimination principles. The anticlassifi-
cation principle frames the theory as a barrier against the harmful effects that arise
from race-conscious government decisionmaking.198 Color blindness, in the view of
its proponents, ensures that policy deliberations are not infected with either racial
stereotyping or racial politics.199 It removes the category from discourse, particularly
among government officials who wield considerable power to dispense benefits to
favored groups.200 In addition, these advocates insist that racial consciousness “has
inevitably led to divisiveness,”201 priming Americans to see themselves as members
of their distinct racial group as opposed to viewing themselves primarily as citizens
that “share more commonalities than distinctions” with their fellow countrymen.202
This facilitates, they conclude, “identity politics,” making groups compete for gov-
ernment benefits at the expense of targeted groups.203 The effect is surely heightened
when the affected group—university students—lacks all agency as a common part-
ner in creating a community and hence lack a bond provided by a sense of collective
psychological investment.204
Despite a reasonable concern with racial identity politics, the “purist” version of
the color-blind view consists heavily of assertion and repetition, without nuance.205
197 See infra text accompanying notes 207–09.
198 Though the opinion for the Court in City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co. leaves some
room for race-conscious action to ameliorate ongoing societal discrimination—in which a
government program may play a passive role that helps effectuate its distributional effects—
Justice O’Connor’s opinion provides instruction on the risks of political motivation affecting
race. 488 U.S. 469, 731 (1989) (“[T]here is a danger that a racial classification is merely the
product of unthinking stereotypes or a form of racial politics.”). Justice Thomas’s concurrence
in Fisher provides an almost surely comprehensive enumeration of all the arguably negative
features of race-conscious university admissions. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133
S. Ct. 2411, 2422–34 (2013) (Thomas, J., concurring).
199 City of Richmond, 488 U.S. at 493 (referring to “racial politics”).
200 Id.
201 Isaac Simon, Constitutional Theory Building in the Context of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment: The History of Affirmative Action, 23 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 113, 136 (2002).
202 Id.
203 Id. at 135–36.
204 Building a community is an undertaking with critical psychological components which
are not discussed in any of the Court’s writings on the benefits of diversity admissions to
build a learning community. See generally SEYMOUR B. SARASON, THE PSYCHOLOGICAL
SENSE OF COMMUNITY: PROSPECTS FOR A COMMUNITY PSYCHOLOGY (1974) (providing
founding work on the psychology of community).
205 Though Justice Thomas’s lengthy discussion in Fisher is undeniably creative and
thought-provoking, it nonetheless has the legal form of advocacy for persuasion and relies
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Racial classifications are wrong, we are told, and they are presumptively unconstitu-
tional. The assertion is forceful, but the moral theory is not stated with any effort to
align it with the theory of the Fourteenth Amendment as a barrier to the use of gov-
ernment power to oppress in ways at odds with core liberties.206 There is a strong
basis for the view that the theoretical loss of a seat in a school because of aspirations
to better racial health and dialogue does not carry with it the concerns that assertion
of white superiority would.207 Thus, even if the effects of benign racial programs are
unwise, such claimed imperfections are seemingly not at the core of the constitu-
tional concerns in the Fourteenth Amendment. Further, the stance of race “purism”
does not necessarily prevent racial politics and may obstruct solutions to persisting
dynamics of racially motivated harms in political domains.208
Nonetheless, it is also deeply problematic for the Supreme Court and those to
whom it implicitly delegates authority to assign a grade to racial injury. The effect
is to sponsor a franchise in today’s multiracial society for comparing racial injuries,
potentially doing direct harm to identified members of a group, on the basis of a race-
tinged agenda. The effect of setting up a faux language that evades open discussion
of race is often to empower thinly disguised uses of shared public resources by inside
players to advance racial agendas. These agendas can be for personal racial advantage
by cynical recipients of “racial entitlement” or for use by racial “majorities” seeking
to gain advantage from parceling out thinly disguised racial rewards. In groups that
have been encouraged to use coded race language for racial goals, the group may
even act on transparently racial animus against members of the shared “majority,”
whose weaknesses are magnified while those of racial minorities are treated as un-
acceptable for open discussion. The motive may be retaliation for opposing racial
on a legal style of argumentative assertion. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct.
2411, 2424–26 (2013) (Thomas, J., concurring). For example, Justice Thomas asserts: “As
should be obvious, there is nothing ‘pressing’ or ‘necessary’ about obtaining whatever edu-
cational benefits may flow from racial diversity,” and “[i]f the Court were actually applying
strict scrutiny, it would require Texas either to close the University or to stop discriminating
against applicants based on their race.” Id.; see also Carole J. Buckner, Realizing Grutter v.
Bollinger’s “Compelling Educational Benefits of Diversity”—Transforming Aspirational
Rhetoric into Experience, 72 UMKC L. REV. 877, 877–78 (2004) (noting the need for diverse
interactions among students with diverse viewpoints and suggesting admissions, without
more, is merely rhetoric); Pidot, supra note 183, at 778 (suggesting that the Grutter majority
relied more on intuition than science, i.e., empirical evidence).
206 Again, Justice Thomas attempts a coherent claim within the limiting epistemology of
legal style: “I think the lesson of history is clear enough: Racial discrimination is never
benign.” Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2430.
207 Justice Thomas makes clever claims in a passage quoting segregationists’ arguments
for the benign effects of enforced segregation, concluding that “[t]he University’s professed
good intentions cannot excuse its outright racial discrimination any more than such intentions
justified the now denounced arguments of slaveholders and segregationists.” Id.
208 E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2012) (regarding enforcement of voter rights); Shelby Cnty.
v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013) (striking down a portion of the Voting Rights Act).
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decisionmaking, or merely a view of other members of the nominal “majority” as
expendable in a racial game. The result is to undermine the dignity of all groups, in-
cluding the sometimes unknowing recipients of race-motivated awards.
The purist claim is made with a degree of heat not present in the opinions that
argue either for the antisubordination understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment or
in judicial warnings about the risks race classification brings to politics.209 The heat in
the opinions is unidirectional, using language of moral outrage to evoke an idea of deep
wrong. In truth, the judicial language and holdings of the opinions provide a prob-
lematic validation of resentful emotions that race-conscious programs can trigger.210
The opinions bring to racial discourse the theme of public danger, the ominous note,
as in a movie filled with dread: The warnings strive for hair-raising effects, like the
whistling by Robert Mitchum in “The Night of the Hunter” that signals fear and po-
tential violence to children he is stalking.211 The argumentation contributes vivid lan-
guage to public discourse—“there can be no such thing as either a creditor or a debtor
race”212—but the vehemence is mainly useful in debate rather than in legal pronounce-
ments that might command deference to a legal rule based in moral understanding.213
The principle that any public action predicated on race violates a sacred moral prin-
ciple is not a self-evident moral truth for a just society.214 Indeed, a just society may
209 Justices O’Connor and Powell have provided temperate statements on the risk of po-
litical uses of race, and Justices Stevens and Ginsburg have commented, without heat, on the
legacy of racial injustice. See supra notes 5–6, 198 and accompanying text; infra note 237
and accompanying text.
210 See supra text accompanying notes 66–72.
211 See Matthew Gritten, Night of the Hunter: A Masterpiece of American Cinema,
TELEGRAPH (Jan. 17, 2014, 1:26 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/film/10579291
/Night-of-the-Hunter-a-Masterpiece-of-American-cinema.html.
212 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 239 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring).
This formulation by Justice Scalia coincides with two of the popular framing stories described
by Professor Bonilla-Silva as a collective social product of color-blind ideology. BONILLA-
SILVA, supra note 67, at 77–82. The first is called “The Past is the Past” (for example, “I don’t
know if anyone is owed anything because of the, like, past.”). Id. at 77–79. The second is,
“I Didn’t Own any Slaves” (“Me, as a white person, I had nothing to do with slavery” and
“we shouldn’t be punished real harshly for the things that our ancestors did.”). Id. at 79–82.
213 See Pidot, supra note 183, at 764 (noting that the plaintiffs in Grutter mainly relied on
legal argumentation rather than attacking the social science presented by the University of
Michigan). Some of what counts in the area of race as legal argumentation, however, consists
of moral and constitutional rhetoric that assumes the cast of legal argument, but is fraught
with rhetorical assertions.
214 For the pre-eminent political theory in the twentieth century of the conditions for a just
society, see JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (rev. ed. 1999). For a treatment of Rawls’s
silence in the book on racial justice, see Charles W. Mills, Rawls on Race/Race in Rawls, 47
S. J. PHIL. 161, 162 (2009) (explaining that Rawls does not address race as a result of “a cru-
cial ambiguity: ‘ideally just’ as meaning a society without any previous history of injustice
and ‘ideally just’ as meaning a society with an unjust history that has now been completely
corrected for”).
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require correction for past injustice before its conditions can be fulfilled.215 Yet sev-
eral Justices assert the color-blind principle as constitutional and moral bedrock.216
Concern for the possibility that a white litigant lost a seat at a school is seen as
the basis for imposing strict requirements that may result in the loss of seats for minor-
ities.217 Such a view of race as marking an intrusion into a niche of society previously
governed by a different set of rules could be seen to echo post–Civil War responses
to newly gained black access to arenas formerly reserved for white people.218 For uni-
versities, blackness is presumed by those opposed to all use of race to mark all that
it touches if it is named and to throw the natural order of university admissions into
a pit of race injustice and spoliation. The basis for resentment has changed with con-
text, but the need to find means for a connection freed of resentments and silences
remains critical. The causes of resentment have become more complex than immedi-
ately after nineteenth-century reactions by Southern whites to the ending of slavery.
215 Philosopher Thomas Nagel has addressed affirmative action and Rawlsian justice as
follows:
[A]ffirmative action . . . is probably best understood in Rawlsian terms
as an attempt at corrective justice—an attempt to rectify the residual
consequences of a particularly gross violation in the past of the first
principle of equal rights and liberties. Affirmative action therefore does
not form a part of what Rawls would call “strict compliance theory” or
ideal theory, which is what the two principles of justice are supposed
to describe.
Thomas Nagel, Rawls and Liberalism, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO RAWLS 62, 84 n.3
(Samuel Freeman ed., 2003); see also Mills, supra note 214, at 162.
216 See City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 521 (1989) (Scalia, J., con-
curring) (“At least where state or local action is at issue, only a social emergency rising to
the level of imminent danger to life and limb—for example, a prison race riot, requiring tem-
porary segregation of inmates . . . —can justify an exception to the principle embodied in the
Fourteenth Amendment that ‘[o]ur Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates
classes among citizens.’” (quoting Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting))); Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 780–
82 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“The Constitution is not that malleable. Even if current
social theories favor classroom racial engineering as necessary to ‘solve the problems at
hand,’ . . . the Constitution enshrines principles independent of social theories.” (citation
omitted)); id. at 748 (majority opinion) (“The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race
is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.”).
217 See Stephen Clowney, Doing Affirmative Action, 111 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS
27, 28 (2013), http://www.michiganlawreview.org/articles/doing-affirmative-action (arguing
that the effects of affirmative action on admissions are exaggerated and that “an attack on af-
firmative action—divorced from a larger project of increasing fairness in college admissions—
amounts to an attack on black social mobility”).
218 See LEON F. LITWACK, TROUBLE IN MIND: BLACK SOUTHERNERS IN THE AGE OF JIM
CROW 217–79 (1998) [hereinafter LITWACK, TROUBLE IN MIND] (discussing the methods by
which the post–Civil War South re-established pre–Civil War racial rules through legal enact-
ments and restriction of black access to public arenas).
1054 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 22:1011
With new forms of diversity, critical dependence on publicly funded means of ad-
vancement in a “knowledge” society, and the deepening loss of cultural memory about
race, resentment has multiple sources and new means of addressing it to move toward
racial health.219
The theoretical standoff between color-blind and race-conscious theorists is a
damaging impasse in the Court’s affirmative-action jurisprudence, with public silence
a result of the failure by the Court to engage in a discussion that advances thinking
and promotes exchange. Public discourse between these groups poses a stark choice:
whether the Federal Constitution demands total suppression of racial categories or
permits state implementation of racial classifications so long as the discrimination
is not intentional discrimination aimed at a vulnerable group.220 Is such a choice the
only choice we have, or does equal protection doctrine chart another approach to
race-conscious government behavior that does not necessarily keep time to the beat
of either the color-blind or race-conscious drum? Can room be made for official race
discourse in the nation’s life?
B. Bakke’s “Multitude of Tongues”: Breaking Silence Through
Academic Freedom
In Board of Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,221 Justice Powell cap-
tured the essence of diversity in the university as a component of academic freedom.222
Justice Powell’s opinion recognized that admissions programs implicate two constitu-
tional interests that appear at odds with one another.223 On the one hand, race-conscious
admissions interfere with the “personal rights” of applicants to be evaluated for a seat
at a state-sponsored college based upon individualized assessment consistent with the
guarantee of “equal protection of the laws.”224 But, significantly for social health and
support for advancement of First Amendment goods, colleges and universities, as state
actors, play a unique role in our free speech traditions and have an interest in consid-
ering all aspects of a candidate’s background, including their racial status, to determine
whether they will contribute to the “robust exchange of ideas” on its campuses.225
With its dual concern for “not race”226 and “racial, ethnic, and cultural diversity” and
219 See LEON F. LITWACK, BEEN IN THE STORM SO LONG: THE AFTERMATH OF SLAVERY
255, 258–59 (3d ed. 1981) [hereinafter LITWACK, BEEN IN THE STORM] (referring to the need
for freedmen to act with caution to avoid giving offense); JOEL WILLIAMSON, AFTER SLAVERY:
THE NEGRO IN SOUTH CAROLINA DURING RECONSTRUCTION, 1861–1877, at 254 (1965)
(noting that some white people were irritated by the mere freedom of the former slaves).
220 See supra notes 191–208 and accompanying text.
221 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
222 Id. at 281–320.
223 Id.
224 Id. at 289 (internal quotation marks omitted).
225 Id. at 313 (internal quotation marks omitted).
226 Id. at 403 (Blackman, J., concurring).
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race,227 Bakke stands firmly for the proposition that admissions programs aiming to
achieve racial balancing or to institute a quota system are constitutionally impermis-
sible.228 At the same time, Bakke launched a renewed excursion by the Court into ra-
cial “sleight of hand,”229 this time one where race appears and then disappears. You
see it; then it’s gone. With a recognition of the agency of those provided with enriched
opportunities for racial discourse and learning for a diverse society, sleight of hand
can be ended in favor of open protocols for creating learning communities composed
to confer genuine interracial partnerships on student groupings.
Justice Powell’s reasoning appears aligned with color-blind constitutionalism. Yet,
despite concerns that “diversity” sanitizes race,230 Powell’s opinion is not dogmatic.
The opinion recognizes a role for race in the admissions process: “Ethnic diversity . . .
is only one element in a range of factors a university properly may consider in attain-
ing the goal of a heterogeneous student body.”231 In this regard, Powell parts company
with color-blind purists who believe in a puritanical application of the theory to the
Equal Protection Clause. The salient defect in strict colorblindness in this area is thus
addressed. Racial puritanism leaves absolutely no space for academic freedom, which
includes, among other things, the right of educational institutions to the presence of
students who can potentially contribute to the “robust exchange of ideas” that is in-
tegral to the “fulfillment of [their] mission.”232 By permitting colleges and universities
to use race as a means to achieve a compelling state interest in a diverse student body,
Justice Powell placed blanket appeals to pure colorblindness outside the bounds of
affirmative-action jurisprudence as it relates to college admissions programs.
This is not to say, however, that Bakke is based upon race-conscious reasoning.
On the contrary, Justice Powell’s opinion painstakingly articulated how reviewing
courts should evaluate race-conscious admissions programs under the narrow tailoring
prong of strict scrutiny in order to afford each applicant individualized assessment
and safeguard the process from administrative efforts to achieve racial balancing.233
Race, as Justice Powell explained, may only be implemented as a “plus” factor in a
227 Id. at 293 (majority opinion).
228 See City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493–94 (1989).
229 The view of the Bakke analysis as sleight of hand has multiple adherents. While some
see it as hiding race and imposing a veil of silence, much as this Article argues occurs generally
with race, another view is that the treatment of Alan Bakke as a victim of racial unfairness
in Bakke is Fourteenth Amendment sleight of hand. See JOHN LEA, POLITICAL CORRECTNESS
AND HIGHER EDUCATION: BRITISH AND AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES 122 (2009) (quoting Ronald
Dworkin on the “intellectual confusion” of treating Alan Bakke as having a claim of indi-
vidual rights).
230 Winkler, Sounds of Silence, supra note 21, at 938 (discussing how a focus on insti-
tutions overlooks the history of race injustice and slights the black perspective on exclusion-
ary institutions).
231 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 314.
232 Id. at 313.
233 See Bernstein, supra note 16, at 209–12 (describing Powell’s solution to the challenge
of allowing the use of race without making it mechanical or overt).
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holistic evaluation of each applicant, taking into consideration an unenumerated list
of race-neutral factors such as work experience, leadership potential, history of over-
coming disadvantage, and so on.234
Justice Powell did recognize that the Court’s affirmative-action jurisprudence per-
mitted race-conscious programs.235 But this conclusion was not based on the finding
that the Equal Protection Clause allowed judicial scrutiny to weaken when the state
used race with a small minus effect for a majority race and heightened when the states
designed classifications to subjugate minorities. Because “the Amendment itself was
framed in universal terms, without reference to color, ethnic origin, or condition of
prior servitude,”236 Powell doubted that the Clause made such distinctions with regard
to race. In fact, Justice Powell appealed, in a civil, unheated, and even reflective pas-
sage, to a general aspiration in the Fourteenth Amendment.237 Race, Powell suggested,
may be employed in the limited context of college admissions as one element, among
an array of other factors, used to establish the institution’s compelling interest in aca-
demic expression on its campus recognized under the First Amendment.238 Bakke struck
the delicate balance between academic freedom and equal protection as a combined
commitment, not durationally limited, to a healthy academic enterprise in a multiracial
society. Powell’s caution, and optimism, is compatible with student agency affecting
the learning environment about race.
Despite his stern cautions about the need for judicial scrutiny, Powell’s approach
leaves room for repeating the legacy of racial problems and presents risks: tactics of
calculated silences, public distrust,239 and cynicism about “diversity” as a mark for
race—or as a downgrading of race as a unique moral issue—and administrative mal-
feasance. The Court’s next opportunity to get the balance—between transparency
in the interests of administrative integrity and racial discourse—came in Grutter v.
Bollinger, in which the Court addressed the admissions program at the University of
Michigan Law School.240
VI. GRUTTER V. BOLLINGER: CONTEXT MATTERS WHEN EVALUATING RACE
A. The Grutter Majority Opinion: Leaving the Door Open to Something Called
“Critical Mass”
Litigation directed against both the undergraduate and law school admissions pro-
cesses at the University of Michigan was the culmination of a period of intense public
234 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317. Rather, the diversity that advances a compelling governmental
interest “encompasses a far broader array of qualifications and characteristics of which racial
or ethnic origin is but a single though important element.” Id. at 315.
235 Id. at 291.
236 Id. at 293.
237 Id.
238 Id. at 317.
239 See Horwitz, supra note 17, at 519–30.
240 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
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activity aimed against higher-education affirmative action. The tone was often bitter
and incriminating. There were calls for the University of Michigan to be penalized
for knowingly violating governing law by operating a program of admissions predi-
cated on racial considerations.241 In California, a statewide voters initiative banned
the use of race as a factor in admissions to public universities.242 Grutter unexpect-
edly held that Michigan Law School admissions programs could use race to acquire
a “critical mass of underrepresented minorities” along with other “soft variables,” such
as the strength of recommendations, quality of an applicant’s essay, or the difficulty
of the courses the applicant took at an undergraduate school in attaining the educa-
tional benefits that arise from a diverse campus.243
In a heavily criticized, perceived relaxation of judicial scrutiny, Justice O’Connor
pulled the Court closer towards color-consciousness, announcing that when review-
ing race-based government action, “[c]ontext matters.”244 In the admissions context,
Grutter deferred to the Law School’s use of a race-conscious program to pursue its
educational goals. The Court placed emphasis on its recognition “that, given the im-
portant purpose of public education and the expansive freedoms of speech and thought
associated with the university environment, universities occupy a special niche in our
constitutional tradition.”245 Heavily influenced by Powell’s reasoning in Bakke246 and
by the arguments of amici in the military and education leadership ranks,247 the Court
implicitly rejected a norm of complete silence in a setting where robust debate is en-
couraged. The First Amendment peg in the opinion, without a depth of treatment, im-
plies the importance of university control over predicates for robust exchange among
a diversity of “speakers.”248 The Court conceded that a mandate of entire silence would
impoverish the forum that these institutions are constitutionally authorized to provide.
Yet the complicated path to encouraging race exchange also authorized evasions that
241 Grutter’s request for relief included punitive damages in an unspecified amount. See
Complaint at 1, Grutter v. Bollinger, 16 F. Supp. 2d 797 (E.D. Mich. 1998) (No. 97-CV-
75928-DT).
242 See supra note 59 and accompanying text. After Grutter, the voters of Michigan en-
acted such a law. See supra note 59.
243 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330–38. The Court found that some of these benefits included:
(1) “break[ing] down [of] racial stereotypes” through “cross-racial understanding”; (2) mak-
ing classroom discussion livelier by ensuring that “students have the greatest possible variety
of backgrounds”; and (3) “prepar[ing] students for an increasingly diverse workforce and
society, and better prepar[ing] them as professionals.” Id. at 330. These findings do not have
a strong evidentiary basis and have been widely questioned. See, e.g., Pidot, supra note 183,
at 778.
244 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 327.
245 Id. at 329.
246 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 269–320 (1978).
247 See, e.g., Brief for Lt. Gen. Julius W. Becton, Jr. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents, Grutter, 539 U.S. at 306 (No. 02-241); see also Brief for Nat’l Sch. Bds. Ass’n
et al., Grutter, 539 U.S. at 306 (No. 02-241).
248 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329.
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have fed a new silence in a setting imagined to be freed from reticence and separation.
The Court’s concern in Grutter for the mission of the university in a racially diverse
society prompted it to open a forum for racial factors to be deployed as a support for
learning.249 The Court accepted the school’s claim that its pursuit of a critical mass of
underrepresented minorities was not to acquire “some specified percentage” of a racial
or ethnic group on its campuses, but rather to attain the critical mass “defined by ref-
erence to the educational benefits that diversity is designed to produce.”250 In that way,
the Court allowed an opening to speech in the university, albeit a crimped, managed
version at odds with the conditions necessary for robust, shared speech capacity.
The importance of racial harmony and the critical need of the university to func-
tion as a site for a rich pedagogy may not provide adequate support for the “zone of
discretion” within which administrators are encouraged to function. For that reason,
disaffection with the risks of racial categories managed by a class of education admin-
istrators results. Cynicism arises from a lack of trust in “diversity” as a term for racial
classifications251 and from a related lack of trust in the bona fides of the university
249 Id.
250 Id. at 329–30. Again, we note with gratitude a useful comment by Professor Horwitz:
[O]ne interesting aspect of Grutter is precisely the change in thinking
about the university’s mission, from a largely inward-looking one in
Bakke to one that, in Grutter, is less about the mission of the university
per se and more about its role “in a racially diverse society,” e.g., as a
pipeline to leadership jobs etc. Thus, picking up on your next line,
Grutter was not really all that much concerned with universities’ func-
tion as sites for rich pedagogy, and more about their pipeline function—
which is important but, perhaps, encourages mechanical treatments and
views of race and again deprives students of color of greater agency as
participants in the discussion at the school level.
E-mail from Paul Horwitz, supra note 87.
251 Jack Balkin captures the impact on discourse of Court treatment of race, identified
throughout this paper as controlling race discourse, in a way that also helps to highlight the
great weight the term “diversity” is asked to bear so the Court may avoid clarity about goals
of social justice, redistribution, or pragmatic embrace of a need for elite institutions to admit
some portion of all segments of society:
These precedents [iconic race doctrines] had “discourse shaping” or
“discourse forcing” effects. If state governments wanted to practice
race-conscious affirmative action, they had to speak in certain ways.
They could not say that they were remedying past societal discrimination
against minorities, nor could they say that they were remedying their own
past discrimination unless they had proof that they had discriminated
against each and every minority they wished to assist. That meant, for
example, that the University of Michigan would have had to demon-
strate that it had discriminated against Latinos or Native Americans if
it wished to provide either a preference in its affirmative action policy.
Thus, the rules in place forced university administrators to speak the
language of diversity. Hence, they packed all of their different aims
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administrative class.252 In reaction, the dissents in Grutter dismissed the claims of
the university as being pretextual, thus both reflecting and increasing public distrust
of university racially conscious admissions.253
B. The Grutter Dissents
All four dissenters concluded that critical mass, as the Michigan Law School im-
plemented it, was a pretext to mask a de facto quota system.254 Chief Justice Rehnquist
slammed the theory as a “sham,” arguing that “[s]tripped of its ‘critical mass’ veil, the
Law School’s program is revealed as a naked effort to achieve racial balancing.”255 To
support this claim, he presented admissions data, which showed a “tight correlation
between the percentage of applicants and admittees of a given race,” concluding that
such a correlation “must result from careful race based planning by the Law School.”256
Justices Thomas and Scalia went further, however. Justice Thomas launched a fron-
tal assault on affirmative action programs in his dissent.257 He took Justice O’Connor
to task for concluding “[c]ontext matters when reviewing race-based governmental ac-
tion under the Equal Protection Clause.”258 Justice Thomas argued that both Bakke and
Grutter rest on “the fundamentally flawed proposition that racial discrimination can
be contextualized so that a goal, such as classroom aesthetics, can be compelling in one
context but not in another.”259 He adopted a purist view in whole: “The Constitution
abhors classifications based on race.”260 Justice Scalia, deploying a logical claim to at-
tack a poorly supported empirical claim, characterized any educational benefits aris-
ing from campus diversity as entirely “fabled” and “not . . . uniquely relevant to law
school or uniquely ‘teachable’ in a formal educational setting.”261
While Justice Kennedy shared his fellow dissenters’ belief that critical mass had
constitutional defects, he did not embrace color-blind constitutionalism.262 Rather, he
into the language of educational diversity, and as a result, the word
“diversity” came to conflate several different ideas.
Jack M. Balkin, Plessy, Brown, and Grutter: A Play in Three Acts, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1689,
1722 (2005) [hereinafter Balkin, A Play in Three Acts] (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
252 See Horwitz, supra note 17, at 519–20.
253 See infra notes 254–65 and accompanying text.
254 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 379 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and
Thomas signed on to Chief Justice Rehnquist’s dissent, which claimed that the law school
implemented critical mass as a means to establish a quota system. See id.
255 Id.
256 Id. at 385.
257 Id. at 349–78.
258 Id. at 327.
259 Id. at 357 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
260 Id. at 353.
261 Id. at 347 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
262 Id. at 389 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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recognized that the Constitution does not completely silence race in college admis-
sions: “The opinion by Justice Powell, in my view, states the correct rule for resolving
this case,” he wrote.263 “Justice Powell’s approval of the use of race in university ad-
missions reflected a tradition, grounded in the First Amendment.”264 Justice O’Connor’s
failure to apply strict scrutiny, in the view of the Kennedy dissent, would deter college
“administrators in devising new and fairer ways to ensure individual consideration.”265
This Article answers the call for innovation with a conceptual basis for new tactics.
There is room, in a refreshed discourse on race, for colleges to experiment with inno-
vative programs that serve the institution’s interest in the Bakke goal of a marriage of
diversity and expression in a process that is free of racial goals set by administrators.266
We believe that Justice Kennedy’s Grutter dissent, even as modified by his opin-
ion for the Court in Fisher, signals a way forward for universities and colleges to con-
struct meaningful race-conscious admissions programs that can compose a robust
university marketplace of ideas.267 We next propose an innovative program to avoid
the pitfalls that attach to policies designed to achieve critical masses of racial groups,
and the perils of widespread distrust of education bureaucrats. The focus on critical
mass distracts colleges and universities from developing admissions policies directly
tied to a pedagogy in which students participate. In addition, critical mass buys too
little in the confusion it brings to the tool of strict scrutiny. At the same time, the de-
nial of the race category as a matter for public concern would revive and reinforce a
dangerous public silence about race. Silence leaves intact a wall between the races that
has appeared in varied forms as we progress in racial justice.268
C. Refreshed Race-Conscious Jurisprudence
1. Critical Mass: An Elusive Goal
Scholars credit Professor Rosabeth Moss Kanter with providing the foundational
framework for critical mass theory.269 She contended that low numbers of minorities in
the workplace isolated them as tokens, which adversely impacted their performance.270
263 Id. at 387.
264 Id.
265 Id. at 393.
266 See generally Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
267 See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2418 (2013); Grutter, 539 U.S.
at 387–88 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
268 See WILLIAMSON, supra note 152, at 256–57 (explaining the separation between black
and white cultures that became a feature of the South following Reconstruction).
269 See, e.g., Lissa Lamkin Broome et al., Does Critical Mass Matter? Views from the
Boardroom, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1049, 1050–51 (2011) (noting the contributions of Drude
Dahlerup).
270 Id. at 1051–52 (citing ROSABETH MOSS KANTER, MEN AND WOMEN OF THE COR-
PORATION 3 (1977)). Kanter contended that low relative numbers, and the accompanying
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To counter this, Kanter suggested that “with an increase in relative numbers, minor-
ity members begin to become individuals differentiated from each other.’”271 Beyond
this general understanding, there is “no agreement as to what the concept precisely
means.”272 In fact, there is no consensus among judges or scholars on the exact num-
ber or range of underrepresented minorities needed to achieve a critical mass so that,
as Grutter put it, minorities “do not feel isolated or like spokespersons.”273 The prov-
enance of the term is, in truth, heavily allusive, relying on phrases such as “tokens,”
and, in the work of Drude Dahlerup, borrowing the phrase “critical mass” from
quantum physics, with added influence from a theory of the inherent characteristics
of females.274
In United States v. Virginia,275 the Court held that Virginia violated the Equal
Protection Clause by maintaining an all-male military school.276 There, the Court
noted that the district court found that a critical mass of “at least 10 percent female
enrollment” was sufficient “to provide the female cadets with a positive educational
experience.”277 Yet, in Fisher, the Fifth Circuit found that the University of Texas at
Austin had not attained a critical mass although it had twenty-eight percent minority
enrollment in its Fall 2008 freshman class.278 Professor Dahlerup found, however, that
a critical mass of thirty percent was needed because “a large minority can make a dif-
ference, even if still a minority.”279 Other social research reported that a critical mass
of at least thirty-five percent and forty percent is necessary “for overcoming negative
effects associated with tokenism, such as performance pressure, increased social
isolation, and being the target of stereotyping.”280 Yet there is no scientific basis for
any chosen number. Indeed, diversity doctrine draws noncontextually on theories
about numbers in different groups and settings, with little concern for a group’s unique
mission. As applied by university bureaucrats, critical mass rationales lack mission-
specific design and follow-through related to First Amendment goals. The harsh skep-
ticism of Justices Scalia and Thomas is not without a basis, but the entire Court is in
problems of tokenism, affected the social environment of women and minorities in the work-
place, causing isolation and impeding their ability to effectively perform their jobs. Id.
271 Id. at 1052 (internal quotation marks omitted).
272 Mark T. Terrell, Bucking Grutter: Why Critical Mass Should Be Thrown off the Affirma-
tive Action Horse, 16 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 233, 236 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).
273 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 319 (2003).
274 Broome et al., supra note 269, at 1052–53; see also Terrell, supra note 272, at 234
(outlining the basis in metaphor of the term “critical mass”).
275 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
276 Id. at 555–56.
277 Id. at 523 (internal citation omitted).
278 Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 243–44 (5th Cir. 2011), vacated and
remanded, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013).
279 Broome et al., supra note 269, at 1052.
280 Roger W. Reinsch et. al., Applying Indices Post-Grutter to Monitor Progress Toward
Attaining a Diverse Student Body, 7 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 372, 385 (2012).
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want of nuance based in openness to creativity within the whole body of university
actors as well as in empirical evidence.281
To withstand strict scrutiny, critical mass must be adequately defined because it
is not an end unto itself. Instead, it is a means to an end. Critical mass is the mecha-
nism that universities selected to produce the educational benefits Grutter identified.
As Justice O’Connor explained, “the law school’s concept of critical mass is defined
by reference to the educational benefits that diversity is designed to produce.”282 In
light of the disagreement over the meaning of critical mass, Justice O’Connor’s descrip-
tion of the concept’s purpose in the admissions process presents measurement prob-
lems for assessing its constitutional soundness in light of prevailing racial doctrine.283
Critical mass may not attain the constitutional baseline of a “‘fit’ [to a] compelling
goal so closely that there is little or no possibility that the motive for the classification
was illegitimate racial prejudice or stereotype.”284 Even if critical mass has some merit,
admissions programs must, at a minimum, show that these educational benefits actu-
ally manifest themselves to justify racial discrimination to achieve them.285
The primary study that the Law School relied upon in its brief admitted that
“[t]here is nothing automatic about the impact of percentage [sic] of minority stu-
dents on a college campus. . . . Universities have to create educational programs and
to foster actual interaction with diverse peers for campus racial diversity to have an
impact on students.”286 If critical mass does not produce educational benefits indepen-
dent from other programs implemented by colleges, then elites could simply employ
the theory to achieve racial balancing, composing student bodies that are ethnically,
but not intellectually, diverse. Grutter’s application of strict scrutiny camouflaged
theoretical deficits in the concept of critical mass. Grutter was another exercise in an
empirically thin jurisprudence of race: Both sides asserted, parried, and warned, but
neither had much to offer except strong conviction and commonplace ideas.287
281 For example, in his opinion writings, Justice Thomas appears to assume that the primary
purpose is to help African Americans do better economically and in achievements that can com-
mand respect. See supra notes 34–39 and accompanying text. In that assumption, he fails to
credit the idea of partnerships and collaborations that can advance the strengthening of social
bonds and mechanisms for greater overall social health in a multiracial society. Indeed, the
assumption that race-conscious programs can only cast the black students as beneficiaries of
remedial justice is arguably shortsighted, with at least a hint of racial separatism. Balkin has
captured the inconsistent, even incoherent, goals embedded in the diversity rationale under
the Fourteenth Amendment. See Balkin, A Play in Three Acts, supra note 251, at 1725 n.125.
282 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003).
283 See id. at 329–33; cf. id. at 389 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
284 Id. at 333 (majority opinion).
285 Terrell, supra note 272, at 246 (linking Justice O’Connor’s reference to educational
benefits to a necessity of producing such benefits).
286 Pidot, supra note 183, at 778.
287 See id. at 764–65; see also PETER H. SCHUCK, DIVERSITY IN AMERICA: KEEPING
GOVERNMENT AT A SAFE DISTANCE 7 (2003) (calling diversity talk in America in 2003
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2. Grutter-Style Strict Scrutiny: Tilting the Scales in Favor of
Race Consciousness
In Grutter, Justice O’Connor afforded deference to administrative judgment about
the importance of diversity.288 Fisher has, at least formally, departed from the Grutter
conclusion that in the higher education context, “[t]he Law School’s educational judg-
ment that such diversity is essential to its educational mission is one to which we
defer.”289 Judicial deference was an anomaly in the Court’s strict scrutiny jurispru-
dence. In Professor Adam Winkler’s Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical
Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, he colorfully described Grutter as
“strict scrutiny schizophrenia” because it was “unusual” in that it actually deferred to
academic elites.290 According to his study, survival rates for challenged state action
under strict scrutiny varied by government institution, but educational institutions
fared poorly.291 Deference to education elites, announced in Grutter, was seemingly
a significant departure in practice as well as theory.292 Though the courts’ application
of strict scrutiny is “institutionally sensitive,”293 the empirical evidence does not in-
dicate that universities are particularly favored in the application of strict scrutiny.294
Fisher restores a formal commitment to a searching scrutiny commensurate with the
apparently empirical patterns in strict scrutiny of race-conscious choices made by
university administrators.295 Deference to administrators whose sole purpose is to as-
semble a student body for the direct purpose of delivering educational instruction to
a racially diverse group is now rejected. The Court vows to require evidence capable,
somehow, of separating those racial classifications that are aimed at attaining “edu-
cational benefits that flow from a diverse student body,”296 from those designed to
“superficial and largely tactical” and warning against a habit of “intellectual laziness” in
connection with diversity).
288 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328.
289 Id.
290 Winkler, Fatal, supra note 14, at 820–21 (internal quotation marks omitted) (“Under
strict scrutiny, courts are relatively unlikely to uphold a challenged educational institution
rule or policy. The survival rate for educational institutions under strict scrutiny is only 20
percent—not fatal, but still lower than most other types of institutions whose acts were ad-
judicated under the same standard.”).
291 Id. at 818–19 tbl.2.
292 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 228–29.
293 Winkler, Fatal, supra note 14, at 870.
294 Id. at 821.
295 The figure for survival rates for educational institution decisions subjected to strict
scrutiny is across dimensions of strict scrutiny topics. Id. Winkler notes the case of Hunter
v. Regents of the University of California, in which the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals up-
held “the partially race-based . . . policy of an innovative public laboratory school . . . [that]
considered race in admissions to create a sample population with similar demographics as
the typical urban public school in California.” Id. at 820 (citing Hunter v. Regents of Univ.
of Cal., 190 F.3d 1061, 1066 (9th Cir. 1999)).
296 Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2417 (2013).
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advance a race-based agenda, or which are innocently failing to achieve benefits.297
This effort in Fisher to discipline Grutter’s looser approach to strict scrutiny is well
grounded in the record discussed in Grutter, but given low salience by the Court.
While Fisher has useful reminders of the risks of deferring to education administra-
tors, the overall result of the two cases as a pairing is a splatter painting of messages
and outcomes: distrust and permissions afforded to education administrators, argu-
ably increasing the cynicism among the public about “diversity” as a rationale298 and
muddying the principle that universities have missions infused with First Amendment
protections from outside interference.299
The possibility that college administrators could create, or be perceived to create,
racial classifications for political reasons is high. In Justice Kennedy’s dissent in
Grutter, he pointed to testimony from the Law School’s former admissions director,
who asserted that the faculty was “breathtakingly cynical” in its discussion on which
groups qualified as underrepresented minorities.300 The director maintained that the
faculty debated “whether Cubans should be counted as [Hispanic]” because they pre-
dominantly vote Republican.301 As argued in Grutter by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the
statistics on admissions tend to belie claims that the programs lack numeric goals.302
Hierarchical admissions programs run the risk of enabling political assumptions, racial
stereotyping, or merely sloppy theorizing by administrators themselves.303 Perspec-
tives shift generationally and with specialization; even the best minds may lack the
potential for fresh thinking possible among the students themselves.304 The risk of
secretive decisionmaking by insulated administrators is high305 and the consequences
297 Id. at 2418–21; see also Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328.
298 Bernstein, supra note 16, at 204–05.
299 See Horwitz, supra note 17, at 519–30 (discussing the interests in and threats to uni-
versity autonomy from distrust).
300 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 393 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
301 Id.
302 In 1995, the percentage of total applicants to the Michigan Law School who were black
was 9.7%, and 9.4% of admitted applicants were black. Id. at 384 tbl.1 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting). The correlation between the percentage of applicants and admittees was nearly
identical for Hispanics, who made up 5.1% of the total number of applicants: Five percent
of its admitted applicants were of Hispanic ancestry. Id. at 384 tbl.2. Similar to the Hispanic
population, there was a nearly identical correlation between Native American applicants and
admittees: In 1995, 1.1% of its applicants were Native-American and 1.2% of its admittees
were Native-American as well. Id. at 384 tbl.3.
303 Horwitz emphasizes the risk that admissions offices in universities are thought (by
courts) to be “operating as bureaucratic fiefdoms of their own, rather than working under the
control and supervision of university faculty.” Horwitz, supra note 17, at 529. Note, though,
that faculty are also thought capable of self-serving views about admissions for diversity. See
id. at 520–29.
304 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 380 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
305 See Horwitz, supra note 17, at 530 (noting the difficulty for critics of university ad-
missions to obtain data from university officials).
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socially damaging along many dimensions: public trust in a critical institution, actual
institutional integrity as an influence on the public culture of truthfulness, and healthy
racial connections within the university.
Justice O’Connor’s strict-scrutiny-with-deference risked signaling to administra-
tors that they had license to “play” with race so long as they use the approved critical
mass terms.306 Grutter’s reasoning may well have increased the danger for admissions
programs to employ racial classifications in sloppy, cynical, or rigid ways that will,
as Justice Kennedy argued, discourage administrators from developing “new and fairer
ways to ensure individual consideration” in the admissions process.307 Fair ways to
evaluate individuals and afford them a sense of agency while enhancing their interests
in robust exchange predicated on American diversity can be found. First, the existing
stale debate needs to be replaced with creative and open consideration of community
having a say over their composition for racial exchange.
Equal protection doctrine does not present two opposing objectives—individual-
ized assessment and campus diversity—as an irreconcilable dilemma for educational
institutions: choose race-conscious admissions as a means to attain diversity and dam-
age personal rights and public harmony, or choose color-blind admissions policies
and forfeit a right to cultivate a vibrant learning environment as a key element of a
diverse society.
In its consideration of Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin,308 the Court faced
another opportunity to define the parameters for official discourse on race. In a nut-
shell, there were three apparent approaches: (1) affirm the program and not disturb
Grutter-style strict scrutiny, which deferred to the Law School’s implementation of
critical mass;309 (2) overturn both the University of Texas program and Grutter whole-
sale and, in so doing, reverse Bakke’s holding that campus diversity is a compelling
state interest;310 or (3) uphold the University of Texas program on the basis that Bakke
recognized campus diversity as a compelling state interest but overturn Grutter-style
“schizophrenic” strict scrutiny.311
Option One would have permitted judicial deference to admissions programs,
with the risk of allowing college administrators to manipulate or mangle racial demo-
graphics. Option Two, which adheres to strict color-blind constitutionalism, is contrary
to an entire spectrum of constitutional doctrine. The cancellation of Grutter would
foreclose opportunities for educational institutions to develop innovative programs
designed to foster First Amendment expression on campuses through cross-racial
dialogue. Option Three, taken by the Fisher Court, allows experimentation in this
area at a time when campus social challenges impede exchange inside and outside
306 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 318–19 (majority opinion).
307 Id. at 393 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
308 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013).
309 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 318–19.
310 Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 269–71 (1978).
311 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 314.
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the classroom.312 While the Fifth Circuit could not disturb, and did not criticize,
Grutter-style strict scrutiny in Fisher, the Court reached a conclusion consistent with
this Article’s concern: Affirmative-action jurisprudence does not require silence on
the racial category and permits a degree of public discussion and experimentation.313
3. Fifth Circuit, per Higginbotham: A Calm Judicial Voice
The Fifth Circuit in Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin314 applied Grutter v.
Bollinger and held that the University of Texas had a compelling state interest in at-
taining a critical mass of underrepresented minorities “in securing the educational
benefits of a diverse student body.”315 The court rejected the claim that it should use
minority enrollments from the Law School in Grutter as a baseline to determine
whether the university had achieved its critical mass of minorities.316 The Court found
that the university had not achieved its critical mass because Grutter did not tie the
concept to “fixed numerical guideposts,”317 but rather to “meaningful representation”
of underrepresented minorities to “[encourage] underrepresented minority students
to participate in the classroom and not feel isolated.”318 The Fifth Circuit applied the
teaching of Grutter: Universities have a First Amendment interest sufficient to per-
mit a “holistic” management of classroom diversity for the benefit of interracial ex-
change in learning communities.319 Outsiders may not impose a fixed meaning upon
the phrases fashioned to afford scope for judgment to education administrators.320
The Fifth Circuit reposed a degree of trust in the good faith and expertise of the
University of Texas officials who designed the plan under review.321 These adminis-
trators could voice a view of race as a component of their university’s health and use
312 For numerous insights about the potential for richer discourse if courts permit insti-
tutions affected with a First Amendment missions to take measures to reinforce expressive
freedom, see generally PAUL HORWITZ, FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTIONS (2013).
313 Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2418.
314 631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2011), vacated and remanded, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013).
315 Id. at 230–31 (citation omitted).
316 Id. at 233–44.
317 Id. at 245.
318 Id. at 244–45 (internal quotation marks omitted).
319 Id. at 231–34.
320 Cf. id. at 243.
321 Those drafting the plan were of great distinction as educators and as lawyers as well.
These officials drafted “with the opinions open on [their] desks.” E-mail from Douglas
Laycock, Professor of Law, Univ. of Va., to author (Sept. 8, 2013, 9:50 PM) (on file with
author). They drafted to comply with the Grutter opinion, the concerns expressed in dissent
by Justice Kennedy, and to avoid the errors identified in the companion case to Grutter. Id.
The Fifth Circuit accorded respect to the knowledge, good faith, and proper motives of these
administrators, who were specifically attempting to make a stronger student community by
ensuring that minority students were not confined to a small number of majors. See Fisher,
631 F.3d at 231–32. The Supreme Court’s refusal to afford these administrators a degree of
deference might be corrected if the component of student input advocated in this Article be-
comes a recognized approach to building a vibrant, race-aware study community.
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that view as an input into composing the learning community. They could create an
approach to attaining a critical mass that drew upon their knowledge of the state, the
applicant pool, and the learning needs of their students. In its nuance, the Fifth Circuit
opinion presented a set of choices fraught with opportunity and risk for the Supreme
Court’s race jurisprudence.322 In an opinion written by a conservative judge, the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals accepted the premise of a race jurisprudence that concedes
a public concern with the racial composition of a university student body.323 The court
evinced a comfort with the fact of racial diversity as it may relate to educational goals
and the needs of a multiracial Texas society.324 In a compact summary, the court ex-
tended a respect to the right of universities to exercise judgment about race as well as
about the entire set of complex factors in the task of assembling a student body.325 The
court noted, though, that the racial category demands judicial scrutiny, given “the
nation’s slow march toward . . . a colorblind society.”326
The Fifth Circuit opinion thus took the measured tone, that of trusting expert man-
agement of a formative institution’s recognition of our racial facts—historic, present,
and potential future.327 The tone admits race into public language and legal discourse
and recognizes the needs of a multiracial society for racial exchange in public univer-
sities. The opinion spoke of race, not to deny it, but to allow for a “zone of discretion”
for administrators who confront present-day demographic facts.328 In so doing, the
court constructed a calm judicial voice of racial realism, one open to the public project
of racial exchange and public accountability. There was no rhetoric of racial silence.
The opinion touched upon the possibilities for an enriched judicial literature when
Judge Higginbotham noted that “a white student who has demonstrated substantial
community involvement at a predominantly Hispanic high school may contribute a
unique perspective that produces a greater personal achievement score than a simi-
larly situated Hispanic student from the same high school.”329 The one sentence does
not offer an empirically selected sample of the race settings and meanings from
which a student population can be drawn, but it opens judicial writings to a portrayal
of race with reference to the human beings whose lives embody our racial story over
time.330 It is an opening note to our hypothetical student symphony.
At the same time, the court’s grant of a “zone of discretion” respected institutional
competence outside judicial cloisters, but also entrusted to universities the construc-
tion of “zones of silence” within which some administrators may manipulate race
322 See generally Fisher, 631 F.3d 213.
323 Id. at 215–47.
324 Id. at 230–31.
325 Id. at 232–34.
326 Id.
327 Id. at 234.
328 Id. at 231.
329 Id. at 236.
330 See generally Kuykendall, Pressing the Mute Button, supra note 20.
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by methods that would not stand the light of public exposure and open disclosure.331
The “zone of discretion” contains a potential for administrative manipulation of racial
categories and facades of race-respecting “holistic” programs that mask agency costs
imposed by faithless agents who betray their principal: a racially diverse society seek-
ing to find mechanisms for racial harmony and communication.332
Given the willingness of the Fifth Circuit to speak conceptually about race, the
Court faced an opportunity to use the race category as a means to achieve a state in-
terest in providing a robust forum for ideas and long-delayed progress in overcoming
racial silence in the institutions of cultural advancement. The case was also a chance
for the Court to develop nuanced teaching about community and race to protect the
integrity of the university forum.
In this sense, the opinion of the Court, in rehearsing and embedding its existing
race story, missed a large opportunity.333 Post-Fisher, there is a risk that the Court
might, based on stale debates and emotional responses even by Justices, constitution-
alize strict colorblindness and preclude any consideration of race in the admissions
process. Foreclosing this experiment would be a terrible loss of generational change.
Placing the admissions process in hands of the rising generation to recover social and
legal memories of race, make sense of them in contemporary life, and energize leaders
for future discourse on race in a diverse society, would break with a legacy of tactics
to censor racial meanings in our common life. A top-down edict that rules out all use
of race by any level of government, except for the Court to editorialize about its dan-
ger, would not have forged a new path in our racial history. Rather, it would repeat,
revive, and validate a long-standing national habit of silence on race.334 Yet Fisher still
relied on an elevation of the Court as oracles on the residue of racial dysfunction in the
United States. University bureaucrats retained a key role, but the Court claimed, for
judges, the final say. Justice Kennedy’s hope for administrators to develop “new and
fairer ways to ensure individual consideration”335 remained undeveloped in the focus
on risk, Court mastery,336 and the management of the elite’s choices in constructing
a vital community.
The aspiration to make race irrelevant, or to code its meaning, by deeming it not
a matter upon which communities may use state support to reverse a history of evasion
of the category and to construct new meanings and collaborations is neither support
for liberty nor enhancement of equality. Instead, it is obstruction of transformational
energy, reinstatement of race denial, reimpoverishment of a public vocabulary for
unmediated discourse about our race heritage and future, and, with an awareness of
331 Fisher, 631 F.3d at 231.
332 Id.
333 See generally Fisher, 133 S. Ct. 2411.
334 See generally id.
335 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 387 (2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
336 See supra note 25 (enumerating Fisher assertions of final court say over the use of race
in university admissions or any other state action).
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control to administrators using codes for race, tolerance of a separate track for the
nominal form of racial rules and the in-fact permitted incursions by hierarchical ma-
nipulation of a formally un-racial public space.
Without participation by the community itself in fostering connections, the project
of administrators lacks commitment by those whose proximity is supposedly creating
constructive connections. So long as diversity is perceived as a project of administra-
tors, the community lacks a sense of agency and control over the creation of a con-
structive discourse. Even though the factor of coercion present in bussing and other
forms of forced integration in elementary and secondary education is not present in
university diversity admissions,337 there is the suggestion of administrative control
over proper speech and manipulation of both white and black students without their
participation. Speech of insiders, using code and a common parlance for racial goals,
continues, while the race category languishes under the cloud cast by legal disavowal.
When the Court speaks on race with messages demanding formal silence, society loses
the opportunity to shape new aspirations and understandings. An unspoken use of
power shapes and relocates speech capacity from an emerging cohort of citizens living
in a multiracial society to muted understandings among education hierarchs. When
race dialogue is commandeered by a vocabulary of a mannered and repetitive legal
argument, with attendant presumptions and rhetorical conventions, the full range of
speech is disabled. The administrators become the overseers of “racial etiquette,”338
mastering the strategic silences, creating the permitted usages, and refereeing the ap-
portionment of race speech within the academy. Fisher claims a supervisory role, but
fails to chart a path to community agency. The key players after Fisher are lawyers,
the universities, the inevitable plaintiffs, and federal judges.
In the post–Civil War South, former slave owners claimed control over the eti-
quette to which freedmen were required to adhere.339 Although there is no suggestion
that university administrators occupy a parallel racial or legal niche, it is true that
Grutter, and even Fisher, empower administrators as the keepers of racial etiquette
in the academy.340 Grutter both silences open speech and empowers coded speech.341
White students and faculty rarely speak openly about race; like the blacks of the post–
Civil War South, they are aware of unspoken boundaries on safe speech.342 While the
337 See generally RYAN, supra note 105, at 14, 286, 293–94 (noting problems arising from
programs seen as coercive and suggesting that new approaches are available, without the use
of coercion).
338 LITWACK, BEEN IN THE STORM, supra note 219, at 257 (referring to the “time-honored
etiquette of race relations”).
339 See id.
340 Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2421 (2013); Grutter, 539 U.S. at
316, 328.
341 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334.
342 Cf. LITWACK, BEEN IN THE STORM, supra note 219, at 256–59 (describing the white
expectation of black subservience in post–Civil War society). Southern black citizens had a
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stakes bear no comparison to the risks faced by newly freed former slaves, it is none-
theless true that local power over race speech norms and the ability to offer rewards
or exact punishment can create an unhealthy silence. In such a silence, insiders may
use the code phrases of their calling—administrative locutions shaped by legal terms
coined by the Court and conveyed to administrators by legal counsel. Modern day
power is not brutal, but its effects on social health are nonetheless strong.343 The speech
of outsiders—students, both black and white, as well as faculty in the ranks—becomes
either private, or worse, even contentious and adversarial.344
Disabling all forms of state support for experimentation by communities seeking
to create a collaborative learning strategy chokes off a future that belongs to the citi-
zens at large and not to hierarchs in any part of our constitutional structure. We should
not presume an incapacity for collaborative creation by younger citizens of a basis
for new forms of exchange, debate, and public knowledge. New generations are not
doomed to repeat a national history of race speech blockage unless resources which
they might require to chart a new map are requisitioned by former generations and
placed in a constitutional storeroom of condemned cultural property.
In the next Part, we explain that the Court’s jurisprudence recognizes learning
communities as the setting that not only affords rich exchange to the members of the
community, but can serve as the tool to address those phenomena that impede cross-
racial understanding.
more expert knowledge of where the boundaries lay, built on the basis of years of experience.
See id. By contrast, students are amateurs at negotiating the permissible and impermissible
in race etiquette, perhaps overcorrecting out of uncertainty.
343 See, e.g., GEORGE ORWELL, 1984, at 304–06 (1949) (depicting a fictional society in
which a powerful government created a language void of certain words in an effort to make
impossible any thoughts deviating from government principles).
344 A recent incident at Michigan State University illustrates the way in which silence is
safe, and speech challenging ideas about “identity” and displaying a range of unexpected
language about race readily shatters the capacity of a community to integrate experimental
speech about race into a premise of exchange and tolerance for diverse voices. See David
Jesse, MSU Professor Pulled from Classroom After Rant Against Republicans, FREEP.COM
(Sept. 5, 2013, 8:13 PM), http://www.freep.com/article/20130905/NEWS06/309050139/MSU
-Republican-professor. Though the campus is racially diverse, with an increasing presence of
students from many countries, the sense of fragility about race discourse was quickly evident
in the efforts to have a professor removed from teaching their class because of the form his
race speech took. Compare id., with Lou Anna K. Simon, President’s Statement on Diversity
and Inclusion, MSU OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, http://president.msu.edu/statements/diversity
-inclusion (last visited Apr. 15, 2014), and Office for International Students and Scholars, 2012
Statistical Report, MSU, http://oiss.isp.msu.edu/about/stats12.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2014).
In the immediate aftermath, there was very little public discourse on campus from either
professors or students in reaction to the incident, except for the students who objected to his
speech and a few graduates who indicated he was a valued professor.
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VII. LEARNING COMMUNITIES: A MULTITUDE OF TONGUES
A. Repairing the Public Forum for Racial Dialogue
1. The Classroom
The classroom setting is a special place that cannot be replaced for the exchange
of ideas. The Court recognized this much in Sweatt v. Painter.345 There, the Court
found that “[f]ew students . . . would choose to study in an academic vacuum, re-
moved from the interplay of ideas and the exchange of views with which the law is
concerned.”346 Consequently, “[t]he atmosphere of ‘speculation, experiment and
creation’—so essential to the quality of higher education—is widely believed to be
promoted by a diverse student body.”347
This is not to say that the interplay of ideas and the benefits that flow from it can-
not occur in other settings, such as churches, social clubs, or even the local pub. Nota-
bly, though, in Bakke, Justice Powell contributed genuine depth to our understanding
of the unique importance of the education setting to cross-group knowledge.348 Justice
Powell explained the practical reality that “[i]n the school context, . . . people from dif-
ferent backgrounds are thrown together for four years, and they are there to learn.”349
In this regard, Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke assumed that campuses provide a
“safe space” or “zone” where intellectually curious minds are encouraged to discuss
racial matters.350 Such official attempts to compose open forums should not be judi-
cially barred, particularly when this nation is ruled by a constitution that places a
premium on free speech, racial equality, and democratic engagement.351 Complete
suppression of official and unofficial attempts to provide these forums would create
a chilling effect in which citizens would be discouraged from addressing obstacles
345 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
346 Id. at 634.
347 Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978) (quoting Sweezy v. New
Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
348 Id. at 313.
349 Akhil Reed Amar & Neal Kumar Katyal, Bakke’s Fate, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1745, 1776
(1996) [hereinafter Amar & Katyal, Bakke’s Fate].
350 The core idea of diversity as a predicate for educational benefits is the constructive inter-
action in the classroom (and presumably in further exploration of the connections formed
there) by persons of diverse backgrounds. The full expression of the idealization of racial
connection that diversity admissions can create is encapsulated in the Fisher district court’s
valorization of the atmosphere in the classrooms. See supra notes 54–57 and accompanying
text (describing diversity admissions as the basis for breaking down racial stereotypes and
bringing about “lively discussions”).
351 See BREYER, supra note 13, at 10–11, 75–85 (emphasizing the multiple sources of the
Court’s race jurisprudence).
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to cross-racial understanding and would prevent the nation from overcoming its his-
torical baggage.
Given the problematic cultural recordation of race history, both official and in
books and film, the university is an avenue for the recovery and dissemination of race
history. The university can foster interactions that avoid heat or confrontation or the
chill of off-limits signs for robust exchange. The insights of “a multitude of tongues”352
can become the basis for a richer use of the university to generate First Amendment
goods. The frame of stories that serve a color-blind ideology, or stories of entire racial
oppression, can be replaced by more varied and constructively dialogical social scripts.
In Keyishian v. Board of Regents of New York,353 the Supreme Court articulated
the vital role of universities in our national “marketplace of ideas.”354 In ruling that
requirements for faculty to disclaim certain activities and affiliations as a condition
of employment were unconstitutional, the Court elevated the importance of “robust,”
unfettered “exchange of ideas” in the university.355 The Court’s description of the
university as a marketplace of ideas encompasses a richness of input that must be
broad and uncensored, and which inheres in a diversity of the human input that a free
faculty supplies.
The focus of the concern is on a faculty free to explore, learn, teach, and create
without facing the threat of an imposed orthodoxy. Indeed, such a faculty should be
free to take a risk in venturing into sensitive race matters. With a community of
learners prepared to engage in race exchanges, students might have few reasons to
find offense in perceived breaches of an understood code of silences and reticences.
In Keyishian, the Supreme Court provides an aspirational language in support of the
ideal of the university as diversity of thought and background:
The Nation’s future depends upon leaders trained through wide
exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth
out of a multitude of tongues, [rather] than through any kind of
authoritative selection. In Sweezy v. New Hampshire, . . . we said:
“The essentiality of freedom in the community of American uni-
versities is almost self-evident. No one should underestimate the
vital role in a democracy that is played by those who guide and
train our youth. To impose any strait jacket upon the intellectual
leaders in our colleges and universities would imperil the future of
our Nation. No field of education is so thoroughly comprehended
352 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312 (quoting United States v. Assoc. Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372
(S.D.N.Y. 1943)).
353 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
354 Id. at 603–10.
355 Id.
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by man that new discoveries cannot yet be made. Particularly is
that true in the social sciences, where few, if any, principles are
accepted as absolutes. Scholarship cannot flourish in an atmo-
sphere of suspicion and distrust. Teachers and students must al-
ways remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new
maturity and understanding; otherwise our civilization will stag-
nate and die.”356
Today, in the contest over the means of composing a student body, the focus on
human input shifts to the discursive, learning, teaching, and creative capacity of the
student body. The university is the vessel for free exchange, but it is as much a guard-
ian for “a multitude of tongues”357 as a univocal source of the human materials with
which to evoke free exchange and racial knowledge. Because the university is a learn-
ing community, no single source can supply its passion for exchange and growth.
There must be the aspiration and openness to forms of input that unpredictably enrich
community and learning.
Granting discretion to university administrators as the sole engineers, with Court
review, for diversity in admissions creates risks of agency costs—the diversion of a
public good to a private interest of the agent—and, even more importantly, the posi-
tioning of racial minorities as the passive object of the agency of college elites, or as
potential intruders in an environment shaped by and imagined as belonging to an elite
perspective.358 This portrayal of the “race problem” and the palette for public response
lacks rhetorical sophistication to reposition race as “a multitude of tongues” rather
than a narrative that a traditionally majority white population tells itself about its com-
forting myths and discomfiting transitions into a racially equal society. Further, the
continuing arguments before and within the Court between conceiving of any race
consciousness as a moral and constitutional wrong versus differentiating racial op-
pression from benign racial awareness is a conceptual stand-off for which no accepted
“right” answer is possible. There is no creativity that reframes the problem as one for
collaboration among the affected community of learners. Justice Powell proposed
the idea of collaboration and exchange, but the seed of his idea has not been planted
in a rich soil.359
The Keyishian exhortation to avoid “orthodoxy over the classroom”360 has an
enriched meaning in this context: Too much administrative control, even if done in
good faith, clouds free university exchange. Orthodoxy claims a place of pride in the
university when administrators deploy a coded language of diversity, backed up by
356 Id. at 603 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
357 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312 (quoting Assoc. Press, 52 F. Supp. at 372).
358 Cf. supra notes 339–44 and accompanying text; see also LITWACK, TROUBLE IN MIND,
supra note 218, at 234–37 (providing examples of racially guarded space).
359 See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312.
360 Keyishian, 388 U.S. at 603.
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an implicit agency as race monopolists acting as delegees of an official monopoly
claimed by the Supreme Court.361
No strand of Supreme Court doctrine or associated rhetoric, except for Bakke,362
thus makes a clean break with a history of racial silence, evasion, and a dominant
narrative. There is but one fragile underdeveloped opening to a richer narrative of
race—the Bakke recognition of a robust academic freedom in the classroom.363 The
claim that “diversity” enhances learning may carry a grain of truth, but in the ab-
sence of a theory of the discursive context, it once again renders one set of people
the observers/narrators and others the malleable object of an elite imagination—for
under-specified cultural and totemic outcomes.364 The Grutter Court has answered
the charge that including minorities for diversity conveys the idea that they constitute
typical examples of black people for white students to learn about. The Grutter answer
is that if, for example, black students are present in classes, they are likely to demon-
strate diversity among African Americans and to refute stereotypes.365 Despite this
nuanced explanation, however, black and other minority students are still positioned
as being present for the benefit of the “normative” students.366 Although the answer to
charges that blacks are made representatives of their race has merit—they instead re-
fute “stereotypes”367—they nonetheless are positioned as the observed. The staging368
is under the control of administrators; the faculty assists with a performance using an
implied but ambiguous script; and the students take parts as participating theatergoers,
assuming roles the script may suggest for both those viewing the performance and
serving as conscripted cast.
The resulting picture is not of a “multitude of tongues” afforded a forum for active
collaboration in advancing race knowledge and energized by responsibility, but of
a recreated racial silence lacking the dynamic change in discursive strategy that our
history demands and the university should advance.
Dogma as the Constitution’s command supports an atmosphere in which race
cannot be discussed, for fear, resentment, and hostility necessarily arise from the dis-
cussion of a forbidden subject.369 In that atmosphere, adherents of two extreme views
361 See Balkin, A Play in Three Acts, supra note 251, at 1722 (referring to the Court’s
“discourse forcing” effects which requires administrators to adopt the Court’s language if they
are to use affirmative action). The Court’s prescribing the language makes the university ad-
ministrators a “delegee” of approved speech.
362 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 266.
363 See id. at 311.
364 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
365 See generally Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
366 See id.
367 Id. at 333.
368 See GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE, supra note 80, at 252.
369 See Sharon E. Rush, Talking About Race and Equality, 22 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
417, 418 (2011). Indeed, popular discourse has accused the President of “bringing race into
[it]” when he responds to a question about incidents in which race is a debatable presence. See,
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face off when speech occurs.370 These polarized views contribute to racial silence. The
view that race is not a salient concept in America reinforces racial silencing as a norm
that controls group interaction. It is also unrealistic, perpetuating the mentality that
sweeping all race discourse under the rug will somehow eventually result in racial
parity and equality.371
But change requires effort. The repetition of the strict “color-blind” meme is less
an objective account—or even an aspiration to a believable outcome—than a symptom
of a national habit resembling a medical condition called chromophobia,372 the fear
of colors. The coping mechanism for race chromophobia is denial, a fantasy of not
seeing color. Yet the medical treatment for chromophobia is desensitization through
exposure.373 Racial chromophobia can be handled by exposure to forms of acknowl-
edgment that support healthy responses and interactions. An additional effect of an of-
ficial norm of silence is the reproduction of the majority white habits denying agency
to racial minorities.374 Bakke opens up an opportunity for classrooms to serve as fo-
rums where differences on race can be discussed free from race monopolists or group-
imposed orthodoxy.
One effect of Bakke has been to authorize spaces where race is relevant and can
be discussed openly.375 These safe spaces promote opportunities for more meaning-
ful racial discourse and provide alternatives to the intermittent mainstream dialogue,
which is dominated by those who rigidly adhere to either anticlassification (color-
blind) or antisubordination (color-conscious) ideologies.376 As such, it is appropriate
e.g., Chuck Todd et al., First Thoughts: Courts Could Determine the Legacy of a President,
NBC (Mar. 26, 2012, 9:16 AM), http://firstread.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/03/26/10867572-first
-thoughts-courts-could-determine-the-legacy-of-a-president (“Newt Gingrich called President
Obama’s statement on Trayvon Martin ‘disgraceful’ and ‘appalling,’ contending the President
was bringing race into it.”). It is commonplace that the President, because he is black, must be
circumspect in addressing race. See, e.g., id.; Mark Landler & Michael D. Shear, President
Offers a Personal Take on Race in U.S., N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2013, at A1.
370 See Rush, supra note 369, at 419–20 (dubbing the group who believes that race should
not be part of the discussion to end discrimination the “Nothing Group” and the group oper-
ating under the extreme opposite view—that race permeates all aspects of life—the “Every-
thing Group”).
371 See id. at 418–19.
372 Chromophobia Definition, STEDMAN’S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 346 (27th ed. 2000)
(“2. A morbid dislike of colors.”).
373 See generally J.P. Watson et al., Prolonged Exposure: A Rapid Treatment for Phobias,
1 BRIT. MED. J. 13 (1971).
374 See, e.g., Nelson George, Still Too Good, Too Bad or Invisible, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17,
2013, at AR1; Kate Masur, In Spielberg’s ‘Lincoln,’ Passive Black Characters, N.Y. TIMES,
(Nov. 12, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/13/opinion/in-spielbergs-lincoln-passive
-black-characters.html.
375 One scholar called these spaces the “Anti-Balkanization Zone (ABZ),” in which par-
ticipants can “talk about race and avoid the threat that the current racial balkanization poses
to our social cohesion.” Rush, supra note 369, at 419–20.
376 Id. at 420–21.
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for college admissions programs to factor race into their plans to achieve a diverse
campus designed to create a forum for their students. Race, however, must be em-
ployed in a way that selects those students that have something to contribute to the
discussion. Mere hierarchy-driven “racial aesthetics” do not create community or
empower dialogic energy.377
Strict colorblindness, reinforced by the Court’s affirmative-action jurisprudence,
restricts dialogue by exacerbating racial divisiveness, thus withholding opportunities
for citizens to develop strategies to constructively investigate and explore race prob-
lems. In this way, silence turns racial dialogue into a choked conversation dominated
by counselors of silence or loud voices of provocation. Prospect for genuine cross-
racial healing and reconciliation is lost.
Our concern is that silence not only has allowed intemperate speakers to become
louder in public discourse, but has also permitted college administrators to deploy
race in their admissions programs to achieve political ends. Yet the purist jurispru-
dence of strict colorblindness would not give administrators flexibility to implement
innovative programs as an alternative to unchecked race-conscious programs.378 In-
deed, alternatives are sorely needed in this area because unmonitored race-conscious
programs present the same threat to racial dialogue as color-blind purity does.
2. Ending Self-Segregation: Race Consciousness Without Identity Apartheid
A noticeable side effect of unchecked affirmative-action programs is self-segrega-
tion among students on college campuses. Race-conscious programs that encourage
self-segregation produce behavior that undermines the university’s goal of using race
as a means to attain a robust marketplace of ideas. Self-segregation creates an atmo-
sphere of racial silencing as well. In fact, the racial silencing that race consciousness
produces is arguably more dangerous than the suppression produced from a purely
color-blind approach. As explained earlier, adherents of a color-blind society believe
that race should not play any role in daily life, including an individual’s decision on
whom to associate with. In contrast, race consciousness can potentially tolerate a high
degree of deliberate ethnic isolation.
Many colleges and universities that boast about racial diversity as a pedagogic
goal have de facto segregated campuses.379 At Wesleyan University, for instance,
377 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 355 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
378 Id. at 393 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (referring to the possible loss of the “talents and
resources of the faculties and administrators in devising new and fairer ways” of combining
race consciousness and “individual consideration” of applicants).
379 See id. at 349 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Student doubts about
diversity and concern for racial segregation appear in occasional writings, such as student
notes. See, e.g., Sean B. Seymore, Note, I’m Confused: How Can the Federal Government
Promote Diversity in Higher Education Yet Continue to Strengthen Historically Black
Colleges?, 12 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 287, 316 (2006) (“Colleges that
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the housing office gives its students the choice to live in race-based housing “called
Malcolm X, Women of Color, Asian/Asian-American, La Casa, and even one desig-
nated Open, which is the ‘queer and queer-positive special interest house.’”380 Admin-
istrators sometimes accommodate demands for separate dorms because they believe
that it will limit interracial conflict.381
Just as problematic are programs that say they are designed to facilitate inter-
cultural dialogue but, in actuality, are forums exclusive to selected groups.382 The
University of Michigan at Ann Arbor, for example, provides “safe spaces” for its stu-
dents to discuss sensitive topics involving race.383 These safe spaces at the University
of Michigan cater to minority student organizations so minority students may feel suf-
ficiently comfortable and secure to express views that they may not otherwise express
in front of white students,384 who are thus figured as the community norm. Given the
claim to be diverse may be able to tout high minority enrollment statistics, but campus self-
segregation is reminiscent of the 1950s.”).
380 See Stephan Thernstrom & Abigail Thernstrom, Reflections on The Shape of the River,
46 UCLA L. REV. 1583, 1607 (1999).
381 At UCLA, race-conscious housing on campus led instead to conflict when the university
decided to assign nine white students to the Malcolm X house because other spaces were not
available due to an unexpectedly large freshman class. Id. (noting some black students at the
Malcolm X house objected to living with white students, the school “solved” the problem by
“consigning several white students to the basement of the philosophy building”). Schools that
claim to be racially inclusive nonetheless create programs that channel students into living,
eating, and even pledging with students from their own race. See Seymore, supra note 379,
at 290. Some colleges even host segregated graduation celebrations. See Michael A. Fletcher,
Diversity or Division on Campus?; Minority Graduation Galas Highlight a Timely Issue,
WASH. POST, May 19, 2003, at A1.
382 See, e.g., MESA/Trotter, Programs & Initiatives, U. OF MICH., http://mesa.umich.edu
/programs-initiatives (last visited Apr. 15, 2014) [hereinafter MESA, Programs].
383 See MESA/Trotter, MESA/TMC Programming Initiatives, U. OF MICH., http://mesa
.umich.edu/article/mesatmc-programming-initiatives (last visited Apr. 15, 2014) [hereinafter
MESA/TMC Programming Initiatives]. The University of Michigan Trotter House caters to
minority student groups to provide needed “safe space” to discuss sensitive subjects. See id.
A safe space designed for minority groups does not abide by the diversity principle, which
seeks to create contact among diverse individuals, not to replicate outside segregation patterns.
With thanks to Katie Eyer for bring it to our attention, see W.E.B. Du Bois College House,
U. OF PA., http://dubois.house.upenn.edu/frontpage (last visited Apr. 15, 2014), for an ex-
ample of a race-targeted institution said to be deeply integrated.
384 See MESA/TMC Programming Initiatives, supra note 383.The University of Michigan
at Ann Arbor Trotter Multicultural Center partners with the office of multicultural student
affairs to develop programs that “foster the diversity within our communities, promote ma-
ture intercultural interaction, and educate our campus on issues of race, ethnicity, and social
justice.” MESA, Programs, supra note 382. But it appears that any discussion on these matters
is focused mostly on minority students, with a premise that openness cannot occur outside an
identity-based safe space. For example, program materials describe “Nourish: A lunch series
for self-identified women of color.” MESA/TMC Programming Initiatives, supra note 383.
The Nourish Program is a partnership by the Office of Multi-Ethnic Student Affairs and the
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premise about a need for safety, white students are not encouraged to participate in
these spaces because their presence would hamper the free discourse among minority
students.385 The assumption of a need for self censorship, while a factor for any group,
is problematic as a salient ground for organizing a collegiate learning environment
intended to foster the exchange of ideas.386 The premise affords to white students an
implicit permission to be closed off and unhearing and enforces in minority students
a sense of separation from an impenetrably hostile majority. The existence of safe
spaces, with premises of retreat and exclusivity, is logically incompatible with the
claims for diversity admissions developed for Supreme Court approval.387
The phenomenon of racial isolation is diametrically opposed to the principles
of diversity. It is a barrier to cross-racial dialogue. When students self-segregate in
dorms, in student groups, or in safe spaces, they are not occupying an authentic forum
where students, with a variety of life experiences and views, are welcome to partici-
pate. The risk is that this atmosphere can lull students into a social malaise in which
they quietly accept measured or limited interaction with fellow students of other
races outside the classroom. In fact, a few students at Emory University described
self-segregation as a natural and common occurrence, expressing little concern about
whether their decision to separate themselves along racial lines could threaten campus
harmony.388 Yet, ethnic isolation can potentially create a hostile racial environment in
Office of Counseling and Psychological Services (CAPS) addressing some of the unique needs
and experiences of women of color. Id. The program seeks to empower women of color around
issues of identity, intercultural competency, and health and wellness that affect them in an
open, spirited atmosphere. Id. “The program welcomes all self-identified women of color at
the University of Michigan including undergraduate, graduate students, faculty, and staff.
The purpose of this dialogue is to create much-needed safe spaces to discuss relevant and
often sensitive issues specific to women’s experiences within marginalized communities. It
offers a space for self-expression, reflection, and open dialogue.” Id. (emphasis added).
385 See, e.g., MESA/TMC Programming Initiatives, supra note 383 (limiting the Nourish
program to “women of color”).
386 KENNEDY, supra note 19, at 6–7 (describing group pressure from other black students
at Yale Law School shortly after the Bakke case was released to hew to a common line on
Bakke in class and to walk out if any opposition to affirmative action were expressed). Of his
experience at Yale Law School, Professor Kennedy comments, “I remember thinking at the
time that the advice was silly. How else were we—aspiring lawyers—to master the arguments
and counterarguments regarding affirmative action other than by engaging antagonists?” Id.
387 Cf. Pidot, supra note 183, at 765–69 (describing the development of a diversity rationale
for race-conscious admissions).
388 See Paige P. Parvin, The “R” Word, EMORY MAG., Spring 2004, at 2, available at
http://www.emory.edu/EMORY_MAGAZINE/spring2004/race_2 (“‘Emory students do self-
segregate, but it is not an inherently bad thing,’ agrees Juno Lawrence, an African-American
junior from Colorado majoring in international studies and Spanish with a minor in com-
munity building and social change. ‘Segregation occurs naturally with large groups of people
because individuals tend to identify with people whose experiences and histories are similar
to their own. However, this can, and has, become a problem when one never steps outside
of that safe comfort zone.’”).
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which students are not afforded opportunities to develop multi-ethnic relationships
and the means to resolve ethnic differences through respectful and mature exchanges.389
Without these opportunities, some students may express racial views through inflam-
matory and even socially destructive conduct instead.390 Campuses are not exempt from
incidents of race-based violence and intimidation.391 The adverse effects of racial sep-
aration within diversity extend to both physical injury and frustration of the prospect
for cross-racial dialogue.
Students often occupy separate spaces where the participants share the same back-
grounds and may hold racially hostile views. This can create an echo chamber in which
racial ideologies, even bigoted ones, are sounded and not challenged. More troubling,
racial groups can become insular, conducting discourse underground, where groupthink
is internally policed.392 Groupthink attempts to control its members, often through self-
appointed regulators,393 by branding dissenters with verbal scarlet letters, singling
389 See Patricia Gurin et al., Diversity and Higher Education: Theory and Impact on
Education Outcomes, 72 HARV. EDUC. REV. 330, 362–63 (2002) (discussing opportunity for
such exchanges in college).
390 See Priya Narayan Parker, Student Racial Climate: An Analysis and Assessment 51–52
(Apr. 2004) (unpublished B.A. thesis), available at http://pages.shanti.virginia.edu/ucare
/files/2011/06/StudentRacialClimate_2004.pdf (discussing “Hate Crimes”).
391 See Hate Crimes Statistics 2011, FBI, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/hate-crime
/2011/narratives/location-type (last visited Apr. 15, 2014) (reporting that of 2917 hate crime
incidents that were motivated by racial animus, 9.5% took place at a school or at a college
campus).
392 See David B. Fischer, Bank Director Liability Under FIRREA: A New Defense for
Directors and Officers of Insolvent Depository Institutions—or a Tighter Noose?, 39 UCLA
L. REV. 1703, 1729–30 (1992) (“[G]roupthink . . . [is] a mode of thinking that people engage
in when they are deeply involved in a cohesive in-group, when the members’ striving for una-
nimity override their motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of action. . . . In
the ‘groupthink’ paradigm, members of an ‘in-group’ increasingly rely on each other for secu-
rity and acceptance, especially when the group encounters an external stress that forces it into
greater internal cohesion. As the group members come to depend on each other, they increas-
ingly seek unanimity in their decisions because they desire to avoid conflict. In striving for
such unanimity, they actively refrain from critical questioning, and they impede efforts to ex-
plore alternative solutions to the difficult challenges confronting them.” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
393 The phenomenon of groupthink has been critically analyzed within the context of black
America. Kimberly Jade Norwood, The Virulence of Blackthink™ and How Its Threat of
Ostracism Shackles Those Deemed Not Black Enough, 93 KY. L.J. 143, 147 (2005) [herein-
after Norwood, Virulence of Blackthink™] (“Blackthink is a form of prejudice. It assumes
and demands that all Black people think a certain way. It presumes that all Blacks are un-
questionably liberal, pro-affirmative action, pro-choice, pro–gay rights, pro-welfare, and most
definitely anti-Republican. Some segments of our society not only harbor this presumption but
go a step further: they will devalue and marginalize those who fail to comply with Blackthink.
These segments of society are the self-appointed guardians of blackness, the ‘Soul Patrol.’
Although originally composed exclusively of Black people, the Patrol now includes non-
Blacks as well. The Soul Patrol, like Orwellian thought police, monitors and attempts to
regulate the thoughts and beliefs of Black Americans. Autonomy and difference are stifled;
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them out for shunning or disrespect if they dare stray from group orthodoxy.394 The
racially segregated “safe space” is vulnerable to this sort of intellectual boundary
maintenance, with strong potential for affecting minority students.395 White students,
unlike their minority counterparts, are not huddled into small groups but rather are
free to explore the full range of human expression without fear of intragroup back-
lash.396 In this regard, race consciousness creates enclaves of silence in which inbred
behavior among minority students is socially encouraged while, perversely, leaving
open for white students an unimpeded privilege of access to the whole dimension of
human expression, without restriction based on an imposed identity.397 Indeed the
idea of white student groups is seen as an incendiary provocation because they are
anomalous for the possessors of existing full access to opportunities.
acquiescence is embraced and rewarded. . . . Based on criteria the Patrol deems determina-
tive, the Patrol tries to decide who is Black and who is not.”).
394 See A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., Justice Clarence Thomas in Retrospect, 45 HASTINGS
L.J. 1405, 1429 (1994) (arguing that Justice Thomas’s race jurisprudence was “absurd” and
arose from “racial self-hatred”); Norwood, Virulence of Blackthink™, supra note 393, at 148
(describing the targeting of black students who express nonconforming opinions); Adolph
L. Reed, Jr., The Puzzle of Black Republicans, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2012, at A35 (dismiss-
ing the appointment of Tim Scott of South Carolina, a black Republican, to the U.S. Senate
as “cynical tokenism”);.
395 See Kimberly Jade Norwood, Blackthink™’s Acting White Stigma in Education and
How it Fosters Academic Paralysis in Black Youth, 50 HOW. L.J. 711, 717–18 (2007)
(“Accusing a Black person of acting White is an attack on the person’s racial identity and is
really part of a larger problem I call Blackthink. Blackthink is a form of discrimination. It
is practiced by a group of individuals, originally Black people, but the group is no longer so
limited, who judge Blackness, i.e., who decide whether a given individual is really Black.
Blind allegiance to what these individuals deem the true measure of Blackness results in
embrace and welcome; any deviation garners rejection, marginalization, or ostracism from
the Black community.” (citations omitted)).
396 See Norwood, Virulence of Blackthink™, supra note 393, at 187 (“Is it the case that
White Americans can be complex, multi-faceted human beings, tapping into all that America
has to offer and fully exercising their constitutional rights, while the same complexities and
exercises are unacceptable in Blacks? Is it true that a narrower range of permissible thought
is available to Blacks? Is it really the case that, as a Black American, ‘I have no right to think
the way I do because I’m black[?]’ Because racism certainly exists within the larger society,
does that mean Black thought and action must continually be dictated (and thus limited) by
racism?” (citations omitted)).
397 See WILLIAMSON, supra note 152, at 48–52 (interpreting the post-Reconstruction
isolation of black Southerners into enclaves cut off from the full range of social and cultural
life of the country as a tragic limitation of the opportunities for black citizens to thrive within
a niche suited to their various talents and potentials). Self-segregation within a university that
opens its classrooms and other opportunities to all students cannot be compared to Southern
apartheid that stopped interracial contact for a long period of history and deprived African
Americans of the normal range of social interactions from which a common culture is created.
But it nonetheless is not an ideal medium for the benefits claimed to arise from race-conscious
admissions aimed at creating a critical mass of minority students.
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This racial silencing stems from admission policies crafted by administrators that
compose student bodies that are one-dimensionally diverse. Without programs aimed
to foster meaningful cross-racial dialogue, admissions programs will admit students
as race symbols that will simply reflect a statistical portrait of an ethnic composite that
academic elites believe reflects the image of a prestigious campus. But the essential
ingredient to any race-conscious program that claims to achieve diversity must be
a contribution to the college’s interest in free expression. This Article now proposes
learning communities that universities create by using an array of race-neutral-but-
sensitive factors to select students that will contribute to cross-racial exchange and free
expression.398 Such a program must be crafted to avoid the constitutional pitfalls under
the Equal Protection Clause, as well as to move discourse away from popular racial
memes as toward genuine exchange. We will explain the program in the context of
a hypothetical or ideal college.399
B. Proposed Admissions Program and Educational Goals
1. Goal: Cross-Racial Exchange Facilitated by a Rigorous Academic Environment
At a hypothetical college, the admissions office will offer seats at an experimental
residential college, created to establish learning communities and set pedagogical goals
around racial awareness, with an emphasis on admitting students that will contribute
distinctive perspectives on an array of intellectual and academic matters, particularly
on matters involving race. The goal of these learning communities is to admit a diverse
group of students from myriad backgrounds who can be taught in an environment
where students are encouraged to challenge racial stereotypes, explore historic prob-
lems, and correct misconceptions through cross-racial dialogue. In order to achieve
cross-racial exchanges while maintaining academic standards, we propose the follow-
ing method for admission.
The residential college (RC) should have academic standards that reflect the stan-
dards of the broader campus community. The RC will have the opportunity to select
students who display promise for the program. As with athletic programs, the RC may
inform admissions offices of highly recruited prospects believed able to contribute sig-
nificantly to the academic mission of fostering exchange about race and other forms
of diverse experience. As with athletics, minimal standards for admission would not
be related to a fixed standard derived from the typical minimum across the university,
but from an assessment of the applicant’s complementary strengths as a participant
in the residential college.400
398 See infra Part VII.B.
399 See infra Part VII.B.
400 See Report: Exemptions Benefit Athletes, ESPN C. FOOTBALL (Dec. 30, 2009, 1:07 PM),
http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/news/story?id=4781264.
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Indeed, and ironically, athletes are commonly admitted under an NCAA rule per-
mitting “special admission[s]”401 for athletes, many of whom are African-American
students with relatively weak academic credentials.402 According to the 1999–2000 –
2009–10 NCAA Student-Athlete Race and Ethnicity Report, African Americans made
up 45.8% of student-athletes in Division I football (including the Football Bowl Sub-
division and the Football Championship Subdivision), with white football players
following at 45.1%.403 There is a significant disparity in the percentages of African
Americans as part of the broader student body compared with the percentages of
African Americans who are members of NCAA Division I football and men’s basket-
ball teams. Using the University of Michigan and the University of Texas at Austin
as examples, one can see this difference in numbers: In Fall 2009, African Americans
represented 4.9% of the undergraduate enrollment at University of Texas at Austin
and 6.2% at the University of Michigan–Ann Arbor.404 The readily accessible NCAA
percentages for athletes include all Division I universities and are not directly compa-
rable to the percentages at the University of Michigan and the University of Texas.405
Nonetheless, one may surmise that if one were to look closely at the racial make-up
of the football and men’s basketball teams at the University of Michigan–Ann Arbor
and the University of Texas at Austin, the percentages would be similar to what the
NCAA is reporting for African Americans. Thus, the disparity in the race composition
of the student body, admitted in a race-neutral protocol as a result of a constitutional
amendment adopted by Michigan voters,406 and the composition of the football and
basketball teams, admitted under special rules for athletes, is surely massive.
401 NCAA, 2013–14 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL 140 (2013) (“A student-athlete may be
admitted under a special exception to the institution’s normal entrance requirements if the
discretionary authority of the president or chancellor (or designated admissions officer or
committee) to grant such exceptions is set forth in an official document published by the uni-
versity (e.g., official catalog) that describes the institution’s admissions requirements.”).
402 See Robert A. McCormick & Amy Christian McCormick, The Myth of the Student-
Athlete: The College Athlete as Employee, 81 WASH. L. REV. 71, 138–39, 146, 153 (2006)
(discussing underperformance of student athletes generally and zero percent graduation rate
of African Americans in some programs).
403 Blacks Now a Majority on Football Teams, ESPN C. SPORTS (Dec. 9, 2010), http://
sports.espn.go.com/ncaa/news/story?id=5901855.
404 Compare NCAA, 1999–2000 – 2009–10 NCAA STUDENT-ATHLETE ETHNICITY
REPORT 56 (2010), available at http://www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads
/SAEREP11 .pdf, with OFF. OF INFO. MGMT. & ANALYSIS, U. OF TEX. AT AUSTIN, STUDENT
CHARACTERISTICS FALL 2009, FALL ENROLLMENT BY LEVEL AND ETHNICITY 6, available at
http://www.utexas.edu/academic/ima/sites/default/files/SHB09-10Students.pdf, and OFF. OF
REGISTRAR, U. OF MICH., UNDERGRADUATE ENROLLMENT OVERVIEW (2009), available at
http://www.ro.umich.edu/report/09exec.pdf. By comparison, the percentages reported by the
NCAA show that in 2009 to 2010, 45.8% of the Division I football players were African
American and 60.9% of the Division I men’s basketball players were African American.
NCAA, supra, at 56.
405 See Blacks Now a Majority on Football Teams, supra note 403.
406 See MICH. CONST. art. I, § 26; supra note 59.
2014] UNMUTING THE VOLUME 1083
Race silence again reigns, and the ostrich reappears to make law without seeing
race.407 Because athletes are admitted under color-blind admissions, the racial com-
position of the group so favored is not relevant. It is unseen by the ostrich. Further,
the considerable evidence that athletes are not given sound educations, that they con-
tribute what amounts to labor to the schools for the remuneration of white coaches
and administrators,408 and that they fail to graduate in considerable numbers has no
legal significance.
Scholarships may be the only means for an athlete to receive a college education.
Nonetheless, the rigorous schedule for a student athlete and the “demanding practice
schedules, coupled with special admission for academically unprepared athletes who
would likely face difficulty handling academic responsibilities under the best of cir-
cumstances,” creates an unsuccessful academic career for the college athlete.409 A
student’s eligibility for an athletic scholarship ends before the athlete is able to complete
the degree requirements.410 According to the ESPN 2002 report on college graduation
rates, the African-American graduation rate, as an example, at thirty-six different
Division I universities from 1990 to 1994 was at “zero percent.”411
Admitting a heavily minority group to exploit them for the large amounts of
money that they generate for schools—because of their athletic talent and skill—and
failing to afford them an education does not raise a claim of intentional race discrim-
ination under the Court’s Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence.412 Schools may re-
cruit heavily from primarily black secondary educational institutions to discover tal-
ented athletes. A focus on such schools would be because the desired talent is located
there, not because they are black. Despite the exploitation, there is no colorable Equal
Protection claim for race discrimination.
In similar fashion, but without an effect of exploitation, schools could recruit
based on statements from applicants about their interest in race and their capacity
to contribute to fruitful connections among racial groups within the university set-
ting. In each instance, race is associated with the skills sought by a university, but in
no instance are they formally grounded in race. One can seek to find talent by refer-
ence to experiences and locations that foster a capacity for contribution to a discourse
about race.
407 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
408 See McCormick & McCormick, supra note 402, at 140–41 (“Many . . . aspects of the
athletes’ college experience are also structured to serve the universities’ commercial interests
and are at odds with academic considerations.”).
409 Id. at 146.
410 See id. at 148–49.
411 Id. at 153.
412 For an overview of race and Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence, see generally Ken
Gormley, Racial Mind-Games and Reapportionment: When Can Race Be Considered
(Legitimately) in Redistricting?, 4 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 735 (2002).
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2. Initiating Racial Discourse by Applicants: The Tool to Gauge
Applicant Ability to Contribute to the Community
Given that the applicant satisfies the above requirements, he or she must submit
an essay which explains his or her interest in the program. Although the applicant’s
race will be discussed in this essay, it is noteworthy that applicant’s race is not used
simply to classify him or her. Rather, her race as well as other personal qualities will
be important in an overall evaluation of how she will contribute to the learning com-
munity’s goals. To this end, each applicant must submit a five-to-seven page essay
which explores the following four questions:
• What is her race?
• What are her attitudes toward other races?
• What does she think she will learn about race in a college that invites
strong awareness of race and cross-racial exchange?
• What does she feel she can contribute to this community?
The essay will be evaluated based upon the following process. The admissions
committee will consider an array of other factors when evaluating these essays to
identify those applicants who can contribute to the RC in a significant way. We pro-
pose some of the following factors:
• Applicant’s ability to communicate with people outside her own socio-
economic groups
• Applicant’s ability to work with others
• Applicant’s exposure to different races or lack thereof
• Applicant’s enthusiasm to either live, meet, or interact with people from
other racial or ethnic backgrounds
• Applicant’s perspective on race relations, if articulated
• Leadership potential
• Strength of recommendations
• General persuasiveness of applicant’s essay
The above is not an exhaustive list of factors because experience may prompt
the program to consider other race-neutral factors. These factors, however, are what
an admissions program may look for when attempting to compose a diverse student
body, which would be made up of students that would contribute to robust discussions
on an array of subjects, particularly on matters pertaining to race. Once the RC has ad-
mitted its first class, students will participate in a collaborative community admissions
process. The benefits of this aspect of the process will be explored more in Part C.
C. Top-Down Admissions Programs: Is There a Better Alternative? Student-Led
Admissions Free from Numeric Goals and Racial Theories
The novel aspect of this proposal is that it insists that the way for race-conscious
admissions to remain faithful to equal protection principles is to substantially reduce
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the influence of administrators.413 Admissions programs are not tainted simply because
they implement racial categories. Such programs become unlawful when race is me-
chanically employed to achieve racial goals in a process devoid of any meaningful
individualized assessment.414 Restricting consultation of data is, of course, an obvious
solution in safeguarding the process from efforts to achieve racial balancing. But this
does not remove the danger entirely, particularly rigid quotas are not the only threat
to equal protection.415 Rather, the danger to racial harmony, as affected by perceptions
of unfairness, arises whenever a program engages in an activity that makes race a
consideration in its pursuit of a diverse campus but without any other educational goal
tied to the admissions process and without designing an educational project linked to
the resulting composition of the student body.416 Racial quotas are just one means for
colleges to do this.417
Admissions professionals have a command of a limitless set of tools to produce
race-based results.418 Race-conscious programs cannot remove the risk of racial bal-
ancing unless constitutional discipline identifies and addresses the root problem to
these programs—manipulation of racial categories by administrators. Embracing the
legacy of racial silence is not a good solution to the agency problem of administrators
with private agendas. Administrators rarely encourage unregulated discourse; they
search for and find ways to impose silence in the guise of encouraging speech and a
rich diversity of community. Hence, the solution to concern about the use of race as
a factor in state higher education admissions is to admit race into the university square
through the medium of the community for whom speech and diversity can be a work
in progress, powered by constantly refreshed and strengthened commitments to a
shared project. The beliefs and attitudes of earlier generations should not govern the
413 Cf. Horwitz, supra note 17, at 526–28 (discussing the issue of trusting university
officials with such a task).
414 See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 270 (2003). The Court struck down the under-
graduate program at the University of Michigan because it allocated points to minority appli-
cants for admission without any individualized evaluation. Id. (“We find that the University’s
policy, which automatically distributes 20 points, or one-fifth of the points needed to guarantee
admission, to every single ‘underrepresented minority’ applicant solely because of race, is
not narrowly tailored to achieve the interest in educational diversity that respondents claim
justifies their program.”).
415 See, e.g., id.
416 Id.
417 See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 318 (1977) (explaining that racial
or ethnic is but a sign, though important, and a constitutional element if used as “plus”).
418 As discussed previously, in Gratz, administrators devised a mechanical allocation of
points on the basis of race that nearly guaranteed admission for applicants from minority racial
groups. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 270. The University of Texas employed a holistic system for stu-
dents not admitted under its Top Ten Percent program. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133
S. Ct. 2411, 2416 (2013). The Gratz technique failed to pass muster at the Supreme Court.
Gratz, 539 U.S. at 270. Under Fisher, the University of Texas must carry a burden on remand
of showing a compelling state interest and narrow tailoring. Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2414.
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choices that can be made by rising generations. The heritage of unreflective thinking
about race, with repetitions of earlier dysfunction imagined as a new color-blind way
of life, can best be left behind by awarding control and giving a charge to a younger
generation to forge new connections and forms of insight. The university is the critical
site for such a break with stale ways of thinking about race.
The support for the existing hierarchical control over diversity admissions assumes
that admissions programs, like governmental agencies, should be given deference
when constructing learning communities because they “make complex judgments in-
formed by administrative expertise” when deciding how to implement race-conscious
programs to achieve educational goals.419 Grutter-style strict scrutiny,420 as a Croson
method,421 provides a “self-policing standard” of sorts in which schools that choose
race-conscious programs must “have good administrations who . . . develop policies,
amass records, periodically review their policies, form committees and make a case
that the policy will work.”422 Student-led admissions, one could argue, lacks this de-
gree of institutional knowhow. Strict scrutiny, however, does not canonize government
actors as saints when using the race category.423 Deference to administrators in this
field gives them the flexibility to conceal race-based agendas behind technical jargon
(e.g., critical mass).424 Student-guided admissions would lack any goal other than an
environment of discourse and would thus be relatively pure as an input for academic
diversity of thought.
Giving administrators a set of dos and don’ts provides incentives for a lawyered
approach that treats compliance with diversity safeguards much like tax planning:
practices meant to minimally comply while shaping cosmetics for best advantage in
defending the procedure, if challenged, and, in an extension beyond the goals of tax
counseling, advertising it as a mark of desirability. Consulting a list of legal hazards
to avoid is less likely to foster programs of intellectual vibrancy about race than an at-
mosphere of intellectual impoverishment (except for administrators mastering legal
evasions). Debate becomes dull and even dormant, and race is both present and sup-
pressed in the academic program. Instead of developing a market of ideas, the admis-
sions process encourages administrators to select students by studied guesses about
their racial identification. Such students then may well self-segregate and/or acquiesce
419 Annalisa Jabaily, Color Me Colorblind: Deference, Discretion, and Voice in Higher
Education After Grutter, 17 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 515, 526 (2008).
420 See id. at 526–27.
421 City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 409 (1989).
422 Jabaily, supra note 419, at 527.
423 See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 226 (1995) (“[T]here is simply
no way of determining what classifications are ‘benign’ or . . . illegitimate.”). Customarily,
reviewing courts do not assume that admissions officers act with good intentions when it
employs the “highly suspect tool” of racial discrimination because “[m]ore than good motives
should be required when government seeks to allocate [college seats] by way of an explicit
racial classification system.” Id. (citation omitted).
424 See generally Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
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to classroom orthodoxy.425 Those students, of any race or ethnicity, who remain silent
serve in the classroom as little more than visual answers to what Justice Thomas deri-
sively terms an “aesthetic” demand of administrative orthodoxy.426 Indeed, one bene-
fit of integration by sports competition was much like the claimed benefit for diversity
as mere presence.427
We insist that student participation in the admissions program is an effective
means to counterbalance administrators who may taint the program with race-based
theories or paternalistic attitudes. This Article does not suggest that major universities
or colleges should scrap complex admissions programs and replace them with student-
led admission committees. We simply suggest this idea as a method for newly estab-
lished learning communities or residential colleges designed to foster cross-cultural
exchange. But it is an idea that we strongly suggest. Student-led admissions processes
reflect our democratic principles at the most organic level as opposed to programs con-
trolled by administrators that select applicants autocratically. The residential college
will have instant legitimacy in the eyes of its members simply because it was created
425 Worse still, top-down admissions programs are based in large part on paternalistic atti-
tudes toward minority students. Take again the critical mass theory as an example, which holds
that colleges need to admit a “meaningful representation” of minorities so those students “do
not feel isolated or like spokespersons for their race.” Id. at 318–19. The idea that minorities
would feel this way may well be influenced by racial stereotyping. Even if it may be true in
many instances, it is certainly not true in all cases. But this logic is racially paternalistic, as it
implicitly advances the belief that minorities are intellectually and socially less sophisticated
than white people. Certainly, no one would think to ask if white people needed a critical mass
of whites so they may acclimate to a collegiate environment. Some argue that affirmative
action is the manifestation of this thinking, where it is assumed that black students, for instance,
are scholastically handicapped as compared to their white peers and cannot compete without
special consideration. But race-conscious programs do not empower minorities as collaborators
in the school’s educational pursuits but instead cast them as silent victims. Our proposal avoids
the paternalism problem completely by allowing all students to participate in the admissions
process, affording each student an opportunity to contribute to the process. In this way, minority
students are regarded as partners, not charity cases, in the pursuit to admit students that will
improve racial health and create an environment for cross-cultural understanding in our pro-
gression towards a more color-blind society.
426 Id. at 362 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also supra notes
360–61 and accompanying text.
427 See Amy Christian McCormick & Robert A. McCormick, Race and Interest Con-
vergence in NCAA Sports, 2 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 17, 25–26 (2012) (“The racial
integration of college sports meant that college educations became available to many young
black men who might never have otherwise attended college. Furthermore, young white men
and women were exposed to more black people in the educational setting.”). Further, one nega-
tive to the positive of black athlete visibility is that “‘black athletes’ presence on campus for
their athletic ability, not their intellectual promise, stereotypes them as ‘jocks,’ not learners.”
Id. at 27. Interestingly, opponents of race consciousness who worry about stigma and stereo-
typing from diversity seemingly give a pass to athletic admissions that are not race conscious,
but nonetheless feed stereotypes. Cf. supra notes 34–39 and accompanying text.
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by them. Moreover, student participation in admissions gives residential colleges a
sense of community awareness that these communities are autonomous and respon-
sible for their governance.428
We think the discussion among student participants involving applicants will
focus on which candidates will add to colorful classroom discussion rather than on
which applicants will simply add color to the classroom. In this way, the process is
further safeguarded from the contagion of racial balancing because the admissions pro-
cess does not single out any applicant for being a member of a preferred minority or
for being a member of a non-preferred ethnic group. Rather, an applicant’s race is
simply identified and then evaluated by student participants using a non-exhaustive
list of race-neutral factors. In this respect, race is evaluated with “a far broader array
of qualifications and characteristics of which racial or ethnic origin is but a single
though important element.”429 Both color-blind and race-conscious adherents should
understand the social benefits that such a learning community can provide for its stu-
dents. A community composed by students will serve as a setting that will foster cross-
racial understanding and in the process motivate young minds to contribute to and
learn from a diverse world. It can serve to reduce preconceptions and open minds to
novel insights and fresh thinking.
D. Considering First Amendment Objections
Does the requirement for admissions to such a program, intended to animate First
Amendment activities in classrooms, instead impose an orthodoxy on those applying
for admission to the school that requires an essay about race for its diversity admis-
sions? Does it particularly burden minority students, whose path to admission would
require that they express interest in race? The question raises both policy issues affect-
ing fairness and First Amendment doctrinal issues. As to the latter, the First Amend-
ment rights of universities to design and foster curricular programs430 that require a
demonstration by applicants of suitable qualifications should be the basic doctrinal
428 These sentiments, however, are not widely cultivated in the top-down approach to ad-
missions programs. Minority students may not feel a part of the broader campus community
because the process implies that some minorities were admitted for their skin color and not
their scholastic ability. But our proposal removes any doubt that students, regardless of their
background, are contributors in the common enterprise in composing their community. The
mutual bonds of a self-selected interracial community should assure that all students may de-
velop a self-conception centered on their collaboration with one another and not on a racial
category that can be stigmatized for receiving preferential treatment. Put simply, student par-
ticipants who benefit from this robust forum will be serious about protecting it.
429 Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 315 (1978).
430 Ward v. Polite, 667 F.3d 727, 730 (6th Cir. 2012) (“Curriculum choices are a form of
school speech, giving schools considerable flexibility in designing courses and policies and
in enforcing them so long as they amount to reasonable means of furthering legitimate edu-
cational ends.”).
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analysis. It is common for universities to require students to submit essays with their
applications. There is no monitoring of the way that admissions committees respond
to the values and views expressed in such essays. The First Amendment rights of uni-
versity committees to shape the character and apparent abilities of the student body,
based on applicants’ free-form responses to requests for self-revelation, are uncon-
tested. Universities may also expel students whose views impair their ability to con-
form to the professional requirements for a degree. The main exception is if a school
punishes religious views.431 Asking that students express reasons why they are a fit
for a program intended as a curricular and programmatic emphasis on diversity, with
special attention to race, is not a doctrinal problem, at least in the abstract.
The question arises, however, of the legal and ethical propriety of requiring ex-
pressions of interest in race relations and other forms of diversity as the singular
route to admissions by students who would not be admitted based on standard metrics,
such as GPA and test scores. The same paternalism and even discrimination impli-
cated in older approaches to race as a legal category may seem to impose a burden on
minorities to harbor an interest in race to be admitted to a university. The answer pre-
sumably lies in the fact that racial minorities would have the regular path to admission
open to them without using the admissions programs for race conscious programs.
Further, a minority student applicant who does not have a strong interest in a program
with race as a centerpiece could submit an essay challenging the premises of the
project. Nothing in the concept excludes anyone for ideas, though the program does
make a curricular choice tied to forms of identity- and value-influenced interests. Like
white students, African-American students would face a choice of applying for the
diversity program or applying through regular channels. Students could also apply
to the diversity program after being admitted by regular admissions. In that way, the
diversity program would contain a mixture of motivated students with a variety of
standardized credentials. In this pattern, the only burden would be on minority students
whose only realistic path to admissions is through expressing some sort of claim on
motivation and capacity to contribute to a program concerned with advancing social
health in a diverse society.
While two paths to admissions could create a stigma for those in the program
using admissions influenced by the topic of race exploration, the labeling given to di-
versity admissions would be transformed by the basis for admissions in an open, trans-
parent commitment to a community-based pedagogy. The sense that some applicants
receive a purely race-based preference would dissipate, and the participants would
be understood as having a special mission to build knowledge and create healthy net-
works for future collaborations across racial and ethnic lines. Further, those admitted
by regular admissions processes would be likely committed to the idea that merit is
431 Id. at 742 (reversing a summary judgment in favor of a school that dismissed a student
for refusal to counsel gay clients in an affirming manner on the grounds that facts at trial might
show a motive in hostility to her religion).
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not exclusively measured by testing metrics. The program itself would be unlikely
to harbor divisions based on perceived stigma or prejudice. Hence, the objections
to diversity admissions as a source of harm to minority students and to race relations
should be less persuasive. The First Amendment supports the authority of universities
to experiment with race-conscious admissions driven by student input and tied to real
programs. In addition, such experimentation provides a way out of the conceptual
dead end in the Supreme Court’s race jurisprudence for universities and potentially
for other institutions.
CONCLUSION
The tragedies and sins of American racial history are dual. First, there is, in
Lincoln’s words, the “monstrous injustice”432 of having used uncompensated labor
to build wealth, with the forms of brutality deployed in the theft of lives and labor, all
painful to contemplate. The second tragedy is the manipulation over more than two
centuries433 of the race category, with shifting silences to suppress discourse, always
thought dangerous and in need of control. Some of this has happened by chance, with
the vagaries of mass opinion and attitude and with human psychology. But, though
the first tragedy may be irremediable, with candid recognition, the second is subject
to contemporary correction. We urge others to develop alternatives to the myopic tra-
jectory of our racial discourse and advance new visions to elevate, rather than debase,
dialogue in this historically neglected area.
Healthy conversation is needed now more than ever. Regrettably, race is still ig-
nored by politicians and the courts as a salient category, or it is hijacked by dema-
gogues to achieve partisan ends. Driving race entirely from the public stage is not
the solution, however. It would impose racial silence, and give the illusion of racial
harmony until some controversy primes deep-seated racial tensions.
We insist that colleges and universities provide a unique setting in which students
from different backgrounds can rise above present-day racial divisions so the next gen-
eration can be emancipated from past animosities. Top-down admissions do not pro-
duce student bodies that foster cross-racial exchanges. The current affirmative-action
jurisprudence allows administrators to play politics with race by admitting minority
students into their schools while sponsoring programs that foster backward exclusive
thinking and behavior through race-based student groups, housing, and safe spaces.
In practice, these programs create a climate of racial silencing as well. Racial dia-
logue is encouraged, but only between individuals of the same race in the designated
safe space. A safe space that is not open to all students is no safe space at all. A forum
where people from diverse backgrounds are not encouraged to participate is vulnerable
432 Abraham Lincoln, First Debate with Stephen A. Douglas at Ottawa, Illinois (Aug. 21,
1851), available at http://mason.gmu.edu/~zschrag/hist120spring05/lincoln_ottawa.htm.
433 See generally Kuykendall, Pressing the Mute Button, supra note 20.
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to being dominated by preferred opinions. Newcomers are more likely indoctrinated
on racial issues than encouraged to challenge group orthodoxy. Creating closed groups
in a university setting has a long history, though not one that clearly advances the mis-
sion of universities to foster open thinking and create connections capable of prompt-
ing creativity and innovation.
This Article proposes that colleges and universities experiment with residential
colleges designed to combat self-segregation and in the process break campus silence
on racial issues. But the admissions process must be safeguarded from race-based
numeric goals and the theories of academic elites. Student participation in the process
ensures that selecting students who can contribute to the climate of free expression
remains the central goal. Admittedly, our Article does not present an exhaustive plan,
but it offers a general outline for colleges and universities to develop further in their
quest to realize cross-cultural dialogue on their respective campuses. We believe that
these institutions can begin this necessary process, so long as affirmative-action juris-
prudence, as amplified by Fisher and subsequent cases, maintains our constitutional
traditions that recognize that college and universities possess expressive interests in
composing their student bodies.
